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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since the beginning of mankind people have had confidential messages to
send. This still holds true today, be it be brokers exchanging information about
possible future mergers, lovers writing letters, or secrets conveyed by spies. With-
out the presence of prying fellow human beings all of these messages could just
be sent as plain letters. However, in most situations, and especially in the pres-
ence of modern means of telecommunication, the need for covert communication
is omnipresent.
In order to hide the content of a message, cryptographic means have long been
known. Early examples are the use of a stick, also known as a scytale, together with
a roll of paper by Spartian warriors, or the cipher used by Gaius Iulius Caesar1. Of
course, both of these methods are outdated and numerous successors have been
developed. The Data Encryption Standard (“DES”) and its enhancements evolved
in the 1970s2. Since then it has been possible to encrypt messages in a way that the
majority of unwarranted people are incapable of deciphering them.
Still, it can be shown that protecting the content of a message is sometimes not
sufficient. The mere fact that a person sends encrypted messages to certain recip-
ients can raise enough suspicion to justify further investigations; possibly leading
to the secret being compromised. For example, someone downloading files from
a website hosting pornographic material cannot hide his actions by encrypting the
traffic. Also, people peering with foreign secret services are likely to be traitors or
spies3.
Additional cases are given for people who would like to send information to
somebody without revealing their own identity, e.g., whistle-blowers giving legal
authorities tip-offs about on-going or future crimes. This also applies to investiga-
tions by law enforcement agencies, like public prosecutors or the police research-
1For both see, e.g., [Col04].
2See, e.g., [Nat77] and [Nat01].
3See, e.g., [Hüt70].
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ing information for a criminal case. In these cases, encryption will not solve the
problem of hiding the sender’s identity.
Thus, we recognize that protecting a message’s sender and recipient, or their
relationship, can be as important as hiding its content. We can also see that in some
cases, encryption is of no help to hide the actual confidential information.
1.1 Anonymous Communication
In computer science, the research area of anonymous communication deals with
protecting the aforementioned information, i.e. hiding a person’s identity and also
the relation between two peers in a computer network. To be more precise, it covers
explicitly4 :
• hiding a sender/recipient relationship.
• hiding the identity of a message’s sender and/or recipient
• hiding the volume and type of traffic between two peer partners.
Any of the above, if leaked, can give a third party enough information to infer
further information or be used in a way to create unfortunate consequences for the
sender or the recipient of a message. For example, if a series of encrypted e-mails
sent from a hotel abroad to a big industrial company are discovered, it can lead
to the conclusion that the person in the hotel is an employee, possibly a manager,
from that company. From this point on, committing industrial espionage against
the employee is only a matter for unscrupulousness reasons5.
A number of theories and solutions have been developed in order to protect the
privacy for those with the respective need. The seminal paper of David Chaum on
“Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms” [Cha81]
is widely considered to be one of the most influential works and marks the actual
start of research in this area. On the practical side, tools like AN.ON [BFK00],
Mixmaster [MCPS03] or Tor [DMS04] have found wide deployment and usage
across the Internet.
Anonymous communication, and with it this work, lies within a bigger context
of different research areas (see also Figure 1.1):
• Hiding the fact that a user is communicating at all has stronger requirements
than research into anonymous communication. This area is mostly dealt
with in research into steganography, if the message can be embedded in a
carrier. Some research in the area of censorship-resistant systems also con-
siders building systems, which hide the existence of communication, e.g.,
[CSWH00].
4The following items are listed in no particular order.
5See, e.g., [Int01] or [Fin06].
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• It is related to hiding the content of a message. This task is solved by means
of cryptography. To a certain extent, this has been well researched and un-
derstood6.
• Host and network security, i.e. research that is targeted towards securing
computers, their hardware and software running on all layers. This is an
essential part of any other topic in the area of IT security. Since the late
1990s this area has been a vast growing field, due to an uncounted number
of computer worms, viruses, break-ins and privacy leakages.
The relation of anonymous communication to all of these areas will be of impor-
tance in various chapters of this work.
areas
other
areas
other
areas
other
cryptography host and network layer security
steganography
IT security
builds upon
has related aims
Anonymous communication
areas
other
Figure 1.1: Related areas of research, all of them being sub-parts of IT security
1.2 Contribution
One of the most fundamental problems, which anonymous communication has to
deal with, is an open environment. These are a counterpart to closed environments,
where most properties can be enforced by either simple technical means or poli-
cies. This is possible, as in closed environments there is usually a single entity
which controls all hosts and network lines, or possesses the legal power to react
to misbehaviour. Also, the identity of all participants is known in closed environ-
ments. Conversely, in an open environment there is neither an entity with central
control, nor a way to penalise abuse. Hence, technical means are the only way to
achieve any property, especially security properties.
The aim of this work is to act as a foundational work for providing data pro-
tection in open environments. To this end, we give an overview of important parts
6Compared to the topic of anonymous communication.
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and aspects of this research area. This work is targeted at researchers, technicians,
engineers and students. It displays the research area in a bigger context and from
a practical point of view. This allows us to see the big picture of current advance-
ments and issues in this area. To conclude, we give the reader an outlook on future
research questions.
The chapters of this work can be divided into two main parts: the first three
chapters follow a constructive scheme. After an introduction into this field’s ba-
sics, we describe technology which achieves the targeted protection. Then, we
consider additional works, which aim at enhancing single aspects of anonymous
communication.
In the second part, we will take the position of devil’s advocate and show weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities of anonymous communication systems. For this, we dis-
cuss the notion of an attacker and classify attacks. In the conclusion we provide
the reader with an exploration of today’s most dangerous attacks.
1.2.1 Roadmap, Constructive Part
Initially, we introduce the general terminology as well as basic issues in this field.
The goal of this chapter is not only to ease the reading and understanding of this
work and other publications of this research area, we also want to raise awareness
about underlying principles and prepare the ground for more technical details. To
this end, we discuss in detail the targeted aims of anonymous communication re-
search, as well as notions, definitions and implications of terms like, e.g., security
or privacy.
As we work towards a holistic view, we include a discussion on connections
to related research areas. This refers to computer networks, cryptography and IT
security. The basics of each of these three areas are discussed according to their
relevance to our topic.
In addition, we elaborate on the entities involved into deployments of anony-
mous communication infrastructure. As we will see, anonymous communication is
about multilateral security, with different stakeholders having different, even con-
tradicting, requirements. For a full understanding of the severity of the issues in
this field, it is inevitable to display the conflicts emerging from the deployment of
systems.
On this basis, we introduce systems and technologies which are designed to
protect the privacy of their users. Rather than discussing the potential benefits of
theoretical systems, or proposed systems which never left the stage of a theoret-
ical proposal, we will mostly focus on systems which were brought to an actual
deployment.
Our main motivation for this is the fact that theoretical proposals abstract from
reality and hence do not suffer from a multitude of problems. By working on a
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conceptual level, many issues which affect the security and scalability of deployed
systems can be ignored – examples include fingerprintingfingerprint of traffic pat-
terns [LL06], learning a host’s identity from network layer latencies [HVCT07] or
even clock skew due to the temperature of loaded CPUs [Mur06].
To conclude the first part, we summarize works which add additional value to
the basic building blocks of anonymizing networks. These are, e.g., works on pro-
viding quality of service: most networks offering privacy-enabled communication
are geographically spread and heavily loaded with traffic. This leads to a severe
impact on the quality of service. Studies have shown [Köp06] that the number of
users in an anonymizing network is linked to its performance. Also, it is generally
considered that the degree of protection of these networks is linked to their number
of users. Hence, only an adequate speed of transmission is able to attract enough
users to a network for a reasonable level of protection for each single user.
Here, one of the core questions is how to achieve this goal without risking a
loss of security at the same time, or at least limiting the impact on security while
gaining better bandwidth and less latency. More precisely, if implementations of
systems try to provide a better quality of service by selecting paths and nodes in
a way to achieve good performance, they will more likely fall prey to a specific
class of attackers. Similarly, adding arbitrary security measures for an increased
level of protection results in a strong decrease of usability. This holds true for, e.g.,
dummy traffic, induced latency (“mixing”), local route selection by helper nodes,
deactivation of active content on webpages and much more. Thus, it is not only
a temporarily technical infeasibility which dictates that services for anonymizing
systems offer a bad quality of service, but the overall security may depend on it.
Other works discussed add additional features to the networks, like enforced
anonymity or extending the scope of data transmitted by the means of these net-
works.
1.2.2 Roadmap: Devil’s Advocate
As virtually every other technique in IT security, anonymizing networks do not
achieve perfect protection7 . There are weak algorithms, implementation errors,
mistakes in deployment, and a lot of other ways and opportunities for mischief
to happen. However, the biggest danger is given if it is possible for malicious
people (attackers) to deliberately tamper with the system and learn confidential
information.
For the purpose of understanding the threats due to attackers, we set ourselves
the goal of shedding light into this area. Thus, we elaborate on who is actually
capable of committing attacks. This includes a description of technical capabilities
necessary for committing attacks. Further considerations include the motivation
and opportunity for doing so.
7In this area, the only known exception is the anonymization method “DC-network”.
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We have elaborated above that adding arbitrary layers of security is not an
option in this research area. Hence, it is crucial to choose wisely which methods
of protection have to be applied. However, this is usually derived from the set of
entities which a user does not want to know his data. If the utilized network, on
the other hand, protects against a different set of attackers, this only has a potential
negative impact on the user’s security, but may also unnecessarily affect his or her
quality of service. On the other hand, a network which tries to defend against
as many attackers as possible will result in a very low quality of service, thus
decreasing the amount of users, which in turn is likely to reduce the degree of
protection (a schematic graph of this relationship is shown in Figure 1.2).
resulting protection ?
am
o
u
n
t
targeted degree of protection
quality of service
number of users
Figure 1.2: Schematic relationship between targeted protection, quality of service,
and resulting protection level
For an end user it is very difficult to actually know which attackers are dan-
gerous and interested in his data at the same time. Often people choose the wrong
attacker to defend against and are neither aware nor capable of judging the success
of their choice because the targets and intentions of attackers are not widely known
or publicly discussed8 . In addition, previous security evaluations for anonymiz-
ing networks have been conducted using abstract attacker models with next to no
relevance for real-world systems.
8This can be compared to security awareness in other areas, e.g., the common perception that
utilizing an airplane is dangerous, while smoking is considered harmless.
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Following this research, we give a classification of known attacks on anonymiz-
ing systems. However, we extend the classical view to a holistic one and include
threats originating from related areas. We also show the influence of dangers which
were overseen in the traditional research due to a strict abstraction level. To this
end, we first discuss the flow of a message through an anonymizing system. The
flow is used as a major thread for the discourse through existing vulnerabilities.
The chapter is concluded with non-technical attacks and some theoretical results.
Finally, in the conclusion we explore the previous study and identify the most
serious attacks on contemporary anonymity systems. We bring the work to an
end by pointing out possible ways for their mitigation and identifying research
questions for yet unsolved problems.
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Chapter 2
Terminology and Scenario
This chapter gives an overview on the terminology as it is used in this document.
Its purpose is to support the understanding of this text for readers who are yet not
familiar with terms used in IT security, computer networks or anonymous commu-
nication. At the same time, we introduce the basic issues on the respective areas.
This way we want to raise awareness on important circumstances which influence
design patterns and decisions in the area of anonymous communication systems.
As anonymity networks are a rather young field there is no fixed terminology
and published works often use homonyms, synonyms or even barbarisms1 which
make understanding difficult and content unclear. Even though some works exist
on unification and standardisation of the vocabulary used by researchers in this
area [PH06], usage and even capitalization of terms is not constant.
In the course of this chapter we first cover the basics of computer networks
(section 2.1) and IT security (section 2.1) – both being indispensable building
blocks for anonymity systems. On these grounds we continue with topics on pri-
vacy and anonymity (section 2.3). The chapter concludes with some notions on
the scenarios and setup (section 2.4). The latter part also introduces and analyses
parties and entities related to and affected by privacy-enhancing techniques.
2.1 Computer Networks
Communication is, of course, a central part of anonymous communication re-
search. In this case, it refers to communication done by computers utilizing com-
puter networks. Networking technology itself can be considered one of the very
basic research fields in computer science. For this reason we do not delve very
deeply into this matter. Instead we point out important parts which we will be re-
ferring to intensively in the course of this work. For a more rigorous approach to
networking basics the reader is kindly asked to consult books like [Com02, Tan03].
1In linguistics the term “barbarism” refers to a non-standard, possibly even wrong, use of a word.
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While computer networks are ubiquitous today and using them seems trivial,
there is a number of non-trivial tasks to be fulfilled in order to exchange data be-
tween two remote peers2. Most of these tasks meet high demands with regards
to efficiency, dependability and security. For a number of contemporary network
protocols it was the case that not all of these criteria could be sufficiently taken into
account, hence leaving room to trade-offs.
In order to cope with the multitude of problems and their complexity, com-
munication protocols are designed in layers. Each layer is designed to cope with
only a limited set of problems and offers its services to “upper” layers. The higher
layers can then build upon the guarantees made by the “lower” layers. By combin-
ing layers into a protocol stack, applications can choose from a rich set of network
properties to fulfill their goals of communication.
We will briefly describe the seven layers of the ISO/OSI model for computer
networks in Table 2.1. They depict in a very concrete way how problems of trans-
mitting data to a remote peer can be split into several groups and solved separately.
Even though the ISO-model is only loosely related to the protocols used in the
Internet, it demonstrates better how to divide a problem into manageable pieces.
# Layer Function
7 Application services to user-defined application processes
6 Presentation establishes context between single application layer entities
5 Session manages connections between applications
4 Transport reliability, flow control and error control
3 Network routing, fragmenting and quality of service
2 Data Link detect and correct errors in the physical layer
1 Physical actual electrical or physical transmission
Table 2.1: A basic view of the seven ISO/OSI layers for network communication
It should be noted that these layers only specify communication processes and
do not include human interfaces. As a matter of fact, the human user of a machine
is sometimes referred to as “layer 8”.
2.1.1 The Internet Protocol
The protocol stack, which is used in the Internet (called the Internet Protocol or
IP), was designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). IP was delib-
erately not designed with accordance to the ISO/OSI layers for several reasons.
Nevertheless, it is also divided into layers [IP89], as shown in Table 2.2:
2In cases where data has to be exchanged between more than two peers things become even more
complicated.
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# Layer Function
4 Application services to user-defined application processes
3 Transport reliability, flow control and error control
2 Internet routing, fragmenting and quality of service
1 Network actual electrical or physical transmission
Table 2.2: A basic view of the layers of the Internet Protocol
The core entity of the Internet protocol are IP addresses. In version four of the
Internet protocol, which is currently prevalent in Europe and North America, these
addresses are 32-bit identifiers. In the upcoming version six, these identifiers are
of 128-bit size. Loosely speaking, the first bits of an IP address can be regarded
as an identifier of the network where a host resides, while the last bits identify the
host itself.
IP addresses and networks are assigned in a rather strict manner. The highest
level is currently managed by the Number Resource Organization (NRO) which
is responsible for coordinating the five Regional Internet Registries (RIR). These
delegate ranges of IPs to more regional Local Internet Registries (LIR) or large In-
ternet Service providers. Eventually, single computers are assigned their addresses
depending on the network they are connected to.
The success and advantage of IP, as compared to other protocols, is that previ-
ously heterogeneous networks can now be interconnected (hence the name Inter-
net) with the help of a single network protocol. IP allows any computer to exchange
data with arbitrary other computers in the network.
For simplicity reasons, IP does not reserve channels but is a packet-oriented
protocol and makes no guarantees whatsoever, i.e. it provides services on a best-
effort basis. Thus, single IP packets are independent of each other and consistency,
if required, needs to be added onto higher protocol layers.
Technically speaking, layer one comprises the different physical methods of
transmitting data, e.g., Ethernet or modem lines. IP-based routing is done in layer
two. Then, in layer three, consistency and streams are added, if the application
(layer 4) has respective needs.
For the in-depth understanding of the following chapters it will be required to
have a knowledge about the details of the major components of the IP stack. We
will use details from the ARP protocol [ARP82] on the Network layer, IPv4 [IPV81]
on the Internet layer, UDP [UDP80] and TCP [TCP81] on the Transport layer.
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to map the physical network
address of a computer to an IP address and vice-versa. This protocol is often
used as an interface for different physical implementations to IP.
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Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) is used to route data packets between hosts.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) adds stream capabilities on top of IP. It
manages multiple separate streams, the rate in which messages are sent,
takes care of lost and duplicate packets, as well as a state-full connection
establishment and termination. Due to these properties TCP is one of the
most often used protocols in the Internet.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a minimal application layer protocol. It is pri-
marily used for simple applications, real-time traffic, and whenever the al-
gorithms offered by TCP do not seem to fit the application demands.
Notably, most anonymizing networks make heavy use of the TCP protocol.
However, each of the other three protocols also has a certain impact on the perfor-
mance and security of anonymizing networks.
It should also be noted that there are a set of application level protocols, which
play important roles:
Domain Name System (DNS) [Moc87] is used to provide a more human-under-
standable way of addressing hosts. As humans are not capable of remember-
ing multiple IP addresses, the DNS service can be used to translate easy-to-
remember host names to IP addresses.
This service is widely considered to be the most important service in the
Internet.
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) [DA99] are
designed to add confidentiality and integrity on top of the TCP protocol.
These protocols can be used for content encryption and authentication of
hosts and services.
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) [FGM+99] is commonly used for brows-
ing content in the Internet. However, in a broader context it can be used for
transmitting any structured information.
In the case of application layer protocols, there are usually only two peers
involved with asymmetrical roles: the client initiates the protocol, which usually
involves a request of some kind. The server’s task is to answer the request with
some kind of response. This client/server paradigm has governed the design of
computer protocols from the very beginning and is still a fundamental component
of today’s networks.
A peer-to-peer architecture takes a different approach: there is no (central)
server, but a set of interconnected peers. Peer-to-peer networks use rather compli-
cated algorithms for achieving tasks in a distributed fashion. Examples of these
tasks are distributing calculation tasks or storing large amounts of data.
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2.1.2 Overlay Networks
Anonymous communication networks are usually built as extensions to normal net-
works. This allows the use and re-use of existing networks and their infrastructure,
e.g., protocols on top of the Internet Protocol (IP) can be used to transfer data
between (nearly) arbitrary computers in the Internet.
As long as network protocol designers stick to the upper and lower interfaces
of a protocol stack they can replace or extend its functionality. This can be used to
create overlay networks. In an overlay network, the protocol stack is split at a given
point – usually between layer 3 and layer 4. In this gap a set of new protocols can
be inserted, transparently for the user. See Figure 2.1 for a schematic illustration
of this.
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Figure 2.1: An example of extending an existing protocol stack with an overlay
network.
Typically, anonymizing networks are designed as overlay networks, as this
guarantees a maximum on flexibility and usability for the user. It also ensures
that users can continue using their applications without further ado.
For example, anonymization service which offer anonymization of arbitrary IP
data packets usually run on top of UDP – the reason is that UDP and both IP-layers
(the one which they run on and the one they offer as a service) are stateless and
have similar characteristics. Those, which offer anonymization of data streams
and HTTP access built upon the TCP/IP layer, possibly even use (“include”) the
SSL/TLS stack for encryption. For obvious reasons, this limits the amount of im-
plementation and design overhead. Finally, e-mail-based services run upon SMTP
and offers SMTP, therefore restricting the cost of design and deployment to a min-
imum.
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While there are benefits of creating services with the technique of overlay net-
works, it should be noted that there are also drawbacks.
In our special case, we have one primary issue: security properties usually
cannot be combined, i.e. if two protocols, each with its own security properties, are
combined it is possible that the composed protocol may lose any of the properties
provided by each part. This can effectively cancel the protection provided by a
compound system. For example, if a malicious person is able to introduce a certain
jitter into lower protocol layers, this might still be detectable on upper layers and
even propagate from node to node. If the injected feature is distinctive enough it
might be used to re-identify data packets on upper layers at any time later, even if
the content of the data packets had been encrypted by the time they got marked.
Another example is that even if users enjoy perfect protection on the network
layer, they might still identify themselves – willingly or unintentionally – on the
application layer. In this case, the information leaked on the upper layers nullifies
any efforts on the lower layers.
This against emphasises the importance in the area of anonymity systems to
build, provide, analyse and maintain holistic anonymity.
2.2 IT Security
As we briefly discussed in the introduction, the area of anonymous communication
is a part of IT security. For this reason, we will introduce a set of IT-security-related
terminology, which will be used throughout this work.
Usually security is split into three parts [ISO]:
Confidentiality is assurance of data privacy. Only the intended and authorized
recipients (individuals, processes or devices), may read the data. Disclosure
to unauthorized entities, for example, unauthorized access is a confidentiality
violation.
Integrity is assurance of data non-alteration. Data integrity is having assurance
that the information has not been altered in transmission, or in a storage.
Source integrity is the assurance that the sender of that information is who it
is supposed to be. Data integrity is considered compromised when informa-
tion has been corrupted or altered, before its intended usage. Source integrity
is compromised when a malicious entity spoofs its identity and supplies in-
correct information to a recipient.
Availability is assurance in the timely and reliable access to data services for au-
thorized users. It ensures that information or resources are available when
required. Most often this means that the resources are available at a rate
which is fast enough for the wider system to perform its task as intended.
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It is certainly possible that confidentiality and integrity are protected, but
an attacker causes resources to become less available than required, or not
available at all.
Anonymous communication can be regarded as being part of confidentiality,
i.e. it is about protecting information from leaking to untrusted third parties. As
previously stated, anonymous communication by itself does not protect the content
of a message. This has to be done with cryptographic means, in cases where it
is desired and meaningful3 . Even though confidentiality is the main concern in
our topic, properties like data integrity and availability should not be harmed. At
the present, however, solutions for anonymous communication are reducing data
integrity and availability properties as compared to normal traffic. The negative
impact of this will be discussed in the later chapters of this work.
Anonymous communication makes use of other security mechanisms (see also
Figure 1.1 on page 3): Cryptographycryptography is used to hide information or
provide data integrity. Also, host security is an indispensable prerequisite; in its
absence an attacker might simply take control of involved computers and retrieve
the data necessary to find someone’s identity or learn his peers. Network security
is compulsory for similar reasons; even if the actual content of the message is pro-
tected by cryptographic means, data packets contain additional information that
possibly allows eavesdroppers to guess the content by properties like a transmis-
sions delay, data packet size, volume, or similar properties. Even if these threats
can be countered, an attacker might use unauthorized network access to, e.g., dis-
turb the availability of a communication system, consequently rendering it unus-
able.
Thus, for any anonymous communication system, it is inevitable to build upon
network layer security, make use of strong cryptographic mechanisms and assume
adequate host security. We will give a brief survey of these three subjects in the
following sections.
2.2.1 Host Security
Host security is a part of IT security whose objective it is to protect a single com-
puter from corruption and sustain confidentiality, integrity and availability. Host
security is distinctive from most other system requirements as it imposes restric-
tions and constraints on what the computer is not supposed to do. This makes
this area particularly challenging because computer programs are very complex4.
Therefore, enforcing that malicious actions will not take place would require to
proof that under all possible conditions the programs and the kernel will not fail
3Anonymous publishing is a case where encryption does not make sense.
4For example, Alan Turing proved in 1936 that it is impossible to decide if a general computer
program finishes in finite time given some input, or if it will run forever (the Halting Problem).
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from an attack. Taking into account typical sizes of modern operating systems and
application software, this is beyond feasibility5 .
The level of difficulty is raised even more by the fact that attackers and au-
thors of malicious software actively obfuscate their actions and tools to mimic
well-behaving software. However, it is not possible to simply stop using obscure
software: some companies use obfuscation techniques for legitimate software,
e.g.,Skype6, in order to avoid their programs being analysed. Hence we can see
that it is today impossible to achieve computer security by analysing the software
running on a computer.
Currently, the most viable solution leading to good computer security is to use
an operating system (which has to be trusted) and rely on the operating system’s
kernel to enforce security policies. The kernel also realizes compartmentalization,
which is used to prevent misbehaving applications from affecting other processes
or the complete system. Policies are implemented by either the use of white-listing
or black-listing actions, or asking the user to confirm critical actions if an auto-
mated decision cannot be made. White lists define, with varying granularity, what
a computer program is allowed to do (e.g., accessing certain files on the hard disk).
Black lists, on the other hand, define the actions which are not allowed, for exam-
ple, waiting for and accepting incoming network connections. There are situation,
for example system maintenance, where it must be possible to circumvent these
restrictions; if an action takes place that might be initiated by the user, he is asked
to confirm that he is really sure that he wishes to complete it (e.g., deleting vital
system files or installing new software).
Still, host security is a hot topic, which is mostly based on the fact that the
behaviour and interaction of computer programs is too complex to be limited by
a set of security policies. In addition, creating these policies is very difficult for
the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, it is possible to find flaws in them which
can be exploited by malicious software or attackers. Even worse, different users
want their computers to do different things and therefore operating systems can-
not prohibit all “strange” behavior. More often than not it happens that unwitting
users find security restrictions to be inconvenient and loosen them – resulting in a
vulnerable system.
Another strategy, besides trying to enforce security policies with the operating
system’s kernel, is to use only computer programs which were specifically devel-
oped to resist malice. However, error-free coding requires the programmer to be
always up-to-date with the current state of the art in software vulnerabilities. It is
easy to see that this only applies to a minority of developers. In addition, even if a
software developer is knowledgeable, he might be pressed, e.g., by firm deadlines,
to write code fast and thus cannot take care to write code which is free of errors.
5It is commonly counted that there is about one security-related programming error per 100 lines
of code [McC04].
6http://www.skype.com/
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To help developers, several software development tools and strategies were de-
veloped to mitigate errors in the process of software development, or at least min-
imize their effect. Examples include security models in high-level programming
languages with automated memory management, data tainting or stack protection
techniques. Still, it can be seen as a consensus amongst experts that it is best not to
create software which is prone to errors in the first place. The reason for this is that
defense techniques do not provide perfect protection, but only raise the bar for an
intruder. Up to now it has always only been a matter of time until some adversary
has found ways to break or circumvent the protection.
The most common threat in host security involves software bugs of various
types. This refers to unintentionally introduced errors in software which do not
handle unforeseen cases right. The result of this is that the software enters an
undefined state. On a case-by-case basis an attacker can then in some cases take
over or modify the execution flow of the software. From this point onwards, the
software stops doing its originally intended work and is completely controlled by
the adversary. He can use the privileges of this software for arbitrary actions:
accessing, modifying, deleting or copying all data which the application has access
to, possibly installing new software (trojan horses, virii), or anything else at his
will.
To a certain extent, software vulnerabilities exist because computers strictly do
what they are told to do, while they are programmed by humans who are prone
to make mistakes. Basically it can be said that programmers make a number of
assumptions during the process of software development, some of them being ex-
plicit, others implicit. If one of these assumptions is invalidated later on, the soft-
ware continues to work with whatever data it is given. Human errors can take place
on various levels:
• A researcher or software designer makes errors in the design of an algorithm.
If an algorithm or concept is not suited for the task it was designed for, every
software implementation of it will fail.
• A programmer creates a program which does not correctly anticipate all
cases of input (e.g., passwords with more than 100,000 characters; user
names containing HTML code) or which is not generic enough to work
within a given context. Also, an implementation might miss covering spe-
cific cases of an algorithm, or is prone to failures due to wrong usage of a
programming language.
• A system administrator installs software which has more functionality than
actually needed – possibly, this additional functionality might even be un-
documented7 .
7In this case it is impossible for the owner of the computer to disable these functions, as their
presence is unknown.
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Another way of software vulnerabilities to becoming relevant is if the soft-
ware is not correctly configured. For example, if the default password is left
in place or no encryption is enabled.
• Given that a piece of software is flawless and correctly installed, it is still
possible that the actual user fails to utilize the software in the intended
way. Prominent examples are users choosing weak passwords, ignoring
SSL-certificate warnings, falling for phishing sites, or installing a computer
virus when they actually just wanted to watch a video of a nude celebrity.
All of these faults can be triggered accidentally, which will in most cases result
in the application, or the operating system crashing8 . However, an attacker might
look for these bugs explicitly and then try to gain advantage from the determinism
with which the computer executes whatever instructions are located in its memory.
Some prominent examples of software vulnerabilities affecting host security
are (e.g., [Sch00, HM04]):
• Memory corruptions; caused by stale pointers, too-small IO-buffers, false
pointer arithmetic, integer overflows, signedness bugs, wrong length calcu-
lations, and much more.
• Input validation errors; resulting in format string errors, shell command in-
jection, SQL injection, directory traversal, cross-site scripting, and more.
• User interface failures; giving the inexperienced user too much, i.e. confus-
ing, information and the experienced user too little.
• Concurrency errors can be exploited in multiple forms of race conditions.
One important term in host security is attack vector. It describes possible inter-
faces which can be used by an attacker to subvert software. The more interfaces a
program uses, the more likely that it will trip over unexpected input. In this sense,
an interface refers to any input which is processed by the program. Besides obvi-
ous devices like network and file access, there are also user interfaces, dynamically
loaded libraries, database servers, and more. Therefore, minimizing the number of
attack vectors does help to secure software.
Unfortunately there is today no metric available to quantify the level of secu-
rity provided by a computer system. Thus, it remains the domain of experts to
create, maintain and evaluate secure computer systems. This dominance is likely
to continue into the near- and middle-term future as the scene of host security is
still evolving very fast and has not lost any momentum.
Finally, it should be mentioned that today all major computer systems are vul-
nerable via multiple attack vectors. There is even a (black) market for programs,
8The Microsoft Windows “blue screen” is an example of this.
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so-called zero day exploits, which exploit previously unknown software vulnera-
bilities – thus there is virtually no known method to protect against these attacks.
The cost of one of these starts at $20,000 and can be as high as $60,000 [Nar06].
To a certain degree it is therefore valid to claim that if an entity only wants hard
enough to compromise a computer system today, it cannot be defended against.
For more information on this topic, the reader is referred to [Sch00, HM04,
Bun06].
2.2.2 Network Security
The main goal of network security is to minimize the impact of network traffic as an
attack vector on software. Thus, its target is to raise the overall degree of security
in a networked and distributed system. Integrity and confidentiality on the network
layer is best achieved with means of cryptography (we will come to his in the
next section). Still, network security is focused on assisting9 cryptographic means,
wherever possible – and also tries to contribute enhancements in availability.
Historically, computer networks were closed environments, i.e. the number of
hosts and the identity of its users were clearly laid out. This led to the develop-
ment of network layer protocols which did not take into account a hostile environ-
ment10. Since the (commercial) success of the Internet and its global expansion
this has changed: data packets are passing multitudes of intermediate systems with
unknown reputations – possibly logging, dropping or modifying data in transit.
Some positive properties, namely that every participant can communicate with ev-
erybody else, can under certain circumstances become a disadvantage: there is no
control over malicious people sending possibly harmful packets.
Network security thus targets to mitigate the negative effect of the Internet’s
openness. To this end, several methods have been proposed and implemented:
• Packet filters are used to defend against unwanted network connections.
• Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are deployed to check network traffic for
suspicious behaviour. If an IDS is authorized to actively disable conspicuous
connections, is it called an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
• Application Layer Firewalls examine requests on plausibility and also check
for possible malicious behaviour.
However, there are limitations to network-based security checks. These boil
down to the problem that a tool for network security is lacking some context or
9Sometimes system operators even replace cryptography with network security means.
10It is a common semi-myth that the ARPANET, being the predecessor of the Internet, was
designed to resist nuclear attacks. As described in http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/
brief.shtml, it was designed to survive network losses. However, the main reason was that
switches and network links were not reliable enough, even without nuclear attacks.
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information, which only the corresponding parties know. Without the missing in-
formation, however, the tool will not be in a position to correctly decide whether
the data packet or a connection is of legitimate nature and can be allowed to pass.
The result is false positive and false negative decisions, whose frequency depends
on the implementation of the tool, the type of missing information and the skill of
a potential attacker.
The first case of information being kept back in this setup is, if the data in the
transmission is encrypted. This is often the case with sensitive data, but more often
than not any service can be used with the help of an encrypted connection. In these
cases only the context of a connection remains as visible information for network-
based security tools, i.e. they can see the source and destination, as well as the
time and volume of the transmission. The actual payload is invisible to plausibility
checks.
Second, the data transmitted in a single connection is often only a single piece
of a complex interaction between two hosts. As the tool for network security can-
not in all cases know the complete context11, it is left to guessing.
And finally, there are ways to tamper with tools for network-based security.
These, being software themselves, can be attacked and modified to ignore attacks
of a certain type or simply shut down completely.
On the network layer an attacker can try to access data which was not sent
to his address by, e.g., manipulating routing information or address information.
Examples of attacks that achieve this are ARP spoofing in Local Area Networks,
several attacks on the Domain Name System (DNS), or even the Border Gateway
Protocol (see [KP08]). In these cases an attacker utilises the fact that these network
protocols are not secured by modern cryptographic means and replies to requests
can be easily spoofed. The result is that traffic gets diverted and can then be read
or manipulated by the attacker.
If an attacker is on the path of a user’s communication channel, or he has suc-
cessfully rerouted the user’s traffic to his location, he cannot only record all data
packets as they pass by, but also modify and spoof information which has not been
cryptographically protected. Most network layer protocols do not contain means to
ensure integrity, as this would require enrollment of a cryptographic infrastructure.
Finally, an attacker can try to disrupt communication channels or means. These
attacks are called denial of service-attacks (DoS), and can also be carried out by
multiple attacking hosts at the same time (distributed denial of service attack, or
DDoS). Their scheme involves saturating a victim’s capacity with repeated re-
quests. It often targets the available bandwidth of a host, but can also be directed
towards its computing capacity, memory consumption, or hard disk usage. The
result is that a system has to be shut down, or becomes unusable. In the case of
11If it knew the complete context, it would need to replicate all hosts which is needs to protect –
something which is obviously not possible.
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anonymizing networks this means that if an attacker disables a system, its users
have to choose to either stop communicating or to communicate in plain.
Summarizing, attacks on the networks layer are not as potent as attacks on
hosts. Often they are also very noisy, in the sense that their presence and effect is
easily noticed, even by non-expert users. On the other side, network layer attacks
base on the fact that the Internet is designed to be open for any kind of commu-
nication – thus they can (by design) neither by prevented, nor prohibited. And at
least denial-of-service attacks are one of the most powerful and dangerous attacks
available nowadays.
More information on network security is given in, e.g., [Bun06]
2.2.3 Cryptography
All systems that want to achieve confidentiality and integrity, not only on the net-
work layer, make heavy use of cryptographic primitives. They encrypt information
in order to make it inaccessible for (possible) adversaries or untrusted participants
in the network. Integrity can be provided by means to detect, if data was modified
by an unauthorized party.
Traditionally, cryptography has been used for nearly three thousand years to
obtain confidentiality of the content of a message. Early cryptographic techniques
were invented by the Spartans, around seven hundred BC [Col04]. More sophis-
ticated techniques were developed starting from around the sixteenth century12.
However, cryptography which was strong enough to resist most attacks was not
available until the middle of the 20th century. Finally, the basic elements of cryp-
tography are today generally considered strong enough not to be broken within
reasonable time by most adversaries. This does not only refer to encryption tech-
niques, but also cryptographic primitives which can be used to provide integrity.
Effective vulnerabilities on contemporary encryption systems can usually only
be mounted with the help of side channel attacks [Koc96, BB03] or implementation
errors13.
It should be noted that while basic cryptographic primitives can be consid-
ered very strong, cryptographic protocols, i.e. protocols composed to work with
elemental cryptographic building blocks, can be prone to attacks. This refers to
protocols which try to achieve a more complex goal than encryption or integrity
protection, e.g., establishing a shared secret between two strangers in a public en-
vironment, authenticating a user to a server and vice-versa, or offering a secure
directory services which lists the hosts in a network. For this purpose, anonymiz-
ing communication is also a case of a cryptographic protocol, where combinations
of basic cryptographic elements are used.
12The Vigenère Cipher was invented 1553.
13See, e.g., the havoc which was caused by a programming error, which caused a weak random
number generator in the OpenSSL package of the Debian Linux distribution (http://www.ubuntu.
com/usn/usn-612-1).
22 CHAPTER 2: TERMINOLOGY AND SCENARIO
In the following part of this section we will give a short overview of basic prim-
itives, their properties and usage: methods for symmetric encryption, asymmetric
encryption, key exchange and digital signatures.
Symmetric cryptographic is the classic form of an encryption technique, where
a shared secret is needed between any pair of peers. These cryptographic systems
can be formally considered a five-tupel, consisting of an input alphabet, an output
alphabet14 , an encryption function, a decryption function, and a key space. Usually
there is an entity called Alice that wants to communicate with Bob, while Eve tries
to intercept or manipulate the communication channel. The interplay of these items
and entities is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Possibly intercepted by an attacker, i.e. EVE
Input Alphabet:
A B C D ... Z a b c ..
Key:
Rosebud
Keyspace:
a, b, c, ...
aa, ab, ...
ba, bb, ...
Output Alphabet:
A B C D ... Z a b c ...
Encryption kVDpIj44JE65..
Encrypted Message:
This is a secret message
Original Message:
Key:
Rosebud
Keyspace:
a, b, c, ...
aa, ab, ...
ba, bb, ...
Input Alphabet:
A B C D ... Z a b c ..
Decryption
Original Message:
This is a secret message
consists out of
consists out of
Realm of Sender = ALICE
consists out of
Realm of Receiver = BOB
Transmission
Figure 2.2: The interplay of items and entities in a cryptographic system.
Most symmetric cryptographic algorithms are very strong and comparably fast.
Typical key lengths are 128 to 256 bits, and throughput can be around 50Mbit per
second on today’s hardware, even with software implementations of the algorithm.
However, the security relies solely on the fact that the secret remains secret15. If
for some reason a third party gets to know the secret, it is not only easy to decipher
the ongoing communication, but also any intercepted and stored message can be
decrypted. Another drawback is that it is difficult (without further ado) to establish
a shared secret between two remote peers. Also, one would need a distinctive key
for each peer, which does not scale beyond a very small group of persons.
Known and widely used examples of this kind of cryptographic elements are
Rijndael, aka. AES [Nat01] and Twofish [SKW+99].
14In our case, i.e. in computer communication, this is often equivalent to the input alphabet
15This property was already recommended in [Ker83].
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In an asymmetric cryptographic system, the need for establishing a shared com-
mon secret is avoided by having key pairs, each consisting of a public and a private
key. The operations of those are dual, i.e. whatever data is encrypted with the pub-
lic key can only be decrypted with the private key and vice-versa. This benefit,
however, comes with the drawback of a much worse runtime performance, which
is 100 to 1000 times slower than symmetric operations.
For this reason, practical systems often use hybrid cryptographic systems. In
this case, the sender chooses a key for symmetric cryptography, and sends it to her
partner using public key cryptography. Afterwards, both can use this shared secret
in order to use more efficient algorithms for encryption. A popular algorithm for
asymmetric cryptography is RSA. Its keys are each usually 1024 to 4096 bits long,
and a modern CPU can make 10 to 100 asymmetric operations per second.
Traditional approaches for asymmetric cryptography have been relying on the
hardness of factoring big numbers and discrete logarithms. Recently a new ap-
proach emerged, using elliptic curves, also known as ECC (elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy). These allow a similar security with around a factor of ten less runtime and
much shorter keys (196 to 256 bits).
While asymmetric cryptography can be used to exchange keys for symmetric
encryption, another way of exchanging keys for symmetric cryptography is the al-
gorithm from Diffie and Hellmann [DH76]. It can be used to derive a shared secret
between two persons without the need for an already existing covert channel. In
contrast to the more deterministic way of sharing a secret with asymmetric cryp-
tography, this algorithm can be used to transmit messages with perfect forward
secrecy, i.e. for every single stream of communication a new key is derived and
used, a so-called ephemeral key. After each session, if both partners deleted the
secret key, it will be computationally infeasible to reconstruct the message from
the intercepted cipher text.
The original algorithm from Diffie and Hellmann, as proposed in 1976, how-
ever, falls prone to man-in-the-middle attacks, i.e. if the users have no means to
ensure the real identity of their partner, they can be eavesdropped. This attack does
not work for a method to derive a shared secret based on elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy.
In addition to the previously discussed methods for providing confidentiality,
cryptographers have achieved ways to ensure integrity protection, namely by the
way of digital signature. As its analogue counterpart, a signature by itself does not
prevent tampering with the data, but provides a means to detect it.
To this end, a fingerprint is first taken from the data that is meant to be signed,
i.e. it a compressed unique bit string of fixed length is created which unambigu-
ously resembles the document16. This stage is created with the help of hash func-
tions. The result, i.e. the fingerprint, is then encrypted with the private key with
16In most cases, that is. While attacks on hash functions exist, we do not go into more depth here.
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the signer, resulting in yet another unique bit string with the property that only the
owner of the respective secret key could have created it, together with the unmodi-
fied version of the document to be signed.
To verify a signature, the recipient applies the same hash function to the docu-
ment, and decrypts the signature of the received document with the public key of
the sender. If both bit strings match, it is very likely that the sender is the actual
source of the message.
More information on cryptography is given in, e.g., [Sch96].
2.2.4 Conclusion
As a result from the three previous sections on computer security (2.2.1), network
security (2.2.2) and cryptography (2.2.3), we’d like to come to the following con-
clusion:
If the cryptographic algorithms are implemented correctly17, they are
usually not the weakest part in an IT-security-related setup.
One should note, however,that this does not hold for cryptographic protocols.
2.2.5 Attack Trees
In general, there is today no way to quantify the security of a complete system.
While some algorithms and functions exist which evaluate single parts of computer
systems (e.g., for cryptographic systems there is [Sha49]), no framework exists
which is able to combine these into a grand total.
The most generic way, albeit its computational complexity makes it difficult to
apply it in sophisticated situations, are attack trees. These were proposed by Bruce
Schneier in [Sch00]. Since then, they have become a popular method to analyse
and quantify IT security. One basic advantage of attack trees is that they can, to a
certain extent, incorporate findings by other algorithms.
In principle, an attack tree is a directed graph. The sources of the network
identify assets which are to be protected by the IT system. On the other hand,
sinks are interfaces at which a malicious person is able to start an attack against
the system18. At every node it is described which actions are necessary in order
to continue attacks along this path. Basically, nodes can be distinguished between
and-condition nodes and or-condition nodes. For the former type, if all conditions
described in its child nodes have been accomplished by an attacker, then this path
17This is mostly true for widely used standard libraries like openSSL.
18In fact, an attack tree is still called an attack tree, even if it is not a tree according to graph
theoretical definitions.
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is open to him. In contrast, for the or-style nodes, it is sufficient if an attacker
fulfills any of the child nodes’ conditions.
An example of an attack tree is shown in Figure 2.3. It illustrates that, in order
to get access to this (fictional) confidential database, an attacker has to either get
access to the database directly, or he needs access to the operating system which
hosts the database. In the latter case the attacker can simply copy the files which
are used by the back-end of the database and analyse them on a different machine.
An and-node is used in the first case, where, in order to log in, an attacker needs a
valid user name as well as the accompanying password.
(or)
Confidential
database
Get access to
OS layer
Have database
account
Need valid
username
Need valid
password
Vulnerable
application
Vulnerable
OS
(or)
(and)
Figure 2.3: An example of an attack tree which depicts methods of illicit access to
a confidential database.
Attack trees are used to determine the weakest link in the defense. It is assumed
that an attacker does not bother to tamper with the strong parts of an IT system, but
chooses the way of least resistance. Therefore, graph theoretical algorithms can be
used to find the shortest (“easiest”) path from the sources to the sinks. In order to
save computational power, it is also possible to split the tree into separate parts and
evaluate these prior to the complete system.
Improvements of attack trees assign costs to each link, as some attacks are
more expensive or difficult to mount than others.
One problem with attack trees is, however, that it is very difficult to rate the
difficulty and cost of single attacks, as these might vary for different people: if,
e.g., an attack has a certain rare piece of software or hardware as a prerequisite,
this attack is difficult to mount in general – if for some reason an attacker is in
possession of the item, this attack might be actually very cheap for him.
More problematic is, though, that there is no universal method to create an
exhaustive list of attacks. The most obvious fact is that even today there might
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be new attacks emerging against virtually any algorithm or software, at any given
time. But even the existing list of attacks and their applicability is so large that
hardly a single expert is able to enumerate all threats. This leads to a situation
where even the most general algorithm available for quantification can only be
used in the face of a certain probability of including errors.
2.3 Anonymity-Related Terminology
Finally, after we have introduced the terminology for communication networks and
IT security, both being building blocks for anonymous communication systems, we
start to work on the terminology for the central part of this work.
As opposed to cryptography, which protects the content and integrity of a com-
munication, anonymous communication has the task of protecting the privacy of
the context of a communication, i.e. the identity of the sender, the identity of the re-
cipient, the date and time or the communication process, as well as the volume and
possibly even the type of communication. Any subset of these can be considered
the items of interest (IOI) for an adversary.
In order to enable anonymity there must be uncertainty about the true value of
a certain item of interest, e.g., the identity of the sender. This means that whenever
anonymity is a desired property there must be a set of decoy values which must
have a non-negligible probability of being the true value. In general, it holds that
Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable within
a set of subjects, the anonymity set.
Anonymity of a subject from an attacker’s perspective means that the
attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject within a set of subjects,
the anonymity set. [PH06]
Depending on the setup, the purpose and the intention of the participating en-
tities, different properties and items can be kept anonymous. Regular situations
are expressed by the terms sender anonymity and recipient anonymity. Sender an-
onymity refers to a situation where the originator of a message would like to stay
unknown. Receiver anonymity holds true if a person can be sent a message without
the knowledge of his identity or location being disclosed.
It should be noted that there is currently no widely accepted metric to calculate
the degree of protection provided by an anonymity system. However, there is a
common ground that the size of the anonymity set is a crucial indicator, as well as
the probability distribution on the subjects within this set. If the latter is a uniform
distribution, then the level of protection is often considered to be the maximum
possible within the given scenario. It is also important to consider that the level of
protection might differ for single users of the system: it can be the case that certain
individuals (subjects, items, . . . ) are more likely than others.
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In certain cases, when it is not possible to identify a subject, it might still be
possible to tell if an action was committed by exactly the same subject as observed
in a past event. For example, an observer might not know the owner of a car, but
based on the car’s license plate it might be possible to tell if it was the same car,
which was involved in some event. This state is called pseudonymity and is often
observed in the world wide web: nicknames in forums, sessions using cookies, and
popular private e-mail addresses in the form of, e.g., some.nickname@yahoo.com
are examples of pseudonymity.
Another important term is unlinkability. It describes the state of two items of
interest which cannot be related by any means to each other by some third party.
Of course, this state depends on the power and knowledge of the entity which tries
to link the respective items. Thus, it might be possible that the owner of a web
forum has the power to link a nickname to an e-mail address, while a normal user
of the same forum might not be able to do so. Pseudonymity is one important
area of influence for unlinkability considerations: as long as an entity is unable to
link information to the true identity of an person, this person’s identity is still very
well protected. However, as opposed to a situation of true anonymity, an adversary
might be able to accumulate knowledge about a pseudonymous person, therewith
profiling him. This might ultimately lead to identification.
The term unlinkability can also be used to described anonymity properties. It
even has the potential to allow more fine-grained descriptions such as, e.g., set-
based metrics. Instead of describing a set of users being an anonymity set, it is
possible to characterize the same fact as all of these users being “unrelated” to the
message which was sent19. This can also be understood as: all users in the ano-
nymity set cannot be linked to the message as a sender (or recipient). In contrast to
the definition with the help on an anonymity set, an attacker might gain knowledge
about the linkability of a message, e.g., by linking it to a reply message or learning
its language, without reducing the size of the anonymity set.
In addition, it should be noted that unlinkability is a sufficient condition for
anonymous communication, but not necessary.
As we have seen, the initial level of any protection can only decrease over
time. This bases on the fact that it is usually not reasonable to assume that an
attacker forgets information. This assumption bases on the fact that storage place
for digital information became cheap enough20 in recent time, to accumulate and
access huge masses of data. This is prominently shown by services like the free
e-mail-hosting gmail.com from Google, which offers each customer roughly 3
19It should be noted that, on the other hand, participants in an anonymizing system are at least
somewhat related to messages originating from it – at least more than users who do not participate at
all.
20In terms of money.
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Gigabyte of storage for his email21. Another example is the abundance of sites
which host videos22, images23 or even arbitrary files24 for free.
As we laid down on the introduction, there are degrees of protection which
exceed anonymity. Anonymizing networks still leak, e.g., the daytime and volume
of a user’s communication to a local observer. If the existence of this is also to be
hidden, we call the communication unobservable. In a more general meaning, one
can speak of undetectability from a certain attacker’s perspective if the adversary is
not able to decide whether a certain communication takes place or an item of inter-
est is present. It is noteworthy that the properties of unobservability, respectively
undetectability, are not boolean but can have varying degrees. observer
The property of undetectability can be extended from single items to complete
networks, in the extreme case. In the latter case, e.g., if there is an undetectable
overlay network, we speak of a dark net. Besides an unknown number25 of private
networks, some versions of the Freenet network [CSWH00] have claimed dark-net
properties.
Profiling is a widely known method of combining the previous paragraphs,
i.e. taking into account that an entity might learn information about a message
without (at that time) being able to reduce the anonymity set, and storing abundant
amounts of information. In the case of profiling, all data which is available about
a pseudonymously known entity is collected. Together with similar data sets from
other persons or companies, profiling allows to infer additional information about
the main subject by extrapolation. This approach is, e.g., used by marketing com-
panies for targeting advertisements to an audience with a higher precision. But it
can also be used to identify previously unknown persons by means of their personal
profile.
One of the more easy methods to achieve recipient anonymity is to broadcast
the encrypted information as widespread as possible, while including the intended
recipient in the set. This method achieves very strong anonymity even against
strong attackers. An extreme example for this technique are numbers station26
which are radio stations that transmit encoded messages on high-frequency radio
signals. Given proper conditions, it is possible for these senders to reach any person
on earth, thus reaching the maximum available anonymity set.
It should also be mentioned that there are some ways to achieve results similar
to broadcasting, even though technically there is no broadcasting involved. A good
example for this is the Usenet. There, the usenet group news://alt.anonymous.
messages exists, which can be used to achieve recipient anonymous messaging27 .
21At the time of writing, it is about 2,757 Megabyte, according to the website.
22E.g. http://www.youtube.com/, http://video.google.com/, . . .
23E.g. http://www.flickr.com/, http://imageshack.us/, . . .
24E.g. http://www.rapidshare.com/, http://www.megaupload.com/, . . .
25Due to the very nature of dark nets, their number and existence is hard to proof, of course.
26See, e.g., [Mas91] or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_station.
27In combination with tools for anonymous posting in the web, even sender anonymity can be
achieved.
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On the other side, the use of intermediary nodes to transmit messages is a pos-
sibility for achieving sender-anonymity. By carrying a message over multiple hops
it gets more difficult for the recipient of the message to trace it back to its origin.
Another property gained with this method is plausible deniability: each forwarding
party, as well as the original sender, can make it plausible that they only forwarded
the message on behalf of another user and are not the actual originator. While
plausible deniability might not always be a sufficient level of protection, it can still
thwart non-decisive attackers on the system, or attackers with low resources.
One of the more secure variations of relaying messages over several hops was
described by David Chaum in [Cha81]. In this proposal, cryptography (onion rout-
ing) is used to protect the sender of the message also against malicious forwarding
entities. In addition, each forwarding entity has to collect multiple messages and
forward them in a different order, therewith inducing additional confusion for an
external observer. If an onion routing implements the latter property, it is also
called a mix.
DC-nets [Cha88] are one known technique to achieve sender and recipient ano-
nymity at the same time. In this scenario a group of people is formed which is then
able to communicate in a perfectly privacy-preserving way: neither an external
observer nor any member of the group is able to tell if, when and who communi-
cates with whom. On the downside, this technique is quite expensive in terms of
bandwidth and computational effort.
In addition to the techniques described above, users are also able to send dummy
messages. This refers to a method of hiding the real item of interest within a set of
others. For example, in the case of sending messages a user can try to confuse ob-
servers by sending a large amount of messages to different people, all of them but
one being without semantic meaning to their recipients. Due to its high cost and the
difficulty of creating plausible dummy messages in an automated fashion, dummy
traffic is usually considered to be a deprecated method by modern standards.
Besides these abstract methods, there are software implementations designed
to deliver the properties listed and discussed in this chapter. We will describe them
in more detail in Chapter 3.
Finally, currently the most complete introduction into the terminology of anon-
ymizing networks is given in [PH06].
2.4 Setup, Scenario and Setting
In this section we describe the circumstances and the setup of a typical deployed
anonymizing network. As it might be that there are a number of private networks or
dark nets, these setups will only be representative for those open to the public. To
this end we shortly introduce entities related to anonymizing network and briefly
discuss their role in, as well as their relationship to, these networks.
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The main parties involved into the operation of a network, or within the area of
its influence are (for a graphical view refer to Figure 2.4):
• Operators of relaying nodes
• Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
• Users of the network
• Providers of Internet services and operators of Internet sites
• Law enforcement agencies
• (possibly any other user of the Internet)
Most obviously, and without the need of going into more detail, the views and goals
of the groups of people differ – often within each single set. In the following, we
will try to elaborate in them in more detail.
It should be noted that one party is missing in the list above: the attacker. Due
to the importance of the attacker to the contribution of this work he will be dealt
with in his own chapter (see chapter 5 on page 71).
NODE
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USER
USER
SERVICE
SERVICE
SERVICE
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INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
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Figure 2.4: Relationship of major participating and affected entities in an anony-
mizing network.
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2.4.1 Node Operators
Today, most deployed networks actually make use of relaying nodes in order to
achieve sender anonymity. Under certain conditions, e.g., if the networks is a peer-
to-peer network, every participant and user of the network is also a node operator.
Due to the architecture of an anonymizing network nodes have to fulfill high
requirements for smooth operation. As public networks are free of charge, node op-
erators do not get refunded for their efforts. In addition, whenever abuse or a crime
happens with the help of the network, relaying node operators are approached by
law enforcement agencies. This can lead to a house search, confiscation of equip-
ment, lengthy interrogations and being charged of the crime committed by a differ-
ent person28.
Some networks allow to mitigate the risk for node operators to have to stand
up in court for other people’s abuse. By only forwarding messages to other nodes
in the network, which will then eventually take over the duty of forwarding the
messages to the outside, a node can minimize the impact on itself by abusers.
However, a certain number of nodes has to take the risk in order to allow users to
access external services.
Thus, the question rises as to what kind of motivation a node operator has
to donate bandwidth and computing power to a network. Currently, no survey is
known that tries to shed light on this.
The situation in slightly different, if the service is able to de-anonymize its
users. This is the case with, e.g., single-hop proxies. As long as the proxy operator
keeps log files of the relayed traffic he it able to resolve the sender anonymity in
cases of legal disputes. While this is a method of risk-mitigation for the proxy
provider, privacy-aware users are known to be reluctant to use these services.
Finally, in commercial anonymizing networks users have to pay for access.
In this case, the provider can try to estimate the damage by fraudsters and adjust
the prices accordingly. The targeted pricing level needs to include bandwidth and
computational power as well as a share of the abuse handling.
2.4.2 Internet Service Providers
Internet Service Providers, ISPs for short, are the companies that own and run the
majority of data links, especially in the Internet. Their basic incentives for doing
so are of commercial nature.
While an ISP usually neither run nodes of anonymizing service nor uses them,
they own the data lines which are used extensively by these networks. Primarily,
28See especially http://itnomad.wordpress.com/2007/01/04/tor-the-feds-and-me/
and following. Also in Appendix A. More, e.g., on http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
May-2008/msg00077.html
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they should profit from the massive use of bandwidth on one side. However, the
use of up to several terabytes per node and month usually does not fit into their
accounting models which might base on combined costing as well as on users not
requiring abundant amounts of bandwidth. The traffic also strains their networks
and causes some technical glitches which in turn may affect other customers29.
Additionally, ISPs are approached as the first point of contact by the police in
cases of abuse: as the addressing scheme of networks does not per se allow to link
a network address to the real identity of a user, their cooperation is a pre-requisite
for any actions of law enforcement agencies which need to prosecute crimes.
As any request from prosecutors for the identity of their users results in unpaid
overhead for them, they have been known to restrict operation of anonymizing
nodes within their area of influence.
Related to ISPs are hosting providers, also known as web hosting services or
hosters. These are companies which offer dedicated servers with direct access to
fast Internet lines. To a certain extent, these might overlap with ISPs, as both
services can be offered and provided by the same company.
The majority of traffic on anonymizing networks is relayed by high-bandwidth
nodes with a good Internet connection. As these conditions are not met at a typ-
ical end-user site, the backbone of anonymizing networks is hosted in computing
centres30. Therefore, besides ISPs, hosting providers are a primary address for the
police to contact in cases of prosecuting a crime.
In contrast to ISPs, which usually are unable to control or limit the traffic they
relay, hosting providers have been known to limit or restrict the operation of anon-
ymizing nodes. In certain cases they have even been reported to commit barely
legal observation techniques and methods to detect and stop the use of anonymiz-
ing networks31.
Consequently we can see that ISPs and hosting providers have the tendency to
oppose the operation of anonymizing services. The main reason for this lies in the
overhead which is caused by the abusers of this system, as well as the amount of
vigilantism which comes with the operation of these systems. Both finally lead to
increasing costs for the provider, explaining their attitude.
2.4.3 Users
The end user is, of course, the central entity whose needs of privacy are to be ful-
filled with the help of an anonymizing system. The original motivation of most
29As some nodes relay traffic out of the anonymizing network, they are perceived as the originators
of it. It has been reported that in rare cases of abuse some harmed entities took the law into their
own hands and attacked the relaying node and its surrounding. See, e.g., Appendix A. More on,
e.g., http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Sep-2008/msg00009.html, or http://archives.
seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2008/msg00003.html
30Some are also located at university sites, but under similar conditions.
31See, e.g., Appendix A
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designers for privacy-protecting communication systems was to help in circum-
venting censorship or to thwart user profiling. But, recent research and experiences
from deployed systems have shown that the set of users is to a high degree, and on
several levels, non-homogeneous. As the very property of anonymizing networks
is to protect their users from profiling, it is very difficult to study the motivation
and identity of users in anonymity networks32.
However, as we have seen in the previous sections on node operators and ISPs,
one of the major unsolved problems with anonymizing networks is handling abuse
and fraudsters. Therefore, there is a certain amount of pressure on systems’ de-
signers to approach mitigation of despicable behaviour. Yet, as, e.g., the area of
intrusion detection systems has shown, it seems not feasible to design algorithms
for this problem. Even worse, there are cultural and regional differences on what
is considered to be abuse. Drawing a line is not possible.
Despite these controversial grounds, law enforcement agencies usually differ
between legal and illegal actions based on their local point of view. There also is
room for some gray scale in between these two extreme positions. In most cases,
no legal authority minds the use of anonymity systems as long as users adhere to
local laws and only use privacy-preserving techniques to hide the traces of their
legit actions.
On the other hand, there is a set of users which abuse the protection granted
by anonymizing services in order to commit malice. The observed scale ranges
from rather childish behaviour (inserting misleading information into Wikipedia,
or insulting others), to criminal actions including blackmail, distribution of child
pornography, credit-card fraud, and phishing.
Nevertheless, some empirical research has been carried out to bring light into
this area. Unfortunately, early studies like [KPK05] only analyse the type of traffic
which is anonymized without drawing conclusions about the users’ intention or
motivation. In the following we will summarize the findings of the few studies
which do so.
In [MBG+08] it has been indicated that there are users of anonymizing coun-
tries in most countries. During a 15-day period the authors observed clients from
126 different countries, with the vast majority of clients being present in Europe,
China, the United States of America, Russia and Brazil. Therefore, it seems to be
a legitimate statement that the user base of these networks is truly global.
With regards to analysing the accessed content, research is getting more dif-
ficult. There have been both user surveys addressing the users of anonymization
services on the web [Spi03] and observatory approaches, relying on the classifica-
tion of logged traffic into several categories [Fed05]. However, the results of the
two types of studies seem to be somewhat contradictory, concerning both back-
ground of usage (with self-reports overstating professional use compared with the
32It should be noted that even in areas where confidentiality is of no concern, like plain web
browsing, no widely accepted taxonomies on users exist.
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measurement/categorization approach) and use cases. While this discrepancy may
be explained with the well-documented bias of people to overstate their privacy
sensitivity (for an overview see [Syv03, Acq04]), or the generally weak validity
of self-report studies [OFB97], to our knowledge the publications based on di-
rect measurements of anonymized traffic do not describe a clear methodology that
would allow us to retrace how the results were obtained.
Also, it is notable that users are obviously consuming a large amount of mul-
timedia content over, e.g., the Tor network, in spite of reported sluggishness (e.g.,
[DM06a, MBG+08]). So, while fast response times are a big factor when browsing
websites [GHMP04], for larger multimedia content, this factor seems less deter-
ring, especially in the case of privacy-relevant contents (like adult entertainment).
For the design of the anonymizer, it makes a big difference on which level the
attackers the user cares about are. For example, a system only designed to protect
against a local administrator (such as the proxy scenarios described in [PP06b])
would hardly be attractive for users who are trying to protect against, e.g., a gov-
ernment.
On the other hand, a strong system aimed at the strongest possible attacker
model would probably be more complex and provide less performance (and thus,
be less attractive for users) than a system aimed at a lower level of assurance. It
is, however, widely understood in economics that adoption heavily depends on
perceived ease-of-use [Dav89], causing a feedback effect.
Also note that, as [DM06a] points out, adoption of a decentralized anonymizer
is an important factor for both usefulness and usability. Perceived usefulness and
usability, in turn, are the main determinants of users’ adoption of a technological
innovation [Dav89]. However, this raises a question: Why should users use a
system, that aims at protecting against very strong attackers, to, e.g., merely browse
adult entertainment? While we cannot answer this question directly, due to the
anonymity and unlinkability properties offered by the anonymizing network, we
would like to point out that:
• In contrast to proxy configurations described, e.g., in [PP06b], anonymity
systems are widely deployed, and immediately available at no cost. This
may of course skew demand in favor of already deployed systems.
• In many countries, especially countries with heavy usage of anonymity sys-
tems (such as Iran [Fed06]), surfing for pornography and/or specific sexual
practices in the Internet may be illegal (for example, in Iran, homosexuality
and adultery may be punishable by death [Mac01]). In these countries, the
strongest attacker model may be absolutely appropriate when browsing adult
imagery.
From the last few paragraphs we can see that there is still enough room left
open for interpretation of who the users of anonymity systems really are, and what
their motivation is.
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Empirical Study
Because of these restrictions of the available material, we decided to do a new
analysis for this paper, with clearly documented methodology. We are basing our
analysis on automation using artificial intelligence, with the aim of minimizing
human error, increased data protection and enabling later verification of our mea-
surements.
As a basis for our analysis, we recorded parts of the output of a exit node of the
Tor network, as well as data from an outgoing proxy of a German university at the
same time. We categorize the visited websites and compared the results.
We actually restricted our analysis to HTTP traffic. [iG07] and [MBG+08]
point out that the largest class of traffic in normal, as well as anonymizing net-
works is peer-to-peer traffic, followed by HTTP. An analysis of peer-to-peer traf-
fic, however, is not feasible within a reasonable time frame, as file transfers are
highly decentralized and content analysis may not be possible due to chunking of
transmitted files. Therefore, we restricted our analysis to HTTP traffic.
Also, HTTP has a long tradition of scientific analysis and there are well-known
methods for analysing HTTP traffic in a privacy-preserving way. The latter was
made even simpler in our case, as we were not able to see the originating IP address
of a request. In addition, we did not save any information except the requested URL
itself; this includes any additional header information like cookies, etc. Requests
sent with methods other than GET, e.g., POST requests, or any requests containing
GET variables, were completely left out of the analysis. We also filtered the time
stamp of a request to store only the year and the month and mixed the request per
month so as to hide any information about the order of requests and also thwarts
guesses narrowing down the date of a request within a month. The processing
was done in an automated fashion and with several people involved so that the
researchers for the actual analysis did not have access to the original data, whereas
the others only selected the URLs from the original data set33.
These methods were applied to log files of the exit node of the Tor network, as
well as log files from users which were surfing in plain. The choice of a university
proxy as a control group to Tor was based on the fact that we were unable to get a
more representative data set from an ISP, because the data we would have needed
is either not recorded or not released for research purposes.
As a lot of multimedia content is sent via websites like image-hosting servers
where the content is difficult to predict based only on the URL, we had to inspect
the actual content. Therefore, we retrieved the content of about 7,000 images from
each of the two sets of URLs. To avoid the result being biased by a vast amount of
small pictures, used as icons or frame borders in webpages, we limited the search
to images with a size larger than 10,000 bytes34.
33This procedure was advised by the ICPP, a German Independent Center for Privacy Protection.
34Note also that small images are not perceived by web surfers as such, but rather as part of their
ornamental function.
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Class 0 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Plain 66% 7% 8% 8% 11%
Tor 28% 15% 15% 14% 28%
Table 2.3: Categorizing pornographic content from plain networks and in anony-
mizing networks
We then used a set of pattern-matching techniques (e.g., Bag-of-Visual-Words
Models trained Support Vector Machines [DPN08]), to classify the images into five
categories:
Class 0 definitely inoffensive images
Class 1 lightly dressed persons, might be offensive in very strict environments
Class 2 partly nude persons, might be objectionable in school environments
Class 3 nude persons, likely objectionable in many environments
Class 4 pornographic images, i.e. one or more persons engaging in sexual inter-
course, likely offensive in most environments
In order to minimize the classification error, we used the automated classifica-
tion method autonomously only for a preliminary result, as the pictures extracted
from the URL streams were too diverse to produce acceptable classification results
in a single unsupervised run. The overall correct classification rate was 33% in the
case of the pictures coming from Tor and 44% for the pictures from the university’s
proxy. The classification rate was raised to 70% (Tor) and 75% (Proxy), respec-
tively, if a deviation of one class (e.g., placing images from Class 1 into either Class
2 or Class 0) was deemed an acceptable error.
Because of these shortcomings, the input of the automated classification was
then enhanced in a manual process of re-classification. Due to time constraints
and data protection concerns we only used a random sample of 1,000 images from
each set for a final manual classification. The results of the second step are listed
in Table 2.3.
We used the one-sided Wilcoxon rank test to check whether the traffic from
Tor contains significantly more pornographic material than the plain traffic and
obtained a p-value < 2.2 ·1016 which means that the traffic fro Tor does contain a
significant higher percentage of adult images.
As a result, we can identify that the Tor network has a much higher percentage
of pornographic material than normal traffic: 72% vs. 34% of the pictures. Even if
material from “Class 1” is not counted, despite that it can be encountered in, e.g.,
advertising from European countries, the percentage remains substantially higher
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(57% vs. 27%). This correlates with results of related work that activities related
to sexual behaviour are very privacy sensitive and therefore subject to privacy-
protection techniques [TECA07].
2.4.4 Service Providers
Despite the current hype on user-generated content, which is also known under
the term “Web 2.0”, the majority of content in the Internet is run and offered by
companies. Even websites which take input from their users are maintained and
operated by companies or organizations.
If the service offered does not allow for much interaction with a remote user,
service providers typically do not be bothered about, to which extent the service is
accessed anonymously. In other cases, they care: As the Web Application Secu-
rity Consortium (WASC) points out in their latest online publication35 , up to 97%
of interactive web applications contain software errors which can be exploited by
attackers. As it is difficult to impossible to commit legal actions against malice
coming from an anonymizing network, some companies have been known to block
access from them.
Second, profiling customers is sometimes part of the company’s business model.
By making use of relaying techniques, users reduce the company’s profit. In the
case of “Web 2.0” sites, where services rely on input made by users, the company’s
profit is directly linked to the value of the collected information.
Thus, unless the purpose of the offered service is widely accepted to be of very
a private nature, like health related forums, service providers have a reasonable
tendency to dislike anonymizing services.
2.4.5 Law Enforcement, Crime Prosecution
Due to the inherent features of protecting the sender’s identity, anonymizing sys-
tems have the reputation of attracting offenders36. Therefore, governmental agen-
cies which deal with criminal investigations or prosecution of crime have to tackle
problems with anonymizing networks. This includes, depending on the country,
police, secret services, judges and prosecutors. Recently, even legislative bodies
have become aware of related issues.
In most cases it is the task of the police to do active investigations, backed
up by orders from a court or prosecutors. Thus, it is up to them to cope with the
higher burden of tracing abusers in anonymous networks, rather than the normal
Internet37. It can be easily seen that they often have a professional interest in
35See http://www.webappsec.org/projects/statistics/
36Up to now no public study has proven that quantity or quality of abuse in anonymizing networks
is greater, equal, or even lesser, than in normal networks.
37Which is already difficult enough!
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identifying the source or destination of some specific messages. This leads them
to ask node operators for the origin or the destination of a given piece of data. If
the node is operated within a different jurisdiction, however, this request will most
often be turned down. Otherwise, i.e. if the police can get hold of the node operator,
they might be able to trace back a single step out of many. Ultimately, there was no
publicly known case, in which it was possible to trace back anonymous messages.
In this context, legislative bodies started to act. For example, the European
Union decided upon the data retention act [Eur06] which in turn is to be imple-
mented in its member states. This led to an expansion of German law which now
also requires forwarding nodes to keep logs of the source addresses from messages
they forward. The extent of this measure is disputed – while advocates of the data
retention directive claim that this will give the police substantial help, others esti-
mate the raising of the crime detection rate to be less than 0.1%38.
For completeness, we would like to point out that some countries do not only
have no faith in other countries’ legal systems, but also actively accuse the legal
bodies of other countries of being corrupt. As this is not the place for ethical
discussions, the interested reader can get material from international human rights
organizations, like Amnesty International39 or the Human Rights Watch40, for an
overview of legal bodies which are considered to abuse their privileges.
Consequently, while it is the very incentive of legal bodies to bring offenders
to justice, it might be difficult to decide whether to help them, or not. In the current
state, offenders are well protected, which makes the law enforcement agencies
clear opponents of anonymizing techniques41 .
2.4.6 Discussion
As can be clearly seen, the desires and goals for the involved parties differ widely.
We will summarize the findings from the above sections in this analysis of multi-
lateral security requirements.
Users prefer to obtain a high degree and irrevocable anonymity42. The situation
for node operators is similar: from the fact that they donate time and other scarce
resources to other people we can deduce that they identify themselves with the
users’ goals. A minor difference is that most users do not care about the set of
38See the statement of the German Work Group on Data Retention together with a
union of judges and prosecutors at http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/
stellungnahme_vorratsdatenspeicherung.pdf
39http://www.amnesty.org/
40http://www.hrw.org/
41Note that it is reported that some crime investigators use anonymizing networks themselves for
research purposes.
42Bundled with good quality of service – but we are currently only discussing the level of ano-
nymity.
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other users, as long as their presence protects them. Node operators, on the other
hand, can possibly be held liable for the users’ actions and thus do have an interest
in reducing the amount of abuse which happens with the help of their systems.
Law enforcement, on the other side, would opt for revocable anonymity, or
possibly even networks in which most data streams can be linked to their original
sender and recipient – the more transparency, the better. Service providers and
ISPs will in most cases not take an extreme position, but rather go with a more
“law and order” approach, as this eases their way to make a profit. In cases of
abuse, providers will in any case contact the police, rather than seek advise and
help from the anonymizing networks’ operators.
Certainly, these extreme positions do not reflect the view of all users or per-
sons working for a legal body; especially as these sets are not disjoint. But it can
be trivially seen that the diversity of opinions bears some potential for controver-
sial discussion. With no global consensus, or one side to get ahead the other by
unexpected technical advancements, no solution is in sight. As social problems
can typically not be solved by technical means43; we therefore refrain from getting
into more depth at this point.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we covered the context and building blocks of anonymizing com-
munication networks. To this end we discussed:
• A rough sketch of related fields whose contribution are essential building
blocks for our subject. Namely we covered computer networks and various
sub-fields of IT-security.
• An introduction to the terminology used throughout this work. For homonyms
we fixed a single meaning and chose a single word out of a set for clarity rea-
sons.
• Protection goals which are targeted by our topic:
– sender anonymity
– recipient anonymity
– unlinkability
– possibly: undetectability and unobservability
• A detailed view on the entities and parties involved and affected by anony-
mous communication systems. A brief view of their intentions, goals and
motivations was included.
43We would also like to recapitulate that in an open environment technical solutions are the only
way to enforce properties.
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Future research in at least the following areas is necessary:
• To which extent are security properties additive in anonymous networks?
While this is known to be not true in general, there are possibly certain cri-
teria in our topic which can be used for general proofs.
• What is the incentive for system operators to contribute bandwidth and com-
putational power to anonymity systems? How can donations be stipulated
and rewarded?
• The biggest threat to the deployment of anonymizing networks is abuse.
Even though social problems are said to be not solvable by technical means,
some questions arise:
– How does the quantity and quality of abuse in anonymizing networks
compare to the amount in normal traffic?
– To which extent is it feasible to identify (repeating) abusers, while pro-
tecting the privacy of the others?
Are there other means to cope with abuse?
– Are there ways to cope with different definitions of abuse? The sets of
outlawed behaviour are different in different countries.
In the next chapter we will describe the actual algorithms and systems used
to achieve network layer anonymity. An overview of additional requirements for
deployment is given and technical details of the implementations are discussed.
Chapter 3
Anonymizing Networks
This chapter provides a survey on mechanisms for network layer anonymity. Its
purpose is to give a detailed look into the different approaches which seek to
achieve protection on the subjects as defined in the previous chapter on terminol-
ogy, i.e. sender or recipient anonymity.
The first part is a brief introduction into theoretical models. We show which
algorithms and protocols have been proposed in order to realize privacy protection.
To this end we will first discuss comparatively simple means like broadcasting
messages. Despite its simplicity this can still be used to build strong systems. Then
we carry on with approaches using relays in several ways. Finally, techniques are
shown which utilize strong cryptographic building blocks to obtain their objectives.
In the second part we present predominant implementations of these algo-
rithms. To start with, a short section on trivial means to achieve some anonymiza-
tion against weak attackers is given. Then, we will describe and compare four
networks, which have a significant user base, namely: Tor, AN.ON, I2P and Mix-
master. In addition, a concise sketch of some minor anonymity projects is given
together with a list of influential, but abandoned projects.
This chapter is terminated with a short summary in which we will give some
classification of the existing systems.
3.1 Theoretical Models
In this chapter we will describe important protocols which were proposed for
anonymous communication systems. The basics presented in the previous chapter
will be taken as a basis to deepen the knowledge about the algorithms. This section
is also used to show common roots for deployed systems which are discussed in
the next section.
In principle, all anonymizing networks are composed out of two functions: an
embedding function and a grouping, or: cover function [KP06]. If an attacker is
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able to control or tamper with any of these two, the degree of protection is lowered.
We can also notice that anonymity is of multilateral concern: a single user is unable
to achieve anonymity by himself and is thus reliant on other participants.
Even though we provide the reader with a lot of details, the confined space
restricts us from considering very detailed questions. An obliged reader will find
more information in the overviews given in works like [KP03, HJW03, DD08] and
in the specialized works on the respective sub-topic of interest, of course.
3.1.1 Broadcast
Broadcast channels can be used to achieve an excellent level of protection. How-
ever, broadcasting requires extensive use of resources in modern communication
media, e.g., the Internet. In real broadcasting media, as with satellites or radio
communication, access is strongly regulated and usually out of scope for arbitrary
personal communication. Thus, broadcasting is only used in rather uncommon
forms of anonymous communication systems.
Sending messages that everybody receives (or can receive) such that only the
real recipient is able to read or decrypt them is a classical means to ensure recipient
unobservability. For example, coded messages were broadcast by radio during
World War II to the French resistance. Of course, nobody but the recipients could
say which radio listeners were able to decrypt the messages, hence the recipients
were unobservable. A similar situation is given with coded messages in newspaper
advertisements; while all readers could be possible receivers, there is no way to
know who understands what they mean.
On a computer network, broadcast allows a message to be sent to all the ad-
dresses of a given network or sub-network. Its usage is, however, constraining as
the communication links of all users are encumbered. Even if we can broadcast in
local area networks, it is not feasible to do it at a large scale (for example, over the
whole Internet) – a prominent example why this is not recommended is spam1.
When users receive a broadcast message they must be able to distinguish whether
they are the intended recipient or not. The easiest way to implement this, as in
World War II radio broadcasts, is for each user to try to decrypt the message. De-
pending on whether he is able to decrypt it into a meaningful clear text or not
the user can understand if he is the intended recipient. This approach is called im-
plicit addressing, as it works without globally visible addresses on the data packets.
To simplify the process of distinguishing meaningful and meaningless clear texts,
messages can of course be formatted in a particular way or contain a tag indicating
it has been correctly decrypted.
When a message is broadcast with an implicit address to a set of users they
form a recipient unobservability set against any attacker; except the creator of the
1On the other hand, spam could be used as a near-broadcast medium for transmitting hidden
messages.
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message who generally knows which user is able to decrypt the message2. If an
attacker controls a subset of users, the non-controlled users continue to form a
recipient unobservability set against him.
Decrypting all messages from all users which are broadcasting with implicit
addresses can quickly become computationally unaffordable. In a communication-
oriented context this computational cost can be drastically reduced, especially
when all the packets of a communication have the same recipient. When a user
starts broadcasting a communication with an implicit address, all the users attained
by the broadcast will just try to decrypt the first message of the communication. If
they do not succeed, they will infer that they are not the recipient of the commu-
nication and stop trying to decrypt the corresponding messages. Thus, a user will
just have to decrypt one message every time a communication starts and not every
time a message is sent.
3.1.2 Layered Encryption, Mixing, Onion Routing
A widely credited academic proposal to achieve additional network layer privacy
was described in Chaum’s seminal paper [Cha81]. In this paper he proposes a
cascade of mixes to hide sender-recipient relationships.
A mix is a unit that receives encrypted messages, strips off the encryption, and
learns two pieces of information: a new address and a message. If certain security
criteria are fulfilled, e.g., a minimum amount of messages have been collected, or a
certain time interval has elapsed, or both, all accumulated messages are forwarded
in a random order to their respective destinations which possibly is another mix.
This way, an external observer cannot trace the relationship between incoming and
outgoing messages.
By cascading several mixes it is impossible even for a set of colluded mix
operators to learn the sender’s peers if at least a single mix is honest. It should be
noted that the original message has to be wrapped in one layer of encryption per
mix that is traversed.
The same protocol, but without inducing additional delay or reordering mes-
sages, is also called onion routing. This refers to the layers of encryption around
the original message which avoid that any intermediary node learns more informa-
tion other than the identity of its predecessor and its successor. In the course of
forwarding a message, these layers get “peeled” off, until the last hop forwards the
original message to its recipient.
This scheme requires messages to be of unified size. Otherwise, an observer
can trace messages by their size. However, the overhead of padding messages to
2Note that in some situations it may be possible that a user encrypts and broadcasts a message
with a key without being able to know to which user this key is associated with. Therefore, the
unobservability property can also be held even against the message creator.
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this size is feasible only for e-mail messaging or similar use cases; other protocols
would require more flexibility in the message sizes and possibly also a return chan-
nel. While, in fact, Chaum developed anonymous return addresses for the system
which allow addressing of users while maintaining recipient anonymity. The round
trip time and jitter in a mix network, however, would be in any case considered too
high for any low-layer protocols as, e.g., TCP.
The security properties of mixes are quite high: given that a subset of users
is not cooperating to identify a user’s peers, and at least one mix in the cascade
is honest, an adversary should not learn enough information to break the security.
However, if users have a fixed communication pattern, this can still be discovered
if they communicate frequently.
3.1.3 DC-networks
Another basic technique to hide communication patterns is the DC-net, also pro-
posed by David Chaum in [Cha88]. Instead of routing a message over a series
of more or less trustworthy servers, a set of users forms a network and coopera-
tively uses strong cryptographic primitives in order to hide the sender of a message.
Together with implicit addressing, DC-networks also allow recipient anonymity.
DC-networks are widely considered to be the most resilient form of anonymity
networks and provide a strong degree of protection. However, they are also slower
and more easily prone to denial-of-service attacks than any other network and pro-
tocol available. Probably, due to these disadvantages they are only rarely seen in
practical implementations.
Another term for DC-networks is superposed sending. The basic idea was
presented through an allegory of some cryptographers at dinner wishing to know if
one of them had paid for the dinner, without revealing his identity (i.e., they wanted
to be able to say “I have paid” with sender unobservability). Computer networks
that implement the resulting protocol are called dining cryptographers’ networks
(DC-nets); the protocol itself is named the DC-net protocol.
In a superposed sending protocol, all the participating users send scrambled
messages at each round, even if they do not have anything to transmit. This cover
traffic is then used to hide the origin of the message to be sent, if there is one.
In any given round, if only one user has attempted to transmit a message, the
result of the round is exactly his message. If more than one user has attempted to
send a message, there is a collision due to specific properties of the network pro-
tocol3. The result is that none of the messages can be recovered from the garbled
output. The easiest way to deal with a collision is to wait for a random number
of rounds before trying to transmit again. More complex solutions to this problem
have been proposed in [Pfi89, BdB90].
3More details on this can be found in [Cha88].
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A set of users transmitting through a superposed sending protocol form a sender
unobservability set against any attacker, including even the recipients of the mes-
sage. If an attacker controls a subset of users, the non-controlled users continue to
form a sender unobservability set against him, whatever the size of the subset is.
If the users participating in the superposed sending rounds are distributed over
the Internet, there are serious performance issues: all of the users’ messages are
needed to obtain the result of a superposed sending round. Today’s Internet con-
nections have good mean throughput and latency; however, the performances are
very variable from one connection to another and even at different instants for a
given connection. With a superposed sending protocol, the latency of a round is
worse than the largest of the users’ latencies and the throughput less than the lowest
of the users’ throughputs. This protocol should therefore be used over the Internet
for high-latency and low-throughput communication only.
In a local area network, the users’ connections have stable enough throughput
and latency and thus this protocol can be used to transmit even a VoIP communi-
cation flow. However, the maximum number of users is limited.
3.1.4 Other methods
Some users and designers of anonymous communication systems consider the
overhead of making multiple layers of encryption too big. Thus, some researchers
proposed to randomly pass the message around within a set of users before for-
warding it to its final destination [RR98]. This protocol does not provide as much
protection as the prior one, and is susceptible to more attacks, e.g., [PP07a]. On
the upper side, it offers a certain degree of plausible deniability and is said to offer
a better quality of service.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is a field of research associated with anony-
mous communication.
Under normal conditions, a user requesting an element from a database sends
a request pointing out which element he wants to obtain. The database returns the
requested element. This simple method is obviously not suitable, if a user would
like to keep secret which item in the database he is interested in. For example, if
the database may be:
• an electronic library, and which books we read may provide information
about our politic or religious beliefs, or details about our personality we may
want to keep confidential;
• stock exchange share prices, and the clients may be investors reluctant to
divulge which share they are interested in;
• a pharmaceutical database, and some client laboratories wish that nobody
may learn which are the active principles they want to use.
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To protect his privacy, a user accessing a database may therefore want to re-
trieve an element without revealing which element he is interested in. A trivial
solution for the user is to download the entire database and retrieve locally the el-
ement he wants to obtain. This is usually unacceptable if the database is too large
(for example, an electronic library), quickly obsolete (for example, stock exchange
share prices), or confidential (for example, a pharmaceutical database).
Private Information Retrieval schemes aim to provide the same confidentiality
to the user (with regard to the choice of the retrieved element) as downloading
the entire database, with sub-linear communication cost. PIR was introduced by
Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan in 1995 [CGKS95]. In their paper, they
proposed a set of schemes to implement PIR through replicated databases which
provide users with information-theoretic security as long as some of the database
replicas do not collude against the users.
In theory, PIR could be used to implement limited web-surfing capabilities, but
no implementation is known to provide this.
A different approach is the use of steganographic network layer protocols.
These are designed to hide the real data within dummy traffic, in a way to avoid
that third parties do not even recognize that there is a different data stream hid-
den under the dummy traffic. As opposed to encryption where the volume and the
mere presence of a message is clear, these techniques hide even the fact that a user
is currently communicating.
A prominent example of dummy traffic is Voice over IP (VoIP). Another widely
used medium are pictures: once the message has been embedded, pictures can be
posted to a website or the usenet without raising suspicion. The drawback of these
network protocols is the small bandwidth available in the covered channel as well
as the fact that there are practically no widespread networks or implementations
thereof; one proposed system was described in [WWP07].
3.2 Deployed Systems
This chapter deals with a detailed description and comparison of deployed systems.
In contrast to theoretical works which mostly focus on the actual routing of the
message, there are more problems to solve in order to deploy a system (besides
providing the targeted degree of privacy). Major issues include:
a directory service which tells new clients where to find relays. As the choice of
servers can uniquely identify clients and the client has to trust the servers, it
is a non-trivial task to design a secure directory service.
quality of service is an absolute requirement in order to gain and keep users in the
network.
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an update service is necessary in order to provide users with bug-fixes and other
security measures. As anonymous communication is a rather new field of
research, attacks emerge on a regular basis. Such it is inevitable to release
and distribute regular updates for client-side software.
application layer sanitization is sometimes considered to be part of the applica-
tion’s task.
It should be noted that in some places the use of anonymity systems is restricted
and possibly fined. Therefore, standard solutions for deploying information cannot
be used, if users from these regions are targeted by a given deployment. Possibly,
this leads to a “hen and egg” problem where an anonymity system is required to
gain access to the system itself. Today, the only feasible solution to this problem
is to find trusted third parties which provide bridges to the area which restricts the
use of anonymity systems.
3.2.1 Basic Techniques
In this section we will briefly list basic techniques to achieve network layer privacy
with simple means. As these techniques do no protect against strong adversaries,
they are only rarely considered in academic literature. However, they can sig-
nificantly contribute to the users’ privacy. Depending on the information which
is intended to be kept secret and the potential adversaries, they possibly provide
suitable protection in combination with an excellent trade-off in performance and
overhead.
Single-Hop Proxies, i.e. simple application layer proxies, are one of the cur-
rently most popular and probably easiest methods of anonymization to deploy and
analyze. Typical proxy protocols are HTTP proxy protocol or Socks [Lee]. Proxies
hide the identity of the sender by forwarding the request and stripping informa-
tion about the request originator. The peer partner only learns the address of the
proxy and is not able to see the original sender. This method can be used either by
configuring a proxy server setting in an application or by utilizing web interfaces
for anonymous browsing4. While this solution sounds trivial, it already protects
against one very common adversary: the peer.
In cases the connection to the proxy server is encrypted, this method also pro-
tects against local area eavesdroppers (e.g., an local administrator or the user’s
ISP). Actually, given a trusted operator of the proxy, this method is reportedly used
by many people today to circumvent governmental censorship and can be powerful
enough to defeat even government-level blocking techniques [Mur08].
On the down side, single-hop proxies have a single point of failure and trust: a
user has to trust the operator as the proxy operator on his own has all necessary data
4http://www.anonymizer.com/
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to de-anonymize involved users and their peers. Of course, technically versatile
users are able to operate proxies (with encryption) on their own, in which case this
point is not valid, but if there are no other users they could be identified by a peer.
Furthermore, the approach is vulnerable to an attack where an eavesdropper
can observe and correlate all traffic entering and leaving the proxy. Also, if no
padding on the packet layer is applied – which is the case in the use of standard
software – this approach becomes vulnerable to fingerprinting attacks [Ray00].
As this approach is simple, and sometimes sufficient, a variety of versions exist,
which should be mentioned here. First, there are a couple of commercial offers for
single-hop anonymization. These can be readily used by any user willing to pay
for some protection. To which extent these services can be trusted not to identify
users is unknown and depends on the individual case.
The second variant is the use of open relays, i.e. misconfigured5 proxy servers
that provide their services for anyone who knows where to find them in the Internet.
As there are groups of people scanning the Internet for open relays and publishing
their results on websites6, the effort of finding open relays can be actually very
small. Besides listing IP addresses and TCP port numbers of open relays, some
proxy scanners also display whether the proxy has high bandwidth and if it strips
off the original address of the sender.
And third, there are bot nets, i.e. computers that have been compromised by
viruses or worms and form a network which can deploy arbitrary services for the
creator of the malware. One very popular service which is chosen by the virus
author is to anonymize his traffic. To this end he sets up proxy servers on the
infected computers and can then use the compromised computer’s IP address to
commit more malice. Of course, running bot nets is illegal – but we take this as one
example where a ban of public anonymizing networks would still allow criminals
to retain their privacy, whereas the average end user would lose it.
A side note on IP- and MAC-address spoofing: as a computer can only partic-
ipate in the Internet by using the Internet protocol, it makes virtually no sense to
change the IP address in order to stay anonymous7. As the user is typically inter-
ested in retrieving information, he has to use his own IP address, or otherwise the
requested response will be routed to some stranger8. Without going into further
details: spoofing the IP address is only of use in a very restricted manner, and even
then it does not protect against strong adversaries. The same applies to the MAC
address.
5Most often unintentionally.
6http://www.xroxy.com/proxylist.htm, http://www.freshproxy.org/, . . .
7Some tutorials claim that it even is possible to use the Internet without an IP at all – this, of
course, is utter nonsense.
8Even if the user is not interested in the response to his request: using IP spoofing for TCP has
become very difficult in recent times.
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3.2.2 Tor
At the time of writing, the Tor-network [DMS04, Din08] is the network with the
most number of users and related research publications. It is capable of anonymiz-
ing arbitrary TCP-streams and consists of a client-server architecture.
Clients can build circuits over the Tor network using onion routing. These
tunnels can contain several parallel data streams, which relate to arbitrary TCP
connections in a normal network. The only asymmetric cryptographic operations
in place are used in the build-up phase of the circuits; thus adding a new stream
to an existing circuit is cheap in terms of computational effort for all participating
nodes.
In between nodes all traffic is relayed in a single TCP connection. This con-
nection is protected with TLS and all data is padded to a unified size (“a cell”)
such that an external eavesdropper is not capable of distinguishing between traffic
which belongs to an existing connection and packets that initiate new circuits.
However, before a client can use the network, he would first have to get the
network information about the available servers from a cascaded cache group of
dedicated directory servers. This hierarchy is ultimately controlled by a very small
group (three to five) of master directory servers, i.e. their operators. The directory
listing not only contains information about the servers’ IP addresses and TCP port
numbers, but also their available bandwidth, contact information, and their policy
for relaying traffic out of the Tor network into the Internet. The latter is a means
of restricting abuse over the Tor network, like spam or bandwidth consuming file
sharing.
The Tor protocol also provides perfect forward secrecy, i.e. logged traffic can-
not be decrypted later on, even if the secret keys of the participating parties are
leaked. The same mechanism, which in fact is the use of the Diffie-Hellmann al-
gorithm, is also used to thwart replay attacks.
As the Tor network is comprised of nodes which are operated by a number
of privacy enthusiasts, the bandwidth, uptime, and computational power of the
nodes vary widely. Thus, clients try to route more traffic over those nodes which
announce a bigger amount of available resources. Recent statistics show a heavy
tailed distribution with only a handful of nodes carrying the majority of traffic (see
Figure 3.1 on the next page; note that the Y-scale is logarithmic).
Due to the distributed setup of Tor, it offers a unique range of opportunities to
its users. One is that clients can choose a country where their streams shall emerge
from the anonymity network – thus effectively circumventing geolocation-based
filtering. The big set of Tor users (it is estimated that at any given time several-
hundred-thousand users are connected [Tora, Torb]) also provides a good level of
protection.
Tor also offers location-hidden services. Thus, it makes it possible to offer web
services, e-mail, file storage, or any other TCP-based service under a pseudony-
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Figure 3.1: A graph depicting the available bandwidth for all running Tor routers,
September 2008
mous address. Some services offer VPN-like services to tunnel arbitrary IP pack-
ets9.
Besides there are a couple of inherent issues with Tor, too10. First, due to its
low-latency properties an attacker can link two peers if he controls the link to the
user or the first node, and the link to the user’s peer or the last node. This vulner-
ability has been shown to be applicable in a couple of attacks and first in [ØS06].
In addition to this, the load balancing algorithm is widely considered to be a weak
point: if an attacker is able to deploy even only a handful of high-bandwidth nodes,
he is able to eavesdrop upon the majority of traffic running through Tor.
Another obvious problem with Tor is that it is stream-oriented and reserves
static resources for circuits; if a node in the path breaks down or gets disconnected,
the circuit, together with the attached streams is gone and cannot be reconstructed.
Summarizing, Tor is currently the most interesting anonymizing network from
a researcher’s perspective as it has a lot of open questions due to its complexity11.
9http://www.abenteuerland.at/onioncat/
10There are a plethora of known caveats in Tor, e.g., the DNS leakage problem. However, given a
proper implementation and integration of Tor, these can usually be circumvented.
11The downside is that this prevents a thorough security analysis.
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In addition, based on an aggressive advertisement of its developers, it is also the
most widespread used network.
3.2.3 AN.ON, also known as JAP or Jondos
A second well-known system is AN.ON which has been known under a set of dif-
ferent names: formerly belonging to the German project AN.ON (for: ANonymity
ONline) [BFK00], the project was sometimes also referred to as JAP12, which is
actually the name of the client side-software. Recently, the project founded a com-
mercial spin-off company, called Jondos13. For the sake of consistency, we will
refer to this protocol as AN.ON.
In AN.ON, similar to Tor, traffic is routed over three nodes (“hops”) and uses
onion routing to avoid the hops learning too much information. It is also capable
of relaying arbitrary TCP-streams.
In contrast to the Tor network, where any user can deploy servers and clients
are free to choose arbitrary routes through the interconnected network, the AN.ON
network offers a limited set of fixed cascades, thus the traffic is more channeled
than in Tor. The cascades also need to register with a central authority. The rather
small amount of them makes a caching hierarchy or other more sophisticated tech-
nologies for distributing information unnecessary. To which extent this influences
the network’s security is disputed: for example, the small number of cascades as
well as their static IPs and restricted geographic diversity makes wiretapping and
end-to-end traffic confirmation easy. Deployment of rogue servers or attacks on
the directory service, on the other hand, are quite difficult.
As a cascade is accepted by the central authority only if the nodes are providing
a fair amount of bandwidth, the quality of service is better than in Tor. Especially,
the jitter is much lower, which results in a more consistent user experience.
On the other hand, AN.ON does not have forward secrecy, i.e. if at some point
an attacker gains access to a server’s secret key, he can decrypt recorded encrypted
traffic. Mixing as well as a protection against replay attacks is implemented but not
enabled with the default settings. Support for pseudonymous services is not given.
Despite the network having the capabilities in principle to relay arbitrary TCP
streams, the usual configuration does only allow HTTP and HTTPS, as an abuse-
reducing policy.
3.2.4 Invisible Internet Project, I2P
The Invisible Internet Project [I2P07], also called I2P or simply I2P, is another big
network for anonymous communication.
12The abbreviation of Java Anonymity Proxy.
13This refers to the term “Jon Doe”.
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Whereas the developers of other projects are known and can be linked to real-
life identities, I2P’s developers are only known under pseudonyms, if at all. To a
certain extent this culminates in the fact that there is next to no academic coverage
of this network. Despite this, it was designed with a higher generic abstraction than
Tor and AN.ON, and targets a higher security level.
As opposed to the prior introduced applications, I2P is packet based, with its
own implementation for streams to handle window sizes, retransmissions, etc. It
is also possible for I2P-routers to put several smaller packets which are directed
to the next same hop into a single large packet – this is called garlic routing by
the developers. Even though it is mostly used for low-latency communication,
its protocol has built-in support for variable latency, similar to the functionality
proposed in, e.g., Stop-and-Go mixes [KEB98]. Instead of a central directory, I2P
uses a distributed hash table (DHT) to locate other nodes.
Additional security mechanisms include different routes for inbound and out-
bound messages to thwart fingerprinting attacks. This also serves as a load-balancing
mechanism and allegedly enhances the quality of service. Similar to Tor it is pos-
sible to offer pseudonymous services and in fact every participant can be reached
under the pseudonym of his public key14.
However, as I2P has near to no academic coverage and analysis, it is rendered
efficiently insignificant despite its merits. Drawbacks are also the lack of easily
available documentation, i.e. there is no byte-level specification of its network layer
protocol online.
3.2.5 Mixmaster and Mixminion
The primary anonymizing network for sender anonymity in e-mail messaging and
usenet postings is currently Mixmaster. It is comprised of a loose network of actual
mixes, i.e. incoming messages are kept for a while in the mix and the output of
messages is done in a reordered way.
A predecessor of this e-mail anonymity system was a single proxy node known
as penet.fi. It allowed anonymous relay of e-mail messages until it got shut
down by law enforcement which acted upon an abuse request. The network pro-
tocol evolved from penet.fi to the cypherpunk network which finally became
Mixmaster.
Differences to Tor, I2P and AN.ON include not only the obviously different
scope (TCP streams and IP packets on one side, e-mail messages on the other),
but also the lack of a central directory authority. For the Mixmaster network, there
is a set of pinger nodes that constantly measure the availability, bandwidth and
reliability of the network’s nodes. It is then up to the single user to choose a set of
pinger node operators he trusts, or operate a ping service of his own.
14If the key is known, that is.
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Due to this specialized design Mixmaster seems to be the network with the
highest degree of anonymity15.
Even though messages can take several hours or even days to pass through the
network, it can be used for limited web “surfing”. This can be achieved by the
help of mail2web gateways16: these are services which can be asked by e-mail
to download a URL. The result is subsequently sent to either an arbitrary e-mail
address which is specified in the request, or posted to a usenet group. Depending
on the choice of the person’s need and capabilities to receive pseudonymous e-
mails, the latter is the preferred way of getting the requested content. While this
procedure is not suited for interactive web applications, like web mail, it can still
be used to poll web forums, news or encyclopedic webpages.
A parallel development in the area of e-mail security is the Mixminion proto-
col [DDM03]. However, the development seems to have stalled from September
2007 on.
3.2.6 Minor Projects
In addition to the larger and well-known projects listed above, there is a plethora
of smaller projects on the topic of anonymous communication.
Freenet [CSWH00] is a content-oriented network providing a distributed censor-
ship-resistant platform for file sharing. It does so by distributing the data in an en-
crypted form over the various participating computers. Hence, once a file is in the
network, the original source is able to disconnect without the content getting lost.
Access to the files is provided by means of a de-centralized distributed hash table.
The level of protection which is currently provided to users accessing the con-
tent can be described as “plausible deniability” rather than true anonymity. Onion
routing and multiple layers of encryption are scheduled to be included yet within
the next major release. In the current version anonymity is achieved by forwarding
requests over multiple hops without encryption.
Besides providing content, Freenet supports pseudonymous e-mails and usenet
functionality provided by add-ons to the basic software.
In 2007 Landsiedel, Pimenidis et al. proposed MORE, a low-latency onion-
routing network that could avoid holding any states in the forwarding nodes at
all [LPW+07]. In addition to saving memory for the forwarding nodes, this gives
communicating nodes the opportunity to change their paths transparently at will.
The downside is extensive use of asymmetric cryptographic operations.
As asymmetric cryptography is known to require extensive computational ef-
forts, MORE uses elliptic curve cryptography, which is somewhat faster than tra-
ditional algorithms based on discrete logarithms. Even though this relieves some
15There is no general means to quantify anonymity.
16A popular gateway is located at agora@dna.affrc.go.jp
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burden of the forwarding nodes, MORE supports a mode called key-reuse for an
even bigger performance boost: under normal circumstances clients generate one
public/private key pair for each hop and data packet which is sent. With the help of
this and the server’s key, a shared secret is computed which is used to decrypt the
payload of the packet at the forwarding server. To increase performance, clients
can choose to reuse an asymmetric key pair with a hop to avoid repeated compu-
tation of the shared secret. On the other hand, the price to pay in exchange is a
(small) loss of anonymity, as the server is able to link the two data packets to the
same sender.
As with I2P, MORE is a pure IP-overlay network and allows sending of IP
packets; it also has support for location-hidden services. However, it does not have
its own algorithms for data streams; therefore, the very high jitter brings down the
performance of TCP and in consequence all application layer protocols on top of
HTTP.
One central problem of anonymity networks is deployment. Without widespread
use there is only limited protection, as the number of participants is generally con-
sidered to be an important factor for security. A new approach to solve this is-
sue is by Shallon[Wes08]. In its requirement analysis the author states that the
complexity of the protocols which are used by the major implementations is a
huge hindrance factor to their deployment, but also to a thorough security analysis.
Shallon was therefore designed to consist of a set of well-known network protocols
(SSL/TLS and HTTP), which were assembled to form a simple and fast anonymity
network – early tests confirmed a good throughput and low round-trip times.
Actually, the routing protocol of Shallon is basically a layer of encryption
around a stream-based proxy protocol. In contrast to most other anonymizing net-
works, the users are free to choose any cipher suite from SSL. Thus, they can
choose high-security ciphers with ephemeral keys or cipher suites which barely
provide protection but are blazing fast17. SSL is also used to authenticate the
servers to the client.
Shallon claims to use a protocol which is most easily adaptable, as there are
ready-to-use libraries for its building blocks in virtually any programming lan-
guage. In contrast to this, other protocols utilize heavily tweaked versions of com-
mon algorithms for various reasons.
A completely different approach is taken by ant routing [GS03]. It is used by
the projects mute net [Mut08] and Ants [Ant08], both providing anonymous file
sharing. Although the ant routing algorithms are well researched for ad-hoc net-
works, their suitability for anonymity is at least disputed, often doubted. However,
no attacks against these networks or algorithms have been published yet. This can
be attributed to the fact that there is only a very limited number of users present in
these networks and therefore developing an attack does not “pay off”. Academic
coverage is also virtually non-existing.
17SSL even supports the NULL-cipher, which does not encrypt at all. However, the use of this
cipher is not possible here.
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Both networks, i.e. Ants and mute, try to keep an attacker from harvesting
information about the number and identity of the networks’ participants. The mo-
tivation for doing so is that it is hypothetically possible to de-anonymize traffic, if
an attacker knows the pseudonym and the real network address of a user. As these
networks are mere peer-to-peer networks, all the participants are also possible in-
termediary nodes, and any new user needs to learn some of these identities in order
to connect to the network. Therefore, these networks have the dilemma that they
do not want to disclose information about the IP addresses of their users, on one
hand, but they need to, on the other.
To solve this problem both protocols try to make this information as difficult
as possible to get. Participants only get to know small parts of it upon arrival of a
new node and there is no central point where all information is gathered together
at any given time. Furthermore, the information is transmitted in-band, to make it
more difficult to harvest it with conventional tools. Anyway, it is legit to doubt that
this method (“security by obscurity”) is fail-safe, but as pointed out in the previous
section, there have been no public attacks against this system, yet.
Stop-and-go-mixes (SG mixes), first presented by Kesdogan in [KEB98], are
widely considered to be the most robust and efficient type of mixes for message-
based communication, e.g., e-mail. Reliable [Rel04] is an implementation loosely
based on this technique. As it fails to implement some crucial parts of the algo-
rithm, it cannot provide a sufficient amount of protection [DSD04].
GNUnet [BG03] is yet another anonymous file-sharing system. Similar as in
Freenet, requests are forwarded a random number of times in order to achieve
plausible deniability for its users. GNUnet also makes use of a distributed hash
table as directory and for searching contents.
3.2.7 Abandoned Implementations
This chapter briefly lists implementations of anonymity networks which are no
longer developed and deployed.
Freehaven [DFM00] was meant to be an anonymously distributed data storage
for privacy-friendly publishing – thus, a predecessor of Freenet. The project was
put down due to problems with the reputation system. Also, at that time there was
no effective method of achieving strong anonymity on the network layer.
An often cited system for low-latency communication is Crowds [RR98], de-
veloped by Reiter and Rubin. Unfortunately, Crowds never left research state. Still,
there is a good academic coverage on security analyses of Crowds, e.g.,[ALFH04,
MAFH06, VSV05].
The Six/Four-System [Hac07] makes use of the GNutella network[Gnu01].
Technically, it is designed to build circuits through a network, using some kind of
onion routing with hop-to-hop encryption as well as end-to-end encryption. How-
ever, active development stopped in October 2004, and their homepage now adver-
tises Tor as a method for secure communication.
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DC-Net-chat [DCN03] was a short-lived attempt to create an instant messenger
based on DC-nets. Last activity in the project was recorded end of 2003.
Cebolla [Bro02] was an approach in 2002 to achieve network layer anonymity
using UDP-packets on the transport layer to build virtual tunnels.
While Tarzan [FM02] was an actual implementation, it did not receive any
kind of relevant deployment in order to make statements or measurements on its
performance under load or with real traffic.
Morphmix [RP02] has been proposed as a solution specifically designed against
Sybil attacks18 and collusion in general. However, due to the complexity of estab-
lishing a circuit, there was never significant deployment.
Herbivore [GRPS03], a network using DC-network technology instead of onion
routing, has never left alpha-status. However, there was a prototype implementa-
tion that was used for performance studies on PlanetLab19.
A simple proof of concept using satellite broadcasting was shown in [AGL05].
Due to the limited deployment of satellite Internet lines, project development has
been stalled.
3.2.8 Overview
A short overview of the described techniques is given in the Table 3.1 on the next
page. In the column Type we denote if the network is designed for data streams,
message based protocols, or has an emphasis on transmitting contents/files. In the
latter case, the targeted latency is not of high importance as even plain content-
oriented networks take a lot of time to transmit files. For stream- and message-
oriented networks, we listed a targeted latency in the table – this value is widely
expected to correspond to the amount of anonymity which is provided to the end-
user; induced latency is a countermeasure against a third party observing the mes-
sages going in and out of a mix unit. To which degree the desired protection level is
reached using induced latency is uncertain as there are yet no measures to quantify
the degree of anonymity provided by a system. It should also be noted that high
latency makes no sense for stream-oriented networks.
In the column Directory we listed the type of directory which is used to tell the
clients where to find the servers. Finally, the last column displays which basic tech-
nique is used to provide anonymity. From this table, and the descriptions above,
we see that there is a wide variety of systems – however, there are not enough of
them to fill the full cardinality of the feature space given in Table 3.1. However,
we illustrated the degree of relationship between these systems in Figure 3.2.
We used the colour red to mark the four major systems. Box-shaped nodes
present stream-oriented networks, while round boxes are used for message-based
18See Section 6.4.2 on page 102 for an explanation.
19An open platform for developing “planetary-scale” services, [CCR+03]
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Name Type
Targeted
Latency
Directory Based on
Tor Streams low Hierarchy Onion Routing
AN.ON Streams low Central Mixing
major
I2P
Messages,
Streams on top low DHT Onion Routing
Mixmaster Messages high External Mixing
Reliable Messages high (unknown) (SG-)Mixing
Shallon Streams low DHT Onion Routing
MORE Messages low Central Onion Routing
minor Mute Content — Internal Ants Routing
Ants Content — Internal Ants Routing
Freenet Content — DHT Multiple Forwarding
GNUnet Content low DHT Multiple Forwarding
Table 3.1: Overview on deployed anonymity networks
AN.ON
Ants
Freenet
GNUnet
I2P
MORE
Mixmaster
Mute
Reliable
Shallon
Tor
Figure 3.2: Degree of relationship between deployed anonymity systems
systems. Networks used for anonymous content distribution are displayed with
hexagonal nodes. Bold lines connect similar networks whereas dotted lines repre-
sent a somewhat medium relation between two nodes.
In this figure we can see three groups: the networks targeted for e-mail messag-
ing and usenet: Mixmaster and Reliable, the group of content-oriented networks,
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and the group of low-latency systems for interactive network protocols. Differ-
ences between these three groups are so high that there is currently no widely
accepted way of comparing implementations from different groups.
But there is also virtually no research which compares implementations in a
single group. One exception is the work of Diaz et al. [DSD04]. In this paper
the two implementations of Mixmaster and Reliable are compared with regard to
the amount of security they provide. The bottom line is that Mixmaster provides
a higher degree of security than Reliable; however the security analysis did only
take into account the routing/forwarding protocol. Vulnerabilities originating from
the respective directory functionality, deployment, or implementation details were
beyond the scope of their work.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we gave an overview on theoretical approaches to support network
layer anonymity. In addition we discussed the technical details of four important
and some minor deployed systems.
We can conclude that there are basically three protocols which can be used
to achieve anonymity: broadcast, forwarding with layered encryption and DC-
networks. As both, broadcasting and DC-networks, have strong technical con-
straints they are today no deployed systems of significance which make use of
these protocols.
In fact, most deployed systems make use of multiple forwarding, possibly en-
hanced with layered encryption and induced delays. We gave a categorization into
three different groups, depending on their focus. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to give a quantitative comparative analysis of their security properties.
Hence, future research in at least the following areas is necessary:
• Which security implications are due to each choice of directory? Is the cen-
tralized approach superior to a distributed hash table? If so, is this true for
security or performance? Are there possibly other forms of directories (hy-
brids?) with even better properties?
• To which extent can the properties (security and performance) of each rout-
ing protocol be quantified? Is it possible to compare the routing protocols
with regards to their security?
In addition to this: all existing implementations are far too complex for se-
curity proofs. It might be beneficial to have a very simple implementation
deployed in order to study it in real networks.
• Today, low-latency networks are mostly stream based. The major reason
for this is to introduce states for avoiding asymmetric encryption. However,
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the success of, e.g., IP has shown that stateless routers have advantages. To
which extent is it possible to create an anonymous network which performs
well and does not need to keep state in the intermediary nodes?
In the following chapter we will switch the focus from the view on protocols
and networks to a special entity related to these: the attacker that strives to break
the security provided by these systems.
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Chapter 4
Value-Added Works
This chapter lists works which are independent of specific anonymous communi-
cation networks and their implementation, but still try to enhance their properties.
This does not only refer to security properties, but in general also to the provided
quality of service, i.e. latency, bandwidth and jitter.
As examples we discuss
• a method to deploy server-side enforced anonymity. This refers to services
which should only be reachable via anonymizing networks. The main ratio-
nale for this is that these services want to enforce privacy-enabled behaviour
by their clients.
• broadening the scope of protocols which are transported on anonymizing
networks. To this end we will discuss some issues which arise, if we add a
layer of IP on top of anonymized streams.
• research which is targeted into enhancing the user experience of anonymiz-
ing networks. Especially the quality of service.
4.1 Server-Side Enforced Anonymity
One example application for anonymizing systems are webpages or online com-
munities which offer help for issues of health, psychological problems or similar.
However, installing and using an anonymizing system is known to be error prone
and possibly too difficult for the average end user1.
The main problem in the named scenarios are that the average end user is either
incapable of deploying anonymity solutions by himself, does not know about their
1We do not know a publicly available study to show this. However, mere encryption systems
have been shown to be too difficult to use in [WT99, GM05]. As anonymity systems are by far more
complex than encryption systems, we can safely assume the hypothesis above.
61
62 CHAPTER 4: VALUE-ADDED WORKS
existence or cannot judge which system to use. Another problem is that if some
users access the service without anonymity service, their network address might
get recorded; as any recorded data can unwillingly be abused, e.g., the server can
be compromised by a hacker, it would be better to not have any data in the system
at all.
The desired property the service should have is anonymity enforced from the
server-side, i.e. there is no possibility to get access to the content provided by the
service provider other than using an anonymizing network. However, there are
currently no out-of-the-box solutions available for this.
Though the use of proprietary software which includes a client for an anon-
ymizing network is one solution (“client to anonymously access the webpage for
people which have prostate cancer”), the deployment of such a solution is not easy:
there are a variety of different platforms which clients may use, including smart
phones or PDAs. Also, the existence of such a specialised application on a device
can be seen as a problem in itself: other users might not only learn that somebody
is in need of some special service, they also learn which service it is.
A second way to achieve this goal would be to use location-hidden services in
anonymizing networks and the use of a gateway which allows access to location-
hidden services outside the overlay network. Examples of these gateways are, e.g.,
http://tin0.de/ for I2P, or https://www.awxcnx.de/ for I2P and Tor. In this
case, however, all the critical information which should not be collected in the first
place is present at these gateways.
While a good solution is yet unknown, we developed a hybrid solution which
at least exceeds the capabilities of today’s alternatives. To this end, we built an
example website which enforces the use of an anonymizing network with the help
of a trusted Java Applet. The existence of an implementation of Tor in Java [PP08]
made it possible to include the protocol into an applet which in turn can be loaded
into a modern web browser. It took about two person days to include the applet
into a webpage and create an example webpage that loads and reloads its content
anonymized over the Tor network in return.
Figure 4.1 on the facing page provides an overview of the message flow of the
deployed setup. The user first downloads the applet and some initial Javascript
code from a trusted third party. The Javascript functions are used to boot strap the
content loading and prompts the user to choose the webpage which he would like
to visit. Any further accesses to the privacy-sensible content is then anonymized,
i.e. the user can then access the material in the described privacy-friendly method.
To test the implementation, we created a test webpage which was highly mod-
ular, i.e. HTTP requests were done asynchronously and multiples of them could
be done in parallel. With the help of the given infrastructure it is easy to develop
a framework for any kind of web application. In addition to our work it would
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2. FETCH CONTENT
USER
HOSTED APPLET
TOR NETWORK
CONTENT PROVIDER
Figure 4.1: Flow of message in content provider’s scenario.
be easy to extend any given framework which bases on Javascript, i.e. Rico2 or
QooxDoo 3.
The downside of this deployment is that the applet needs to have full access
to networking resources, i.e. in the download process, the user needs to allow the
applet to make arbitrary network connections. As these privileges are not in the
standard set of web applets’ privileges, modifications to the Java policy file need to
be made.
4.2 Virtual Anonymous Networks
Anonymizing networks are usually realised as overlay networks, and as such they
need some interface for applications to send and receive data. In most cases this
interface is comprised like a traditional proxy protocol, like Socks or HTTP Proxy.
This means, however, that users can only use applications which support the
use of proxies. One implication of this is that users have to configure the applica-
tion they would like to use with the anonymizing network. This is known to be a
non-trivial task. One way to circumvent this, and a number of other minor traps,
is to use a wrapper around an application which intercepts the networking com-
mands of the application and transparently routes them through the proxy server4.
While this is technically considered as a very good solution, again, it requires a
fair amount of technical understanding and Microsoft Windows is not capable of
supporting this.
Another problem with proxy interfaces is that it does not offer support for
server functionality, e.g., if a user would like to offer a service anonymously or
2http://openrico.org/
3http://qooxdoo.org/
4This technique is usually called library preloading.
64 CHAPTER 4: VALUE-ADDED WORKS
under some pseudonym. While some networks actually allow such a setup, it has
to be done by manual modification of configuration files. Again, this is not feasible,
or at least prone to least errors, if it is done by average users.
One solution to this problem is described in [PK05]. The interface, i.e. the
Socks or HTTP-Proxy, is used to connect to a VPN and thus support IP on a newly
created virtual network device. With the help of such a network device it is easy
to re-route all outbound traffic through the anonymizing network and also offer
arbitrary services on the pseudonymous IP.
This technique is called Virtual Anonymous Networks (VAN). They introduce
an anonymization layer that is hidden behind the operating systems and allow trans-
parent access to the global network through an anonymizing overlay network. This
approach assigns temporary pseudonymous IP devices and addresses to the user,
that can be used to send and receive IP packets. As a result all of the user’s traffic
can be hidden using this temporary address. The user side configuration is conse-
quently reduced to setup just one system and does not require any modification or
configuration of programs.
The overlay network consists of two additional network layers. An anonymizer
on the lower layer hides the host’s real IP address against the VAN servers. We
chose Tor for the demonstration purpose. The second layer is provided by a virtual
private network (VPN) that provides the pseudonymous IP addresses. In our im-
plementation, we chose OpenVPN [ope]. Both tools are installed on participating
machines and can be pre-configured for clients.
Using the anonymization layer, the VPN clients are then able to connect to one
of the VPN servers and receive an IP address from the server’s private IP range.
Consequently the client can communicate anonymously with other clients in the
same virtual network. If different virtual networks are interconnected, all clients
can communicate with each other, without knowing the other user’s identity.
After the software is set up, every client computer will have at least two IP
addresses. The first one is that of the real network device. All traffic that uses this
address is not automatically protected and will be routed directly to its destination.
The second IP is the one provided by the VPN server. Messages that are sent
or received by the host on this address cannot be linked to its real IP address.
It now depends upon the routing of the operating system as to which traffic will
be anonymized and which will be sent directly into the Internet. One possible
configuration could send local traffic directly, while sending traffic to remote hosts
through the VAN.
An example setups of VANs is depicted in Figure 4.2 on the next page. It
shows five interconnected VAN servers and four clients. The clients’ real IPs are
anonymized by the Tor network and their VAN IPs are used for internal communi-
cation. The picture does not show that the VAN servers also act as Tor servers and
some connections between the VAN servers have been left out for clarity.
Another system which implements similar features is OnionCat5.
5http://www.abenteuerland.at/onioncat/
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Figure 4.2: An example setup for Virtual Anonymous Networks
While the advantages of this approach are clearly visible, it also contains a
number of drawbacks. The most blatant problem is in fact that users can be reached
by means of their pseudonymous IP address even if they did not initiate the request
in the first place. This means that attackers can make use of potent tools like
nmap [Lyo] or Nessus [Sec] which are capable of identifying a host’s operating
system, its uptime and running services, just by sending a few probe packets and
evaluating the replies.
Even worse, there are a number of administration utilities6 which provide ver-
satile passive fingerprinting of incoming connections. This is made possible by
the slightly different methods by which operating systems generate IP sequence
numbers, TCP timestamps, IP ids, source ports, etc.
Hence, together with the raised number of possibilities offered and discussed
in this section, also a certain higher threat to the degree of anonymity arises.
4.3 Quality of Service
Available practical implementations suffer from poor performance [PPR08, WHF07].
This results in a stalling participant number of anonymizing networks, as users are
known to be impatient and only willing to wait a short time in order to get, e.g., a
requested webpage [Köp06]. Even more, due to the increase of multimedia content
transmitted over the Internet in the recent years, the requirements on bandwidth are
drastically increased. While the backbones and access networks of the plain Inter-
net were adjusted to current needs, anonymization networks like Tor are not able
to meet the demands.
6e.g., http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f.shtml
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On an abstract level there are two possible remedies, to enhance the situation:
• More bandwidth can be added to the network by increasing the number of
nodes. This requires not so much technical effort, but rather advertisement
and incentives for more people to run nodes. To which extent this kind of
campaign might be successful was covered in Section 2.4.1 on page 31.
• Making better use of the bandwidth available to the network. While this
means will not be able to gain arbitrary more bandwidth, this issues can be
tackled with better routing algorithms and thus is subject to intense technical
research.
On the other hand, by using more sophisticated routing techniques it is also
possible to enhance a network’s latency and reduce jitter; both of these can
only be marginally improved by new nodes.
In the following part of this section we will give an overview on works which
follow the second path to enhance the quality of service for anonymizing networks.
First, an accepted tolerated latency of about 4 seconds for a website request
has been demonstrated in [WHF07]. Another study [RES03] shows differences be-
tween polychronic cultures (e.g., Saudi Arabia) and monochronic ones (e.g., Ger-
many) in terms of delay-acceptance during web browsing. Users from polychronic
cultures were eager to accept longer delays than those from monochronic ones.
For the use of anonymizing systems, another reason for a higher delay tolerance of
the users from Saudi Arabia might be the following: due to strong censorship they
have higher incentives to wait longer in order to browse anonymously. Subsequent
research [Köp06], however, shows only marginal differences between the tolerated
waiting times in different cultures and a linear relationship between increased de-
lays and the drop-out-rate of users. Since the strength of the anonymity provided
by such a system is usually considered to be linked to its number of users, the
protection for the remainders is weakened with each user leaving the network.
Ideally, all clients participating in the network would select the nodes to be
used in virtual circuits uniformly from the set of all currently active routers. Since
the probability to be included in a path is the same for all routers, this method
offers the maximum achievable anonymity7, but at the cost of performance. The
latter is due to the fact that routers with a weak performance are chosen with the
same probability as very powerful nodes having abundant resources.
Works which have been published in this area include: Rollyson [Rol06], who
proposes a method to improve the client performance in Tor by a modified method
of path selection that is based on latencies between routers. The proposal requires
the Tor directory servers to provide a list of router-to-router latencies that can be
consulted by the clients when choosing a path. The proposed algorithm is limited
7When no metrics based upon QoS criteria are involved when choosing paths, attackers cannot
influence the path selection of clients – except for operating more routers.
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to picking only the middle node of circuits in an efficient way, because of issues
concerning trustworthiness of entry and requirements for exit nodes. Since Tor
directory servers do not provide lists of link-wise latencies for clients, the author
proposes to use an approximation technique that is based on measuring latencies
between responsible DNS servers [GSG02].
Snader and Borisov [SB08] propose an opportunistic bandwidth measurement
mechanism for Tor nodes. It is based on the idea of assigning a capacity value
to nodes equal to the median of the peak bandwidth all other nodes recently ex-
perienced to the given one. For path selection itself, the authors propose a cumu-
lative distribution function based on quantiles in order to reduce the influence of
single routers advertising very-high-capacity links. According to their own mea-
surements, though, the opportunistic bandwidth estimation is less accurate than
self-advertised values from the descriptors. The former, however, cannot so eas-
ily be manipulated by malicious nodes. Bauer et al. [BMG+07] demonstrated that
by artificially increasing bandwidth reports, an attacker can compromise 46% of
all circuits while controlling only 6 out of 66 routers in a Tor network. The au-
thors evaluate the performance and anonymity of their proposal regarding different
system parameters and compare them to the vanilla Tor. For quantification of an-
onymity, the Gini coefficient is used. In this case it is a measure for the equality
of the selection probabilities. Further, according to their evaluation, it is possible
to improve the performance while providing the same degree of anonymity as it is
currently the case in vanilla Tor, or to improve the anonymity without significantly
affecting the performance.
Sherr et al. [SLB07] aim on the design of anonymity networks, while they focus
on meeting application-specific performance and security constraints, rather than
optimizing only one of these. The proposed system, Application-Aware Anonym-
ity (A3), provides three rather obvious approaches for path selection: completely
random, random with constraints, and one with a so-called tolerance parameter
regarding constraints. Due to the abstract description of the approaches it is not
directly comparable to the other proposals.
Panchenko, Pimenidis and Renner [PPR08] studied the performance of Tor un-
der various circumstances in order to detect bottlenecks, as well as to learn about
the overall situational behavior of the network and limits of nodes regarding perfor-
mance metrics like latency and throughput. Furthermore, they show the influence
of geographical diversity of routers in a path on the performance of circuits. The
paper justifies that client performance can be improved by choosing routers that
are located geographically close to clients, respectively destinations. The diversity
of the nodes in a path, though, is an important substance to the security of anonym-
ity systems [MZ07, FD04]. Choosing nodes located in different countries involves
different jurisdictions, and thus, increases the protection of users. Additionally, if
the chosen routers are located close to each other, it is more likely that they belong
to the same operator. Therefore, the authors propose to achieve performance im-
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provements by other means, i.e. by performing routing based on geo-independent
performance metrics.
Murdoch et al. [MW08] explore the effectiveness of path compromise with
regard to the Tor’s default path selection algorithm as well as to the methods pro-
posed in [SB08]. Their metric of security is the probability of compromising a path
by controlling the first and last hop. The cost of an attack is considered in terms
of the number of nodes available to the attacker, as well as the bandwidth available
for each node. The main result is that in the presence of a node-rich but bandwidth-
limited attacker the Tor’s default path selection algorithm offers improved protec-
tion compared to the uniform path selection algorithm. Thus, the vulnerability of
the path selection is not affected that much because of proliferation of bot nets.
These usually have a large number of nodes with a high geographical diversity, but
poor upstream bandwidth.
TorFlow [Per] is a multi-purpose framework with the general aim to improve
the performance and the security in the Tor network. It contains an extended im-
plementation of the Tor Control Protocol [DM], a text-based protocol that allows
to implement controllers with the ability to control a running Tor process by lis-
tening to events and sending commands. TorFlow-specific extensions include ad-
ditional features to support path building, while preserving arbitrary restrictions
on the properties of the generated paths. These were also used to implement the
methods proposed in this work.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we have displayed some works on enhancing the performance of
anonymizing networks. Despite some excellent advancements in this area, a few
words of caution seem to be appropriate: even though it might seem like a good
idea to use elaborate algorithms for a higher utilization rate of the available band-
width, preliminary studies have shown that any additionally provided amount might
not be enough8.
Future research in these areas is manifold:
• deployment at the user side is still a major problem. This goes hand in hand
with the ubiquitous weakness of IT security products used by end users: the
interface (especially the graphical user interface) is often not comprehensible
and thus cultivates harming behavior.
• the experience of users with anonymizing networks is closely connected to
the quality of service. However, especially in this area, it is very difficult to
provide a good level of quality; aggressive attempts to do so will even cost a
lot of protection.
8See, e.g.,
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/07/18/economics-of-tor-performance/
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• again, a means to quantify security is missing, especially to measure the
degree of anonymity. Thus, it is currently not possible to size the different
levels of security provided by QoS-enhanced routing mechanisms. Hence,
it is impossible to recommend or prefer one over the other, even if the exact
requirements of the user are known.
In the next chapter, we will work out details about attackers, i.e. entities whose
target it is to compromise the security of an anonymity system.
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Chapter 5
Attackers
Life in general would be much easier if people did not have opposing interests.
However, this is not the case and thus there are entities whose interests include to
learn information on the whereabouts of specific persons. If this happens without
the consent of the observed person, these entities are called attackers1 . We have
seen in Section 2.4 on page 29 that there are a number of different participants
related to anonymizing networks. Interestingly enough, next to all of them, plus
external entities, could be attackers to the network.
The main reason for the highly detailed discussion in this chapter is that, de-
spite some merits of the theoretical foundation laid by the early academic papers in
this area, existing models are not fine-grained enough when it comes to the prop-
erties of real-world attackers. To a certain degree they also miss to differ between
widely different concepts which exists in deployed networks. In addition, some
of the theoretical models of attackers more no distinction between two classes of
attackers, where no distinction is necessary or possible in a real network, or at the
very least: does not make sense.
Therefore, it follows that it is not easy to design secure anonymization networks
for real deployment using theoretical attacker models. For the given reasons any
implementation will likely fail to provide adequate security in some places, while
providing it unnecessarily in others.
To estimate whether an attacker will be successful in breaking a real system
or not is part of a security evaluation or risk analysis. One critical part of this is
to properly define a realistic attacker model. If the chosen attacker model is too
powerful – most of the protection techniques will be unnecessary. If the attacker
model is too weak – the system will inevitably provide false and undesired means
about protection level of its users.
A common example for an often used theoretical attacker model with no real-
world equivalent is the passive global observer. This refers to an entity which is
1Compare this also to e.g. [Bis02].
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able to monitor traffic on all network lines on earth, but does not have the capability
to inject or modify data. While we agree that this model is interesting for math-
ematical analysis, end-users should be aware that theoretical results based on this
analysis are not representative of real scenarios: an attacker having the capabilities
in the real world to intercept traffic at the global scale can typically also easily alter
and manipulate the traffic and, therewith invalidate the results of the analysis and
protection vision of the end-user.
Seen from another perspective: it is also not realistic for an average end-user
to defend himself against an adversary which is capable of observing the whole
worldwide network because of two reasons: first, such a powerful adversary can
make use of more efficient means in order to obtain the same information, and
secondly most end-users are not an actual target of these kinds of adversaries.
In addition to that, different users are concerned about different attackers each.
While a typical European user might, for example, be concerned about profiling
websites or a prying ISP, users from, e.g., the Middle East or China, have to fear
severe punishment for surfing on webpages with political, sexual, or arbitrary other
content.
To make the situation more complex, users sometimes confuse potential at-
tackers, i.e. those which have the capabilities to harm them, and real attackers,
i.e. entities with the opportunity, the capabilities and the intent to harm them2.
Common misunderstandings of threat scenarios include a fear of European citizen
to be spied upon by foreign secret services. Even if this is true [Tem01], there are
by far more dangerous entities for the average end-users, as we will see.
Besides giving a taxonomy on attackers and a detailed description of them it
is therefore inevitable that users are able to correctly identify their personal threat
model. This goes along with good practice in security evaluation, where choosing
an appropriate attacker model is a necessary precondition before any security eval-
uation can start. This was known and practised even more than two thousand years
ago: “If you know your enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the result
of a hundred battles.” [TzuBC].
This chapter gives a detailed view on attackers to anonymization networks.
First, we will list theoretical models as proposed in research papers. Second, we
develop a more practical-oriented attacker model which can be used for analyses of
deployed implementations. To this end, we will cover the properties and possible
motivations of an attacker to create a new taxonomy of attackers.
At the end of this chapter we will have a good understanding about what and
who an attacker is, what his typical capabilities are, and which goals he wants to
achieve.
2It is noteworthy that this also applies to other scenarios like, e.g., physical security. One famous
example is sexual harassment: while children are taught not to trust strangers, the majority of sexual
assaults are committed by people close to the victim ([LNW07], page 64).
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5.1 Theoretical Attacker Models
The purpose of theoretical attacker models is to make statements about the security
of abstract models of anonymization networks. The main problem with applying
these models to real systems is that their level of abstraction is too high in order
to make relevant statements about fine-grained real systems. The origin of assum-
ing very strong attackers originates from the area of cryptography. There, it is
has become reasonable to defend against nearly arbitrarily strong adversaries. As
anonymous communication is a rather young field, the primitives developed and
deployed so far are not as strong. Thus an attacker originating from a “theoretical
attacker model” would usually either break an anonymizing system with no effort,
or would have no chance against it.
While theoretical attacker models can be used, however, to find basic state-
ments on security properties even for real systems, these results again only hold –
in theory. The reason for this is that these analyses work with models of networks,
rather than with real networks. Hence they assume, for example, that the imple-
mentation of the protocols is perfect or that users behave uniformly. However, both
assumptions are not true in the real world.
In general, one should be cautious to assume that security proofs based on
models and theoretical analyses can hold up in deployed systems. This is due to the
fact that by modelling a network there will be necessarily some loss of accuracy,
which in the end will possibly invalidate the result if ported back to the original
system.
5.1.1 Simple Attacker Models
Some attacker models in literature are quite simple. While this can be correct from
a theoretical point of view, it raises difficulties in cases of the risk estimation in the
real-world settings. In [WALS02] the adversary is described as a participant that
collects data from its interactions with other participants in the protocol and may
share its data with other adversaries.
[SS03] describes an attacker as some entity that does passive traffic analysis
and receives the data by any means that is available, hence it is some form of
maximum attacker. These kinds of attacker models might be interesting in certain
special cases but are difficult to generalize and identify in a real system: depend-
ing on the influences these attackers might have they can be completely different
entities. So, for example, they can be a secret service or a standalone hacker, each
being a different threat to the end-user. Also, the means that should be taken in
order to provide the protection depend on the concrete threat entity.
5.1.2 Simple Taxonomies
A more general attacker categorization is given, e.g., in [KP03]. The authors in-
troduce three classes of attackers with increasing amount of power and capabili-
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ties, namely the global external passive attacker, the passive attacker with sending
capabilities and the active internal attacker. While this distinction makes sense
within the context of the paper [KP03] because it helps to show a difference be-
tween Mixmaster and Stop-and-Go-Mixes, the difference is marginal in real sys-
tems. We agree that a purely passive attacker is different from an attacker that also
participates in the network and is possibly detectable. On the other hand, it’s quite
unlikely that an attacker that has global access to network lines does not also have
the possibility to inject messages. So, the first two attacker types wouldn’t differ in
their capabilities in real systems but rather in the decision whether to make use of
all their features. Also, access to anonymizing networks is not only not restricted
but even actively endorsed (“Anonymity loves company” [DM06b]); thus, there is
also no real difference between the second and third class in a real network.
Similar arguments apply at [SDS02], where the authors propose to split a
global active attacker into the one that can only insert messages, and the one who
can delay messages. However, if an attacker is able to deterministically delay mes-
sages in a real system, he will also be able to insert messages – the reason for this
being that there is no way to actually delay a message in a real system other than
removing it and reply (“inject”) it at a later time. On the other hand, if an attacker
is able to insert messages in a system and observe their effect, he is most probably
in control of some part of the system and thus also able to delay messages.
A more detailed list of adversaries can be found in [HJW03], where four at-
tacker types are listed: the eavesdropper, the global eavesdropper, a passive ad-
versary and an active adversary. Again there will be little difference between, e.g.,
the global eavesdropper and an global adversary in practice. We leave the proof as
an exercise to the reader.
5.1.3 Taxonomies
The most systematic listing of attacker types for theoretic modelling is found in
[Ray00], where Raymond introduces three dimensions of attackers:
internal-external Attackers can be distinguished on whether they are participants
in the network or not.
passive-active Attackers can actively change the status of the network or remain
passive.
static-adaptive Attackers can’t change their resources once the attack has started
or they can continue to build up their capabilities.
An additional dimension is given by Pfitzmann in [Pfi04]: active attackers can
either limit their actions, follow the protocol and thus reduce the chance of being
detected, or trade-off their stealth in favor of more powerful attacks by committing
actions that are not part of a network’s protocol.
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The most realistic attacker model can be found in [STRL00] where not only
the method of attack is provided (ranging from an observer to a hostile user or a
compromised network node) but also the extent of the attacker’s influence on the
network (i.e. whether it’s a single node or some large parts of the network).
5.1.4 Discussion
As we have seen there is a wide and scattered range of attacker models in theo-
retical works. For obvious reasons it is not feasible to unify them in a reasonable
framework. One more issue which we would like to draw attention to, are the
notions of an active attacker versus a passive attacker.
In theoretical attacker models, there might be a difference between a passive
and an active attacker. In this very basic notation, we denote an active attacker as
someone who tries to modify an anonymizing system in order to gain advantages,
whereas a passive attacker reduces his set of actions to those that do not alter the
attacked system. While being active seems to be the superior mode, passiveness
usually includes a smaller probability of being detected as an attacker by the other
participants in the system.
Usually, the following actions are considered passive, and are unlikely to be
detected by the other entities running the system:
Recording traffic , e.g., eavesdropping.
Resolving identities of users, in order to map network addresses to real people.
Reading log files in case they would be accessible to him by some means, e.g., if
the attacker is a system’s operator.
Breaking cryptographic primitives is considered a passive action, as this usually
done off-line and without the users noticing.
On the other hand, these actions are usually considered active:
Injecting, dropping, altering, or delaying messages
Denial of Service attacks
Please note that neither of these lists is meant to be exhaustive.
If we take, however, a real-life situation, the sets of actions converge: both im-
ply that an attacker has physical access to the communication lines, in which case
he can of course commit passive record as well as active manipulations. We can
therefore conclude, that if an attacker is passive in a real-world scenario, this is
rather based on the decision to stay invisible, rather than due to missing capabili-
ties.
Strangely enough, there are actions carried out on a regular basis by real-world
attackers which are usually not covered in any theoretical model. This means that
these actions are simply ignored by traditional research:
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Compromising servers or clients in the network.
Profiling application layer data in order to identify users by their behaviour, writ-
ing style, specific applications or versions of applications, operating system,
etc.
Providing bait information in order to lure users out of their anonymity by trick-
ing them into distinctive actions.
Side channel attacks on hardware layer, or the operating system layer.
Summarizing this section, it seems inevitable to develop a novel system for
attacker classification. To this end we take a look at the properties of real-world
attackers and introduce a comprehensive classification.
5.2 Practical Attacker Model
In this section we develop a novel attacker model for anonymous communication
systems. The motivation for this is to overcome the limitations and ambiguities
in the existing theoretical works. After we have described the properties which
should be fulfilled by a classification, we continue with a list of properties inherent
to attackers. Furthermore, we describe their motivations and finally provide a tax-
onomy which fills the gap between theoretical attacker models and real networks.
As given in [Amo94] and [How97], a taxonomy should have classification cat-
egories with the following characteristics:
mutually exclusive – classifying in one category excludes all others because cat-
egories do not overlap,
exhaustive – taken together, the categories include all possibilities,
unambiguous – clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain, regardless
of who is classifying,
repeatable – repeated applications result in the same classification, regardless of
who is classifying,
accepted – logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved,
useful – can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry.
We will use these attributes in order to verify the validity of our newly devel-
oped attacker model.
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5.2.1 Properties of an Attacker
As much as humans differ, so do attackers3. However, all of them have at least one
thing in common which is the fact that they are attacking an IT security system.
It is also safe to assume that in the majority of cases the attacker likes to learn
information which is hidden by the means of anonymizing network. This intention
together with an attacker’s action distinguishes the attacking entity from normal
users, operators, unrelated third parties, etc.
Consequently, the attacker is then interested in some or all items of interest
which are related to one or more peers of the system. For example, the adversary
might be interested in either a user’s peers, the identities of all parties regularly
polling a webpage, or who sent a specific message.
As we are currently not interested in estimating the total effort of an attack,
we will assume in the remainder of this section that the attacker is only interested
in a single item of interest related to a single user. We can do so without loss of
generality, if we decompose all other scenarios to be multiple or repeated instances
of this.
Other than this, we can identify several properties and capabilities in which
attackers differ:
Physical Influence This capability can be used to gather information from nodes
and lines in the network. In fact, we consider the owner of IT equipment to
have physical influence over his infrastructure.
In addition to known eavesdropping techniques physical presence and influ-
ence may be used for physical capture and extraction of information out of
computers, network equipment, printed papers, and persons. Depending on
the attacker’s choice and possibly other properties these actions take place
stealthy or noisy.
A practical unit for measuring this would be the area of physical influence.
For example, a single user does not have any significant authority beyond his
dial-up line and beyond maybe some kilometers around his physical location.
Governments have quite a huge physical influence which contains the home
state and possibly even limited influence on allied territories4.
Computational Power is a capability which is easy to quantify, e.g., in FLOPS.
It can be used in traditional ways to break cryptographic primitives, e.g., by
brute force. In our context it can also be used to set up a lot of different
(rogue) nodes in the network, or simulate participants to lure a victim by
pretending these nodes are honest users. Other uses for computational power
include data mining on captured data and doing traffic analysis on network
flows.
3Unless we take Hollywood movies for real.
4See, e.g., the extradition of Gary McKinnon as happened in 2008 (http://www.freegary.
org.uk/, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gary_McKinnon).
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Knowledge and Skills are unconditional prerequisites for an attacker. In order
to compromise a system in a targeted way, i.e. such that it fails to provide
protection but rather allows the adversary to learn whatever he is curious
about, it is inevitable to know the inner workings of the system.
In our context this means that an adversary can be proficient in any areas as
discussed in Chapter 2: computer networks, IT security, cryptography and
anonymous communication systems, or any subset thereof. These also in-
clude the knowledge about typical vulnerabilities of anonymizing networks
and common mistakes that users make. The potential attack vector grows
with the amount of the attacker’s knowledge and increases chances of suc-
cess.
The skill of exploiting known vulnerabilities is of substantial significance.
It influences the probability of success and the amount of noise generated
during an attack.
To a certain extent, e.g., in cryptography, analysts assume that an adversary
knows all public information as well as algorithms in use. This has been
even understood to be of importance since 1883 [Ker83]. As anonymous
communication itself is still a rather new area of research, it is safe to make
similar assumptions.
Hence, we will assumed that the attacker knows the infrastructure of the
network, the algorithms that the network bases on, and strategies that are
deployed5 .
Potentially, this property can also be used to develop new attacks.
Man Power refers to amount of human resources at the attacker’s disposal. This
can be used for large-scale social engineering, or broad penetration of large
anonymizing networks. It is also useful for all kinds of impersonation at-
tacks.
Legal Influence refers to the ability of an entity to either commit actions which
are of privileged character in a jurisdiction (for example, physical capture of
other people’s computers), or the property to commit these actions without
the threat of being prosecuted (for whatever reason).
Most actions which are related to attacking computer systems are either il-
legal, or at least falls into a legal grey area. Exceptions are only on a base-
to-base case, whenever an attacker is legally permissible to an action: For
example, a father may legally access the computer of his son, a company
may access all of their workstations, and law enforcement may access all
computers in a country, given they are in possession of a warrant.
5This is a commonly used assumption, thus we intentionally omit a long list of references. See,
for example, http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/
5.2. PRACTICAL ATTACKER MODEL 79
Therefore, the amount of actions which an attacker can commit within a short
time interval is somewhat related to his legal influence. However, it might
also happen that adversaries ignore these restrictions: malevolent persons
might be willing break laws in order to obtain information.
Additionally, for practical security evaluation purposes there is the possi-
bility that an adversary originates his actions from a different jurisdiction,
thus thwarting all of his risks being legally prosecuted by the victim. As in
fact any person can use resources within different jurisdictions in order to
commit attacks, which makes legal prosecution at least very difficult. This
circumstance should also be taken as an incentive not to rely on laws in order
to protect assets in the Internet.
Money can be used to a certain degree to substitute a lack of any of the above
properties and capabilities. For example, it can be used to hire employers,
private investigators, or researchers. Also, hardware and bandwidth are legal
goods to buy.
However, money can also be used to hire hackers, thugs, henchmen, or to
bribe people.
Risk averse vs. Risk ignorant makes a distinction between the attitude of attack-
ers, to either ignore the possible consequences of illegal and risky behavior,
or not. This property makes a difference, even though this work does not
consider the aftermath of an attempt to attack a system, regardless if it was
successful or failed.
A number of attacks either take a lot of time or consist of multiple steps.
Hence, if the first steps are somewhat of legal risk, an attacker might be
scared off practising these as preconditions to the following steps of an at-
tack. Another case is given if a preparative action is noisy, i.e. easily de-
tectable by the victim: a risk-averse attacker might be too cautious not to
call attention to his presence and possibly not be able to continue the attack
with the necessary second step.
In fact, not all of the properties listed above are equally important: for example,
vast computing power does not help attackers, unless they have a huge physical
presence and are able to collect enough data which can be processed in a second
step.
As we have already discussed, it is a reasonable assumption that a dedicated
attacker will be up to date with academic literature and additional knowledge, hav-
ing read documents describing typical vulnerabilities. Basically, this skill allows
an attacker to choose attacks from either the complete set of attacks, or a subset
thereof.
Since attackers might be willing to break laws in order to accomplish their
goals, and possibly are able to avoid prosecution, it seems reasonable to only
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marginally consider the amount of legal influence of an attacker as a major point of
distinguishing classes of attackers. As we have seen, this is of central importance
especially in the case where attackers come from different jurisdictions. How-
ever, legal influence can reduce the cost and risk of certain attacks. As we do not
consider cost in this chapter, this variable has no influence on our attacker classifi-
cation.
Finally, it can trivially be seen that money is a wildcard, having mostly no effect
on its own, but being a substitute for any other property except Risk Affinity. The
later is special in a certain sense: while the other attributes are properties which can
be acquired or traded to a certain extent, risk affinity is likely to remain unchanged.
This leaves us with the most influential variables Physical Influence and Man
Power being the two most important variables to distinguish different attacker
types. Computational Power and Risk Affinity are ranked at second level. Finally
Legal Influence and Knowledge and Skills only play minor roles.
These interdependencies, plus typical classes of attacks that are possible with
the given properties are listed in Figure 5.1.
Properties
Physical Influence
Hardware
Network
Non-technical AttacksMan Power
Breaking Software
Computational Power
Breaking Algorithms
Risk affinity
Knowledge and Skills
Identifying SoftwareOperating System
Legal Influence
Legal Attacks
Money
Figure 5.1: Overview on Properties of Attackers and their interdependencies
As can be trivially seen, the variables are, with the given exception of money,
mutually exclusive, unambiguous, repeatable and useful. Since a preliminary ver-
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sion of the model has been published in [PP06b], we claim it to be accepted, too.
However, we are not able to claim a (pre-)final degree of exhaustiveness. The rea-
son for this is that our model consists of more variables than other existing attacker
classifications. Our model even has a finer granularity of variables than attacker
models in the general field of IT security [How97, Rog05, Hec05]. Hence, we at
least claim to fulfill a sufficient coverage of attacker’s properties.
5.2.2 Attackers’ Intentions and Motivations
If, however, we would not only try to evaluate the probability of an attacker to be
successful, but also assess the damage afflicted, than we would have to take into
account which motivation an attacker has, and what he will do with the information
gained from his attacks.
Thus, in addition to the possibilities of an attacker, it is important to know
which incentive and intentions an attacker might have. For example, even if a secret
service can easily spy on arbitrary citizens, the probability of an actual (targeted)
attack is rather low. In general this holds true if the perceived gain of an attack is
too low in relation to its costs. Conversely, the owners of bot net (herders) do at-
tack people because of negligible cost and risk, and the possible gain of yet another
additional computer in their bot net. In this section we list attacker’s motivations
and intentions. These play a central role in an attacker’s subjective perceived mea-
surement on gains and costs of an attack. Hence, we see that it might be possible
to defend against some attackers by raising their perceived cost of attacking.
Works describing the motivations for attackers on computer systems origi-
nally copied jargon from the world of counterespionage, using the acronym MICE,
which translates into money, ideology, compromise and ego. This was extended in
[KAS04] by Kilger et al. to MEECES, and refers to
Money as the most self-evident cause. An attacker can abuse an anonymizing
network infrastructure in order to make money.
One of today’s most easy approaches to this would be to operate an exit
node of the network and wait for users to make network connections to the
webpages of a bank or similar critical webpages. In these cases the attacker
can either eavesdrop or modify the users’ requests, or impersonate the bank’s
online site, in order to place money transactions in his own favour.
A more passive attacker could plainly eavesdrop credit-card numbers from
the network traffic exiting from his node, or profile users in order to mount
large-scale impersonation attacks or commit identity theft.
Entertainment is one of the less dangerous motivations for an attacker to have.
Usually this attitude implies no direct will to harmful behaviour but rather
pranks that are to be played on the users. In our scenario the damage that can
be inflicted by this motivation is quite small, and can be easily circumvented.
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Practical instances include redirecting users’ requests for websites to shock
websites6, replacing images in business websites with pornographic pictures,
or modifying stock-exchange information which is forwarded through their
area of influence.
Ego is one of the most driving factors for individuals to attack computer systems.
As also discussed in [KAS04], it is highly unlikely that high prison terms
for crimes have an impact on individuals to reduce their activities, but rather
gives them new incentive to do so.
Cause (Ideology) is a motivation often shaped by political influences. Therefore,
the impact of this motivation is roughly determined by the power of a politi-
cal group in accordance with their technical savviness.
Law enforcement agencies and maybe small groups of political activists
form the main representatives with this motivation.
On the other hand, companies are usually not to be found within this cate-
gory.
Entrance to a social group, especially a group of active computer hackers, is a
motivation to commit damage to other people’s computer systems. However,
this motivation is most likely for single attackers with a limited skill set,
therefore reducing their impact on, e.g., world wide distributed systems like
anonymity networks.
Status is a similar driving force like entrance, de-facto being the follow-up which
takes places after joining social groups.
However, the above reference to an attacker motivation is not complete. In
“Scene of the Cybercrime” [Shi02] (pp 113 ff.) a generic attacker on computer
systems and his intentions are described:
Just for fun is described as a motivation for people with no deliberate intention to
deliver harm to others.
Monetary profit has been discussed above.
Anger, revenge, and other emotional needs is a motivation that leads to timely
actions, usually committed by individuals.
Due to the international deployment of anonymizing networks and their size,
it is quite unlikely that unplanned attacks will not result in severe damage.
Political motives have also been discussed above.
6E.g., (no, sorry, not in this work)
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Sexual impulses are among the most severe drivers for people to commit crimes.
However, since these are only significant for individuals rather than groups,
corporations, or agencies, we regarded them as a special case of emotional
needs in our case.
Serious psychiatric illness is a similar case to sexual impulses.
It is obvious that both lists focus mostly on individuals rather than organiza-
tions.
In addition to the motivations above, there are two special cases of motivations
which were experienced in real networks:
Research is a motivation to break anonymizing networks and find out their vulner-
abilities. The effect of this kind of attackers is mostly similar to those which
act due to Just for fun in [Shi02] or Entertainment in [KAS04]. This means
that attackers with this motivation do not have the intention to deal harm to
others; most often they even use their attacks to improve the security for the
attacked networks later on.
However, as opposed to the types of attackers that do it Just for fun, re-
searchers usually have a deeper insight and broader skill set.
Law enforcement purposes, i.e. handling of a network’s abuse, are motives for
agencies and social entities that strive to punish sanctioned behaviour. For-
bidden behaviour may include distributing pornographic material, political
opposition or terroristic activities.
While in total, the basic motivation for these attackers is based on political
grounds, one can say that the actions of these attackers are not illegal, since
they act upon (in democracies) a legal legitimation of the public.
In Figure 5.2 on the following page we depict a short summary of the moti-
vations. It also gives an a priori estimation on the degree of danger related to the
motivation, as well as the man power of an adversary.
5.2.3 Classification
Based on the previous sections on attackers’ properties ( 5.2.1 on page 77) and mo-
tivations ( 5.2.2 on page 81), we propose a novel scheme for attacker classification
in anonymizing networks.
As we have seen above, the attributes that distinct real-life attackers best are the
amount of man power and the amount of physical influence the attacker possesses.
The latter also correlates with the number of nodes and links that the attacker con-
trols or which are within his reach. To a certain extent, with increasing man power,
there will also be an increase in physical influence.
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Figure 5.2: Differences between attackers’ motivations.
Furthermore, computational capabilities are not as relevant in today’s scenarios
because cryptography is usually too strong to be broken. Hence, breaking of cryp-
tographic primitives is only seldom a preliminary to successful attacks on anony-
mizing systems.
On the groups as prepared previously we thus created the following classifi-
cation of attacker types [PP06b]. This specification is independent of a specific
network’s infrastructure and topology, as well as coherent with the findings we had
in the previous sections.
The classification can also be seen as classes of entities and social stereotypes
participating in, affected by, or being interested in a transaction between two parties
using an (anonymizing) network.
0. External Party The least powerful class of attackers has no control of any com-
puter between the two communicating parties.
While this kind of “attackers” is hardly worth consideration, this class forms
an excellent base check: if even these attackers can successfully compro-
mise an anonymizing network, surely problems exist. Thus, countermea-
sures should be taken to prevent them from gaining information. Since fail-
ing to do so will result in a system which is neither secure nor confidential.
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Note that external parties can be very powerful, e.g., competitors in interna-
tional trade. While the initial position of an external party is limited, it might
be possible for this attacker to levitate its position, depending on the network
used and parties involved: e.g., he can lure a victim into communicating with
him, hence gaining “peer” status. Another possibly is to participate in the
network as a node operator and wait for the victim to choose these nodes as
forwarding nodes.
However, unless this class of attackers undertakes actions to increase their
influence on anonymizing networks, their power is limited to, e.g., collect
public information which is available on the world wide web, the usenet or
any other public source.
It should be noted that systems sometimes leak information to outsiders even
if they’re not supposed to do so, e.g., some implementations of e-mail servers
allow to check if a given e-mail addresses exist without actually sending
them an e-mail. [MD05] is an excellent example of an attack which allows
external parties to infer information about the inner workings of an anony-
mizing network.
1. Service Provider/Peer This class of attacker represents the victim’s communi-
cation partner in scenarios where the victim does not only communicate with
a closed group of entities. This attacker is technically bound to the receiving
end of the communication and its close neighborhood.
In addition to all sources of information that the external party has access to,
the peer learns (by definition) the content of some of the victim’s communi-
cation. This includes application layer information. This class of attacker is
also able to commit quite elaborate attacks against the victim: first, he can
try to manipulate the victim on a social level and persuade him to, e.g., use
different, i.e. non-anonymous, means of communication. This attacker can
also try to inject malicious content into his messages which target to exploit
the anonymous victim’s software and then take control over his computer.
More subtle attacks include profiling the victim’s software and learn his
operating system, language and time zones, as well as individual writing
style [ZLCH06].
2. Local administration In contrast to the victim’s peer, this attacker can eaves-
drop and manipulate data in the network close to the victim. This includes,
but is not limited to sniffing data, manipulating DNS-responses, man-in-the-
middle attacks, denial of access to anonymizing networks in order to force
plain communication, and much more.
These capabilities of this attacker class are very powerful if the user trusts
all received and transmitted data or is clueless about the abilities of these
attackers.
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On the other hand, this attacker can be easily evaded once the user manages
to establish a secure connection to an outside trusted relay with strong en-
cryption. Yet, there is still a small information leak remaining as, e.g., the
number and size of transmitted data packets can be used to identify certain
webpages [Hin02].
3. Internet Service Provider (ISP) The next most powerful class of attackers mostly
resembles the capabilities of the previous one. However, this class has access
to a significant larger number of computers and network lines in the vicinity
of the user. The amount maybe so large that it can even be a non-negligible
part of the whole global network.
Thus, while a local administration can be circumvented by means of a relay
outside the attacker’s scope, the relay would need to be in another country
in order to thwart this attacker. Given the interdependencies of big ISPs
(particularly multi-national companies like T-Mobile, AOL, Tele2, and sim-
ilar), however, there are chances that nodes in other countries are operated
by affiliates of them.
4. Government This class of “attackers” does not only have the power to access a
significant portion of all networks but also has large resources to setup honey
traps7, break simpler encryption schemes8 or prohibit access to specific ser-
vices.
This adversary is also able to take measures that are illegal or impossible
for others: confiscating hardware and other material, or introducing laws on
data retention are only two of them.
5. Secret Services are forming the highest class of adversaries. They can be as-
sumed to either have access to most parts of the global networks or they can
get the access to it if they think it is necessary for their operation.
To a certain extent, it can also be assumed that this class of attacker is also
not bound by any kind of laws9.
It should be mentioned that the latter two types of attackers will probably
have the highest advantage by using non-technical methods to get informa-
tion – this includes but is not limited to the physical capture of nodes.
In addition, it should be noted that some countries deploy their secret ser-
vices also for industrial espionage [Tem01].
7A computer service which fulfills the task of an Agent Provocateur.
8The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) factored the RSA-640 number in
September 2005: http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2092
9Consider, for example, the kidnappings of alleged Al-Quaida terrorists by the CIA:
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/003/1600325.pdf or
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6368269.stm
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We deliberately specified the categories in a way which is intuitively under-
stood by researchers as well as by end-users. Note also that these classes must not
be seen with strict boundaries, hence real-life attackers can be found at a certain
point somewhere on this scale.
At this point, we would like to put a side note on collusion of attackers. Collu-
sion of different attackers is a commonly seen act in traditional analysis of anonymiza-
tion networks which we deliberately did not covered in this model. The reason for
this is simple: if attackers cooperate in real life, they are not independent of each
other. Either they can be found to be in a “natural alliance”, like two peering ISPs,
or in a clear command chain, like, e.g., a government forcing ISPs to cooperate by
means of laws. A second reason for not handling collusion is that (in our model)
the resulting power will rather be the power of the bigger partner.
5.2.4 Evaluation of the Attacker Model
We now evaluate the classification given in the previous section according to the
characteristics defined in [Amo94]:
mutually exclusive – with the exception of the victim’s communication partner,
we have created the categorization in an increasing order of power. The
attacker which comprises the peer partner does not intersect with any other
class.
exhaustive – the classification gives a list of entities having an increasing influ-
ence over the user’s communication. The scale starts with entities having
little impact and next to no power over the user, and ends with entities with
a global view, a huge budget, and free of any legal or ethical obligations.
Therefore, we have covered the complete range of (human) adversaries.
unambiguous – While it might not be possible to uniquely determine a real-life
entity classification within this scale, it should be possible to give at least
two adjacent points on our classification list in order to identify the power of
a real-life adversary.
repeatable – Due to the natural description of the entities, this characteristic is
naturally given.
accepted – The proposed scheme shows basic similarities to those as given in,
e.g., [Rog05], [How97], and [Hec05].
We also published this scheme at [PP06b]. Therefore, we can assume a
necessary minimum degree of acceptance.
useful – as we demonstrate in the upcoming chapters, this model can be used for
a detailed in-depth security analysis for anonymizing networks.
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From these points we can see that our classification fulfills all but the first char-
acteristic very well. The first characteristic is still fulfilled to a very good degree.
However, as it was pointed out in [Amo94], it is very hard, if not impossible, to
find a metric that complies with all of the given characteristics.
Thus, we can see that this model forms a valid classification for threat analysis
and exceeds existing attacker models.
5.3 Summary
As we have seen in this chapter, there is essentially no significant related work on
attacker classification in anonymizing networks. As a consequence, researchers
have to either work with over-simplified attacker models, or adapt them individu-
ally to their needs – the latter will, however, result in work which cannot be com-
pared to other researcher’s results.
The most far-reaching outcome of research results based on wrongly chosen
attacker model is that they possibly defend against the wrong adversaries. Thus,
the resulting algorithms are often impractical to deploy or rely on unrealistic as-
sumptions.
We tried to overcome this situation by proposing a novel classification for at-
tackers that is realistic, i.e. adaptable to real deployed networks, as well as suited
for security evaluations. As we have shown, our taxonomy is currently the best
solution to access the problem of attacker classification.
Table 5.1 shows the relation between the entities as we discussed in Section 2.4
on page 29 and the classes of attackers, as developed in this chapter. Positions
marked with a filled cycle (•) mark likely relations. I.e., if an entity which is
involved in anonymizing networks would attack the system, it is likely to be an
attacker of this class. This also holds true vice-versa: if an attacker from a certain
class considers attacking a system, he would use the denoted positions as a starting
point. Relations marked with with empty circles (◦) denote a low, but not negligible
probability.
However, future research in at least the following areas is necessary:
• Building a formal model based on the classification as given in Section 5.2.
• Empirical evaluation of occurrence of the single classes of attackers.
• Investigate relation to attacker models from other fields and subareas in IT
security. To which end can these different models be merged or mutually
benefit from each other?
In the next section we will again switch the focus and comprehensively discuss
attacks on anonymizing systems.
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3rd Party Peer Local
Admin.
ISP Govern-
ment
Secret
Service
Node
Operator
◦ • • • •
ISP • •
Users • • ◦ • •
Service
Provider
• • •
Law
Enforce-
ment
• • • •
Table 5.1: Relation between entities as discussed in setup (Section 2.4) and classes
of attackers (Section 5.2).
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Chapter 6
Attacks on Anonymizing
Networks
After we introduced basic principles of anonymizing networks, discussed their de-
ployment, the involved entities, and their attackers, we discuss attacks on anony-
mizing networks. To this end, we give a thorough overview of manifold ways to
compromise the security of privacy protecting mechanisms. The task of this chap-
ter is to show limitations and constraints of anonymizing networks. We target an
evaluation which points out the most vulnerable points of these networks.
Even though a plethora of security issues are known in the area of IT security
we will only be as verbose as necessary in order to highlight important relations
between well-known weaknesses and information leaks in our area of research.
However, in the core area of anonymous communication we strive to be as com-
plete as possible, covering all major relevant attacks, known vulnerabilities and, if
viable, inherent limitations.
As large-scale networks have only been deployed since recently, their proper-
ties could not have been studied before. This resulted in a number of surprisingly
easy attacks, which undermined their security. This showed that it is inevitable
to enlarge the horizon from the traditional point of view of anonymity researchers,
which is focused on the network layer, especially routing functionality. The current
situation is best described with the need for holistic anonymity, i.e. future solutions
to provide anonymity will have to target all layers of communication protocols in
order to achieve any kind of reasonable protection.
In the next section we will briefly recapitulate the flow of information through
an anonymizing network. Then, we discuss vulnerabilities and attacks on messages
in the different parts of this flow. Special attention will be given to attacks on
the networks layer, as this area has undergone the most intensive research. We
conclude this chapter by building an attack tree and summarizing the findings.
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6.1 Flow of an anonymized message
To prepare the view for holistic anonymity problems it is inevitable to have a de-
tailed understanding of the flow of a message through an anonymizing network. We
use the details provided in this chapter to explain recent findings on anonymizing
networks’ failures.
As we laid down in Section 2.1 on page 9 about computer networks a message
has to pass through multiple layers in an anonymizing network in order to reach its
destiny. It is also a peculiarity of our topic that messages traverse protocol stacks
multiple times on different hosts. Making this flow explicit is a crucial precondition
in order to understand at which points attacks influence or tamper with this flow.
An illustration of this flow is found in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Schematic flow of an anonymized message
Even though the major deployed systems for anonymity use circuit switching,
in the end there will be IP packets transmitted from one host to another. Because
of that we will lift some assumptions and only consider the course of a single
message whenever it makes no reasonable difference to do so. However, the reader
should keep in mind that depending on transmitted content there might be number
of transmitted data packets, possibly within a short time frame and along the same
path.
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User’s Computer A message is generated on a computer or similar device1. This
usually happens by a user typing in a message on his keyboard; other pos-
sibilities include clicking an URL. While there are messages also sent by
background processes without user interaction, those processes also received
input from an user at a prior point in time, e.g., a configuration file.
The majority of messages are HTTP-requests, file sharing and e-mail [iG07,
MBG+08].
If the user participates in a multi-hop anonymizing network (see Section 3.1.2
on page 43) a series of intermediary hops to relay the message needs to be
chosen. This can either be done by the user in a manual fashion or is carried
out by his software on his behalf.
Depending on the chosen anonymizing network, the original message is then
encoded, transformed, encrypted and otherwise processed by the machine’s
software and hardware. The algorithms are possibly also determined by the
chosen message type.
Finally, the resulting message leaves the machine over a network interface
for further processing by other machines.
Network Depending on the kind of network the originating machine is connected
to and the next chosen hop, the encoded message will traverse multiple phys-
ical networks. This might be a local WiFi network, or an ethernet LAN to
the next gateway connected to the Internet. Other possibilities include GSM,
DSL, modems, fiber cables and satellite connections. Whatever technology
is used, the message is very likely to be passed into an ISP’s backbone net-
work at some point in time.
If the next recipient is located at a different ISP, the message will conse-
quently also pass some IXP2, and/or NAPs3. These form central switches
where ISPs interconnect their networks.
From these places onwards, it is routed along a similar topology in order to
reach the specified host for which it is addressed.
Hops and Relays Most anonymizing networks make it mandatory to forward a
message over one or more other nodes before passing it to its final destination
– or at least the purpose of an anonymizing network suggests to do so. At
each of these nodes the message is transformed, decrypted, re-encoded and
possibly re-encrypted, much like the processing done at the originator. Also,
depending on the network, the message may be stored and withheld before
being forwarded for some amount of time. Only after this handling took
place, the message is send to the next node or the final destination.
1In the remainder of this work we will not distinguish between servers, personal computers,
mobile phones, PDA, etc.
2Internet Exchange Points.
3Network Access Points.
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Some deprecated network protocols, like Crowds, require the intermediate
nodes to assist the original sender by choosing the next hop themselves4.
While this has a number of security implications, none of the currently de-
ployed systems requires this. One reason for this is that this feature required
users to place more trust in the forwarding nodes – however, this should be
reduced to the most possible minimum extent.
One of the most important differences of the forwarding nodes in contrast
to the original sender is that these nodes do their work without any human
intervention, i.e. all work is done by fully automated processes. Depending
on the message and protocol in use this might apply to the receiving end,
too; e.g., HTTP messages are usually handled by a server process, whereas
e-mails are typically targeted to be read by another human.
Network Depending on the anonymizing network and the sender’s preferences,
the last two steps might be iterated a number of times. Depending on the
network in question, the number might be deterministically chosen by the
user or the result of a process involving random variables.
Depending on the type of message, i.e. if the targeted entity is inside the
anonymizing network, or not, the last intermediary node has to pass the mes-
sage to the final recipient outside of the network.
Recipient’s Computer Arriving on the recipient’s device, the message is pro-
cessed a final time by hardware and software before it is presented to either
the user, stored on the disk, printed out or thrown away.
In case the message was received by a server process, the message will be
reacted upon in an automated fashion.
If the anonymity network and the type of message allow to return a reply, a
similar chain of events will take place in order to transport the reply back to
the originator.
On each of the stations above which a message is traversing can involve multi-
ple sub-steps.
In the following sections we describe in detail vulnerabilities and weaknesses
of anonymizing networks, i.e. in which ways an attacker can compromise an anon-
ymizing system and gain information about its users.
The only widely known academic work presenting a similar point of view, but
on a much smaller scale and less structured, was presented in [CDK01]. In con-
trast to this work, we take a structured approach on listing and discussing publicly
known attacks.
4Other networks allow nodes to add detours for messages. However, these still put the messages
back on their original track after a certain amount of time.
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To this end, we will start on the lowest layer, seen from a communication the-
oretic point of view: the physical hardware (Section 6.2). From there, we discuss
issues of operating systems (Section 6.3), which is followed by an examination of
problems of application layer software in Section 6.4. We continue with attacks
on the network layer (Section 6.5) and conclude with non-technical attacks (Sec-
tion 6.6) and theoretical results (Section 6.7). As an outcome of the discourse, we
will be able to build an attack tree in Section 7.1 on page 117.
6.2 Attacks on Hardware
Anonymizing networks are built as overlay networks. Accordingly, they require
some kind of software, i.e. an application, for their operation. This application
runs on top of an operating system which in turn is run on hardware. In order
to ensure a secure and trustworthy application the operating system as well as the
hardware have to be secure and trustworthy, too. This is called the chain of trust.
To state it as a general problem: it is in most circumstances very hard, if not
impossible, for an application to determine if one of the lower layers, like the oper-
ating system, are compromised by an attacker. This is especially true for applica-
tions with restricted privileges which do not possess the capabilities which would
be necessary to delve into the lower layer’s depths. The extent of this problems
difficulty can be illustrated by this example: it is even hard for a human adminis-
trator with full system privileges to determine if a system is compromised by an
attacker, hence it is much harder for a piece of software. Another point underlining
this is that there is its own discipline of computer science, namely digital forensics,
dealing with these kind of problems.
Therefore we can conclude that if an attacker gains access to the lowest layer,
i.e. the hardware, he has access to a very powerful attack vector on a victim’s
computer.
Fortunately, this kind of attack requires physical access to the hardware in most
cases and is thus rather difficult to conduct, if the hardware is either safely stored
or located at a remote place. Another problem for attackers mounting attacks on
hardware is that it is usually impossible to automate the attack. That is, unless
the attacker produces the hardware and builds in deliberate back doors or sells
computer systems on a large scale5.
6.2.1 Attacks
Attacks on hardware traditionally include reading the victim’s screen either by
shoulder surfing or utilizing a hidden camera. These techniques essentially provide
5Compare e.g. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122366999999723871.html
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an adversary with a good overview of a victim’s actions. It is also possible to install
microphones to listen into (otherwise encrypted) Voice over IP conversations.
The victim’s input can be grabbed with hardware key loggers; these are very
small devices which are placed between the keyboard and the computer case and
can record up to two gigabytes of keystroke data6. There are versions which can
be soldered into existing keyboards such that there is no physical or electronic
presence detectable7 . Hardware key loggers give an attacker the opportunity to
gain access to a user’s passwords and arbitrary complex key phrases.
Other methods include extracting information directly from the memory of run-
ning or suspended computers [PP07b, HSH+08], or reading fragments of data from
a hard disk [FV04].
Of course, full access to network equipment gives a wide range of opportuni-
ties. These will, however, be discussed in Section 6.5 on page 106.
6.2.2 Discussion
These attacks imply high requirements on the attacker’s resources, especially on
his physical presence, but also on his budget, as they include the available of spe-
cialised equipment. On the other hand, they are very powerful. There is virtually
no defense against a well-placed hidden camera reading the screen of a user or a
keyboard recording all keystrokes.
Also, analysing hard drives has become one of the major information sources
for law enforcement agencies to prove that a suspected individual has committed a
certain action. Hence, if an anonymity set is getting small enough and its users can
be enumerated, it might be feasible for some adversaries to capture the devices of
all remaining participants. These seizures makes it possible to analyse hard disks
and search for digital evidence.
It should be noted that access to hardware cannot only be gained by means of
official search warrants, but also with burglary or social engineering. One possi-
bility for an attacker is to use some malicious software to tamper with an unwitting
end-user’s computer and then offer to repair it. As he inflicted the damage himself
it is trivial to removing the problem’s cause and the access can be used to plant
bugs into the respective PC.
Attacking laptops is even easier, as they might be accessible outside a victim’s
house. Depending on the hardware modification to be made it is enough to have
less than a minute of unattended time with the target’s hardware [Fin06].
In recent time, attacks on hardware have become even easier. This has two
main reasons: one is that hardware is increasingly becoming more and more “mul-
tiple purpose hardware” with software loadable firmware. With this mechanism
6These are devices which are available for commercial purpose (about US$80).
7About US$20, soldering equipment is extra.
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software is able to control the behaviour of hardware. One example of creating a
malicious back door in the firmware of a network card is demonstrated in [HM04].
The same authors also discuss ways to inject malware into a computer’s BIOS.
In the latter case the malware would be executed before any operating system is
started.
The second reason bears even more potential: hardware is becoming more
complex, i.e. is capable of more functionality than before. With this additional
complexity comes also danger, as it introduces new security risks8. This dan-
ger comes from faulty hardware, i.e. one in which the security mechanisms are
not implemented correctly; for example, some versions of recent Intel processors
included bugs which allowed access to arbitrary memory regions for any soft-
ware [dR07, Cor07]. These kind of faults allow malicious software to circumvent
any protection provided by operating systems which thrives to prevent that appli-
cation software tampers with other processes or the operating system itself.
Another danger arises from advanced hardware features, like hardware layer
virtualization. This can be used for transparent malware to operate on a com-
puter below the operating system, separated by a layer of hardware virtualiza-
tion [KCmW+06, Rut07]. Thus, it is not possible to detect this malware by con-
ventional means.
Finally, it is possible to use special hardware characteristics in order to learn
information over side channel attacks. One example is the Hot or Not-attack by
Steven Murdoch [Mur06]. In this attack Murdoch uses the fact that a heavily loaded
computer system produces more heat than an idle system. The temperature rise
then influences the internal clock of the computer in a way that can be detected
from a remote computer. In [Mur06] it is shown how this effect can be used to
identify users of anonymizing systems.
We can conclude that once an adversary has gained access to a user’s hardware,
the attacker has a plethora of powerful and stealthy methods to get all information
he is interested in.
6.3 Attacks on Operating Systems
As discussed in the previous chapter on attacks on hardware it is necessary for a
secure system to rest on solid pillars. In addition to hardware this specifically refers
also to the operating system of the computer that runs the software.
Modern operating systems make use of compartmentalization in order to pro-
tect themselves and other processes from malicious applications. Today’s hardware
provides operational modes which support different levels of privileges9 in order
to enforce these protection schemes. The typical goal of attacking an operating
8
“Complexity kills security”.
9This protection provided by the hardware may fail, see Section 6.2, page 97.
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system is to break through this protection and manipulate the functionality of the
operating system.
There are basically two methods for attacking the operating system: the most
common way is to first gain unprivileged access to a computer. This can be
achieved by means of, e.g., a faulty user-land application. Even if the adversary
targets a specific application on a computer, e.g., the software running the proto-
col for the anonymizing network, he might take advantage of any other software
running on the same computer. Typical examples are mail user agents, browsers,
instant messengers or web servers with interactive content. Once the attacker has
succeeded in compromising one of those he can attack the operating system as a
local user of the system. From this point on, an attacker can use local faults in
the system to breach kernel security. This act is called a local privilege escala-
tion. Once succeeded, the attacker is in control of a layer “below” the targeted
application and hence has arbitrary control over it.
Attacks utilizing trojan horses to gain (unprivileged) access to a victim’s com-
puter are technically related. Once the software is installed on the target computer
it provides the attacker with some access to the victim’s computer. Typical ways of
installing trojan horses include social-engineering techniques or peer pressure10.
The second way of compromising an operating system is by using flaws in
its implementation that interface directly to the network. Prominent examples are
errors in implementations of network stacks, like the TCP-stack. However the
security of network interfaces has been vastly improved in the last years and hence
these attacks became rather unlikely.
With access to the operating system, an attacker has essentially a similar set
of opportunities available as if he would have access to the hardware: some possi-
bilities include reading the screen and the keyboard, getting a copy of the network
traffic or copying the hard drive and the computer’s memory. The main difference
is that an operating system provides the attacker with unified, and thus more con-
venient, methods to access the data, as well as a ready network stack for remote
control and data transfer.
On the downside11, it is easier to detect a modified or misbehaving operating
system, than malicious hardware.
6.3.1 Configuration Errors
Although exploiting configuration errors requires as a unconditional precondition
an absent-minded administrator, attackers can still take advantage of these lapses.
Despite this, there are still rare conditions, at which an attacker can influence the
configuration of some software. For example, the default Tor implementation had
10See, e.g. http://www.skype.com/
11Seen from the attacker’s perspective.
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a vulnerability published in late 2007 in which an attacker could overwrite, and
hence control, the user’s configuration file.
Configuration errors can happen at operating system level, as well as for each
individual application. Both have potential impact to an attacker gaining access to
a computer.
Typical scenarios include software which is delivered “insecure by default”
and relies on the user to configure it correctly before usage. Prominent example
are most low-latency networks for anonymity: these require the user to configure
his browser to make use of, e.g., a proxy interface and turn off all active web
content like JavaScript, ActiveX, Java applets, etc. It is frequently reported that
unexperienced and inpatient users miss this step for various reasons, or do not
want to use the world wide web without active web content.
Another common mischief is the so-called DNS-leak: even if a user’s software
is correctly configured for proxy usage, there are chances that the application by-
passes this setting in order to make DNS lookups. These requests can in turn be
eavesdropped by a set of people and allow to trace the user’s connections despite
the actual data being anonymized. To a certain extent, this bug can even be trig-
gered by, e.g., malicious websites, by embedding parts of the websites with the
ftp-protocol; while all major browsers are capable of loading content over ftp,
there is a good probability that they will not use a HTTP-Proxy to fetch the con-
tent. Consequently data loaded by ftp will be fetched with the user’s original IP.
As we have seen, these issues have severe impact on the degree of protection.
However, it is most often beyond feasibility for an adversary to tamper with the
users’ configuration, even more, if a specific user is targeted. On the other hand, an
attacker can be sure that in a bigger network there will always be a certain amount
of mis-configured clients.
6.4 Attacks on Software
This section deals with one of the major attack vectors on anonymizing networks:
issues regarding implementation details of the actual software. Implementing any
software introduces a plethora of problems, most of which are known, but there
might also be a number of yet unknown problems. Some of these errors lead to
unpredictable behaviour, likely to crash the process. Others can be exploited by an
attacker to trick the software into doing arbitrary actions, other than those planned
by the developer.
For a basic overview on the possibilities which software vulnerabilities offer
an adversary, the reader is suggested to consult e.g. [HM04].
This chapter also deals with some attacks on algorithms that are used in anon-
ymizing networks. Algorithms are theoretical constructs which have to be imple-
mented in software to be used in, e.g., real networks. Therefore, there are at least
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two different ways to attack them. The first is to find an inherent deficiency in them
which consequently can be abused in all of their implementations12 . Or second, it
might be possible to find an implementation specific flaw13.
This section will discuss issues in the following order: we first list generic ways
of breaking software and their effects on a system. The ubiquity of these mistakes
is displayed with an examination of their relation to anonymity systems.
Given that an attacker cannot find and use these ways of compromising a sys-
tem, does not have the required capabilities or simply chooses to try different
means first, we then focus our view on methods to learn desired information even
in absence of generic implementation errors, i.e. by attacking the algorithms itself.
Finally, we describe even more possibilities for an attacker: this includes iden-
tification of specific types of software and form a last resort to identify users, even
if the algorithm for anonymization or its implementation do not leak sufficient in-
formation to succeed with an attack.
The section will be concluded with a small summary.
6.4.1 Breaking Generic Software
Even if algorithms used for anonymizing users’ network traffic would be perfectly
secure and all users would behave uniform, software errors could still compromise
their protection. This holds true since programming errors can be abused by attack-
ers to learn information or even get arbitrary control over other people’s computers.
The technical background of software errors was introduced in the terminology
section, 2.2.1 on page 15. Their presence rests mainly on the imperfection of hu-
man application developers, i.e. missing foresight of specific input and behaviour
patterns. This applies to any software in general, hence also to implementations of
anonymizing networks.
The ubiquity of software errors makes it today impossible to build a “secure
system”. One reason is that the complexity of modern software makes provable
security impossible. Also, the code base is growly rapidly, hence enlarging the
attack vector more and more. Today, the most reasonable approach to ensure a
certain baseline of security is to establish a process to handle security issues. This
refers to a procedure to handle the disclosure of problems, ordering them by pri-
ority, fixing them, testing the fixes and enrolling the fixes. These procedures grant
advantages over less organized ways of handling security issues.
However, even if there are established processes to deal with security issues,
these take time. Response to newly discovered vulnerabilities takes several hours
in the best case, sometimes up to multiple weeks. This leaves a large window for
successfully attacking computers. In case, an adversary discovers an exploitable
12One example would be a Man-in-the-Middle attack on the Diffie-Hellmann algorithm.
13See, e.g., the havoc which was caused by the OpenSSL-bug in the Debian distribution in 2008.
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Type Cost
Windows Vista Zero-Day Exploit $20,000 – $30,000
Application Level Exploit $4,000 – $5,000
Custom Trojan (stealthy) $1,000 – $5,000
Custom Malware (generic) up to $20,000
Fake identity $150 – $800
Account information $7 – $100
Table 6.1: Overview on the cost of vulnerabilities for arbitrary computers
vulnerability and actively makes use of this knowledge, his attack programs is
called zero day exploits. It is widely considered that it is generally impossible to
defend against this kind of attacks. Therefore, having access to, or being able to de-
velop zero-day exploits, gives an attacker the opportunity to successfully penetrate
nearly arbitrary computers.
There is an abundance of programming errors that can be found in virtually
every kind of application and operating system, most of them providing an at-
tacker with the ability to exploit them. Due to the prevalence of programs written
in C, the security landscape was dominated by buffer overflow vulnerabilities in
diverse forms – on the stack, heap, BSS-, or data segment. Together with other
vulnerabilities, like the format string vulnerability, this had led to a situation where
applications written in C are not considered trustworthy by a majority of computer
scientists.
Even with the advent of protection mechanisms like stack guards, the No-
eXecution bit to avoid code execution on a program’s stack, and even other pro-
gramming languages, computers are still vulnerable. A famous quote related to
this is [Dul00]:
[..] So it raises the bar for us all , but [that] just might make writing
exploits an interesting business again. [..]
Even if an attacker is unable to develop high-potential exploit by himself, he
can still buy them on a black market. A list of generic vulnerabilities and the
cost of a ready-to-use exploit on the black market are given in table 6.1 (taken
from [Nar06]).
Note that even next-generation programming languages did not change the se-
curity landscape. While some of them solved problems that existed in former pro-
gramming languages, most of them introduced a variety of new vulnerabilities. As
these programming languages have inherently more possibilities than C, their faults
are consequently also more dangerous and easier to exploit then errors in compiled
C-code. For example, a widely known study14 shows that more than 95% of web
14See http://www.webappsec.org/projects/statistics/
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applications, which are mostly developed in a “higher” programming language,
contain errors which can be exploited by an attacker.
While attacking server applications was the main focus in the 1990s and in
the beginning of the new millennium, today’s exploits are focused on client-side
applications. Thus, with an exploit for, e.g., a web browser (a cost of about $5,000)
and a website that is engineered to lure a victim into visiting it, it is possible to
execute arbitrary code on the victim’s computer. With this methods an attacker can
take over control of the victim’s computer and is able to not only get the victim’s
IP address and true identity, but, e.g., also read arbitrary information from the hard
drive.
That even high-security systems are vulnerable to attacks was prominently
shown in the public media in fall 2007: groups of supposed to be Chinese hackers
broke into computers of the German chancellor’s office, the Pentagon and British
military systems [Bri07]. However, it should also be noted that penetrating high-
security systems is harder than attacking the computer of an average end user. This
is of concern to anonymizing networks, as the relaying nodes are most often bet-
ter protected than end user’s computers, but still more vulnerable than high-end
systems.
We can therefore conclude that just with the use of software exploits, an at-
tacker is capable of breaking an anonymizing network. To this end, he must either
manage to break into a certain amount of network nodes or to exploit the victim’s
machine with the means of, e.g. a bait page. We can also see that an attacker can
compensate lacking skills with an adequate amount of money.
6.4.2 Breaking Anonymizing Algorithms
Given that the implementation of an anonymizing network’s algorithms are flaw-
less15, an attacker can still attack vulnerabilities in the design of the algorithms.
Hence, he can find inherent problems with the deployed algorithms which him to
infer supposed-to-be secret information.
In this section we will list several well-known and analysed attacks on anonymiza-
tion algorithms. These can be used by an attacker in order to gain more information
on the whereabouts of his target or to increase his chances of getting these.
End-to-end timing attacks make use of the fact that sometimes the same entity
might own the first and the last node of a connection through a circuit-switching
anonymizing network. In this case the entity can successfully link the data’s orig-
inator with the destination. Despite this weakness being publicly documented on
the Tor website, there were a couple of publications that re-discovered it [ØS06] or
which proved it to be possible under relaxed conditions, as described in [MD05].
While other networks, e.g., AN.ON, have not publicly been proven to be vulner-
able to this attack, it is very likely that these attacks work. However, there are
15See the previous section, 6.4.1 on page 100, for a discussion on this topic.
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some indications that end-to-end timing attacks are not as dangerous as commonly
perceived16.
One of the most dangerous and also most difficult attacks to defeat is the so-
called Sybil-attack [Dou02]. In this attack, the adversary mimics the behaviour of
a complete anonymizing network, tricking the user into believing that he has just
joined a set of other users, each one providing cover traffic – see also [KP06] for
a description on cover traffic. Variations of these attack are discussed for different
types of anonymizing networks in, e.g., [SDS02].
In order to create sufficient plausible identities an attacker is in need of man
power and hardware. A commonplace argument to defeat the Sybil attack is to in-
troduce a centralized check in anonymizing networks, to determine the participants
are actual humans to avoid automated multiple logins. On the other hand, as Table
6.1 illustrates, it is no problem for an adversary with enough money to provide a
sufficiently large set of fake identities.
In a scenario, where the attacker does not control all machines, but rather a high
percentage of some arbitrary machines, he is still able to attack networks. Bauer et
al. describe in [BMG+07] a method to use fake routing information for subverting
an anonymizing network.
Proposed protection mechanisms against these threats include enhanced rout-
ing algorithms which choose nodes in a way to make it very costly for an adversary
to control all of them. To this end, the assumption is made that even well-suited
attackers only have limited resources of special types, e.g., in IP ranges. Hence
paths can be chosen, where the relays are located in vastly different IP ranges.
However, from recent studies on bot nets it costs $0.05 to $0.10 per node to
rent a bot net [Zel07]. This invalidates the above assumption for attackers that are
willing to buy, rent or build a bot net.
But even attackers which do not like to get into touch with bot nets have oppor-
tunities to invalidate the above assumption: instead of using a multiplicity of slow
nodes, they can buy high-performing nodes in several countries. To rent a decent
server in most developed countries ranges from $100 to $500 per month; virtual
servers can be rented for as less as $10.
Another powerful attack on anonymizing networks is the predecessor attack
as described in [WALS04]. It uses the fact that in some routing protocols the last
node to forward a message is the actual originator of the message with a higher
probability than all other nodes in the network. The attacker can use this fact to ac-
cumulate this knowledge over time in order to proof sender-recipient relationships.
A detailed discussion on the efficiency of this attack can also be found in [PP06a].
The attacks as described in this section require the attacker to have a reasonable
coverage of the network, i.e. he is in need of a certain physical influence. Conse-
quently, attackers fulfilling the requirements are in a very powerful position: if an
16http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Sep-2008/msg00016.html
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adversary is capable of mounting this kind of attacks there is only a very limited
set of defense mechanisms to deploy.
6.4.3 Identifying Software
Given that the implementation of an anonymizing network is secure and its algo-
rithms are strong enough to resist an attacker, the possibility remains to identify
users or their computers on the application layer. As a method to protect infor-
mation leak on the network layer does not change application layer data17, it is
possible to profile users in accordance to this information.
This means that an adversary who is operating an exit node of a network or
one of the user’s peers, can try to learn information about the anonymous user by
finding characteristics in the user’s application layer data. This profile can then be
used in order to either re-identify the user at another place, or shrink the anonymity
set to a size which allows an identification of the user in real life.
Profiling on the application layer usually works on characteristics of the data
that is sent as additional information by client software. For example, web browsers
send sets of data to the web server concerning the user’s setup, even though this
information is not necessary to process the request. These headers (an example is
given in Figure 6.2) contain hints about the operating system of the user, software
versions, possibly the language of the user, as well as accepted file types and encod-
ings. They also show which web-site the user visited before, so that an adversary
can easily follow the trail of a user through the web.
Figure 6.2: An example HTTP-Request with a highlighted set of privacy-related
information
While the provided information are rarely unique enough to identify a single
person, they allow to cluster users in groups. Statistics over the most prominent
field User-Agent show an entropy of about 6.5 bit for more than 3 million different
user agent strings18.
17Due to adherence to the ISO/OSI-layer or network layer stacks in general.
18Data collected for the duration of 15 months on a medium-sized e-Commerce site.
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<html>
<head>
<title>Hallo-Welt-Beispiel</title>
<STYLE #header {margin-bottom: 3em;}
html>body #header {margin-bottom: 1em;}
body { color: purple; background-color: #d8da3d }
html>body {color: #d8da3d; background-color: purple;}
</STYLE>
</head>
<body>
hello
<font color = "purple"> You are not using Iceweasel </font>
<font color = "#d8da3d"> Your browser is Iceweasel compatible </font>
</body>
</html>
Figure 6.3: Identification of the user’s browser based on its rendering capabilities
However, removing this information does not lead to a situation, where the
user is safe from being profiled. Is it trivially possible to profile software by its
individual behaviour. The reason for this is that different software acts differently
on some kinds of requests, e.g., because it does not implement certain features. An
example is shown in Figure 6.3: depending on the user’s browser rendering engine
only one of the texts is visible. If both texts contained a link, the server would
know the user’s browser based on which link was clicked.
Typically, this technique makes use of “strange” requests and observes the ac-
tual behaviour of the implementation. Amongst other observations, the order of
fields and response codes can be used to identify implementations even if obvious
information, like user agent strings, are removed or faked.
The most powerful way of analysing a browser is active web content. A good
example of information that can be retrieved by active web pages is given at http:
//gemal.dk/browserspy/. This attack vector can be abused to identify users, as
can be seen in [ALLP07].
The most privacy invading technology however is Javascript, as was demon-
strated with Spyjax19: a small piece of Javascript code that uses CSS and HTML
rendering in an invisible part of the screen. It can be user to determine if the user
visited any given site recently. Other information to retrieve with Javascript include
the user’s timezone and the computer’s clock skew, i.e. how much its time deviates
from the actual time.
Last, but not least, it is possible to identify users based on their writing style,
grammar, typos, or similar information (e.g., [ZLCH06]).
19http://www.merchantos.com/makebeta/tools/spyjax/
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Thus, even given the fact that the data streams of an user are anonymized in
a perfect way, users will be distinguishable from other each other based on their
software characteristics. Therefore, a good technique to hide would be to fake (or
better: actually use) the software that is most common in the set of people that
comprise the anonymity set.
6.4.4 Summary
In this section we covered the possibilities for an adversary to learn information
about a user by means of abusing software. We described three main fields: generic
software faults, breaking anonymization specific algorithms and identifying users
based on their software.
6.5 Network-based Attacks
Attacks on the network layer adhere to the established focus on anonymity re-
searchers. For this reason there is an extensive list of works in the area of attacks
on the network layer, mostly focusing on information that can be gained by third
parties observing messages.
A small survey of traditional network-based attacks in this area is given by
Wright in [WALS02]. However, this work is somewhat outdated and a number of
very powerful attacks have been found and published after 2002. With the estab-
lished attacks discussed first we prepare the ground for an overview on the more
advanced attacks.
The attacks we present in this section are listed into increasing order of their
required preconditions. Hence we first start with a set of rather simple, but possibly
highly efficient denial-of-service attacks. These can usually be mounted even by
remote attackers, not involved in running or participating with the attacked network
at all.
The number of possible attacks grows with an increasing physical influence
of the attacker. Hence we then discuss locally bounded attackers and those which
are close to the victim’s peer or the peer itself. We then continue with ISP-scale
attackers and finally cover attacks which are feasible for a global adversary.
6.5.1 Denial of Service
The objective of denial of service (DoS) attacks in our context is to make it as
hard as possible for victims to use the anonymizing network; if this succeeds, the
victims have to either stop communicating or use plain means of communication
which will reveal their peers. Basic methods to achieve a shutdown of the service
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include shutting down the network or preventing the users from connecting to it in
the first place.
There are several ways of setting up denial-of-service attacks. Any user in the
Internet can try to shut down a network using central infrastructure by making the
servers which are obligatory to connect to inaccessible. Possible attack vectors
of the network can be, for example, a central directory service which lists the ad-
dresses of the nodes in the network. Another vector are the nodes themselves, in
case the attacker can cope with their number.
“Taking down” can be achieved by rather unsophisticated means as bandwidth
exhaustion. This means that the attacker sends a high volume of requests to the
targeted computers, such that they are too busy to answer legitimate requests. In an
extreme case, the network link to the attacked computer would be utilized in such
a high manner that no legitimate packets would even reach the attacked computer.
Other possibilities include attacks on the routing protocols which change the path
of messages such that messages to the target are routed into an empty space, or
even redirecting DNS requests by spoofing or poisoning. The biggest problem
with these attacks is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to protect against
them. Any networks which rely on centralized infrastructure are highly vulnerable
to this kind of attack.
Real-life examples of this attack include attempts by the Chinese government
to restrict access to the Tor network and attempts from the Iranian government to
stop accesses to AN.ON.
For an local administrator or ISP there are more elegant, but also more trivial
means of blocking access to anonymizing networks. In addition to blocking ac-
cess to certain IPs and (TCP-)ports, an administrator also has the opportunity to
inspect the content of a victim’s data streams and decide to redirect or drop con-
nections that look suspicious or similar to a network protocol that is being used for
anonymization. Attacks of this type can ultimately only be thwarted by steganog-
raphy.
ISPs or hosting servers can also cause problems for networks by cutting the
lines of nodes. An easy way to detect anonymizing nodes is to take a look at the
amount of traffic: participants, but especially also relaying nodes, have a high usage
of bandwidth, which is often equally distributed into upstream and downstream.
This characteristic is easy to spot and very distinctive. An alternative method is to
forbid the use of these services by legal means, i.e. in the contract with the clients.
For this see also Appendix A.3 on page 148.
Finally, governments are capable to outrightly make the use of anonymous
communication illegal. This has a direct effect on users and operators within the
given legislation. The only remaining possibilities would be the use of infrastruc-
tures which are not primarily related with anonymity, e.g., open proxies and open
relays. Also, the use of other people’s unprotected WiFi access points can be of
use in this case.
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Finally, governments can try a “FUD” tactic, i.e. spread fear, uncertainty and
doubt along the lines of privacy enthusiasts in order to break the willingness of
contributing nodes to an anonymizing network. Possible actions in this area include
confiscating nodes of the network or filing lawsuits against their operators to reduce
the size of the targeted anonymization network. However, as long as there is a
significant amount of nodes outside the legislation of nations practising this, the
effect of these techniques is negligible.
6.5.2 Local Area Networks, and Local Attackers
Anyone between the user and the first hop of the network, like the user’s local ad-
ministrator, can try to identify the type of traffic anonymized by the user with the
help of statistical traffic pattern analysis. This has been shown to work for web
traffic, to the extent that attackers can identify certain webpages accessed by the
user due to characteristics in volume of and the delay between single data pack-
ets [Ray00, Hin02].
Follow-up research was conducted by Serjantov and Sewell who analysed the
general properties of hiding connections in anonymizing networks [SS03]. They
identified a set of preconditions under which packet counting attacks were feasible
for an attacker and could be used to identify individual connections. They also
discussed briefly countermeasures which, however, are impractical to deploy in
large-scale systems.
A new type of attack has been presented by Murdoch and Danezis in [MD05]:
A remote attacker can send probing messages through the anonymization network
in order to gain information about the path of an victim’s message through the
network. With the help of this attack, which is nearly transparent to the victim,
the attacker can trace him down to the first node of the network. If the victim is
participating as a node himself, it is even possible to identify the user. This attack
reduces the protection of low-latency networks like Tor, which should provide a
rather high practical level of security, to the protection provided by a single proxy
hop.
While this attack on its own can only rarely be used to identify end users, it
was significantly enhanced in [HVCT07]. The authors show how to accumulate
knowledge about the network latency between an user and several nodes in the
network, as well as how this can be used to clearly identify the physical location of
a user.
End-to-end traffic confirmation attacks have been used in [ØS06] to identify IP
addresses and identities of location-hidden servers in the Tor network. To this end,
an attacker builds several connections to the hidden service, which in return has to
start building up virtual circuits through the Tor network. This behaviour is due to
the specifications of the Tor protocol for hidden services. By deploying as little as
a single node as a relay in the network, the attacker has a certain probability for
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each of this connections to be chosen as first hop in one of the hidden services’
paths, thus learning the true identity of the server providing the hidden service.
6.5.3 Exit Nodes and Peers
Most of the users of an anonymizing network hide their identity from their peer
partners while communicating with network protocols like HTTP and e-mail. Even
though traffic is encrypted within the anonymizing network, it is in often without
encryption when it leaves it. This gives the opportunity for the end node operator
to read or change all data exiting from the network or being returned as a response
to one of the anonymous requests20.
The reason for this attack to work is that the security model of anonymizing
networks only covers routing information. This means that the protocols are de-
signed to keep the relaying nodes from learning the complete path through the
network. If the protocol is designed correctly the nodes may be partially untrusted
by the user and hence there is no problem, if one node is operated by an untrusted
party.
However, the actual content of the message is not encrypted per se. This is
not a problem in networks which only transmit messages within themselves, like
Freenet. But there are networks, most notably Tor and I2P, which offer access
to arbitrary webpages. Here, the protocols of the network itself are insufficient
to provide protection because they do not offer protection of the content. While
unprotected HTTP can be considered a minor security issue if only professional
ISPs are forwarding packets between the two entities, anonymizing networks offer
anyone the opportunity to forward messages on behalf of others and hence also
record their content.
This means that any exit node which might be operated by an untrusted entity,
is in a position to eavesdrop personal data from users21. The attacker can use this
data in order to profile users and commit identity theft or impersonation attacks.
This refers not only to personal data deliberately entered by the user: name, address
information, his language, etc, but also includes data contained in the header fields
of communication protocols (also described in Section 6.4.3).
Given that an attacker does not only resort to passive techniques, he can in-
crease the odds on identifying a victim. An exit node, but also a peer partner, can
inject active content into data in order to force the victim’s software to bypass the
anonymizing network. Practical instances of this class of attacks have been shown
to work in, e.g., [For06, GAL+07]. The results were devastating: the success rate
was far beyond 90%, allowing to identify an significant amount of the network’s
20As a side remark it should be noted that there is a share (of unknown size) of users who perceive
that anonymizing networks “magically” encrypt and secure all of their communication.
21Under rare conditions it is possible to detect attackers logging data [MBG+08]. However, if
properly mounted this attack cannot be detected.
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users. Encryption of content does avoid that a malicious exit node tampers with
the traffic, but a peer partner will still be able to conduct these attacks.
Even if the content is encrypted exit nodes are still able to to tamper with the
connections to a certain extent: if the cryptography used is too strong to be bro-
ken, the adversary can simply block all encrypted connections, effectively resulting
in an denial of service attack. Another possibility includes an active man-in-the-
middle attack on the secured connection. While this relies on the user to ignore the
warning of a strange SSL-certificate, in fact, studies found that more than 90% of
users does so [SDOF07].
6.5.4 ISP-Scale Networks
ISPs have a significant amount of network connections under their control, multi-
national ISPs may even control a significant part of the complete Internet. This
rises significantly the potential of an ISP to prohibit a user from accessing an anon-
ymizing network by means of denial of service attacks.
In addition, it has been shown by Murdoch in [MZ07] that controlling a single
central hub of the Internet is sufficient to deploy timing and correlation attacks.
This even holds true, if the attacker is able to intercept only a fraction of all traffic
running through the hub, like one out of 10,000 data packets.
6.5.5 Wide Area Networks and Global Attacker
For reasons described in Section 5.1 on page 73, the traditional focus of researchers
in our area has been an adversary which is able to observe all communication lines
in a given network. Therefore, the majority of (older) works on vulnerabilities of
anonymizing networks focuses on this view.
Some publications make the simplifying assumption that an attacker cannot
see all messages passing between nodes of the network. Hence, in some of these
papers the network itself is modelled as a single entity processing messages. The
input to this entity consists of messages generated by the users, while the output
consists of the users’ message to their peers.
Intersection attacks form a very powerful class of attacks in these scenarios.
They are capable of extracting information about users based on repeated commu-
nication with a similar pattern of behaviour. By exploiting traffic patterns, statis-
tical characteristics, or similar features, it is possible to break even systems which
provide perfect protection in each single round.
Seemingly unobtrusive differences like the number of hops which are used to
forward messages have been shown to leak enough information for adversaries
[BPS00]. Other methods known to work include the analysis of the view which
a user has on a given network [GKK05]. If users know different sets of nodes,
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for example because the directory service of a network only releases a part of the
nodes rather than all of them, this can be used to partition the users into smaller
anonymity sets.
Kesdogan discovered an attack which identified a user’s peers by making use
of a distinctive feature of mixes: each output batch contains only a single message
from each user [KAP02]. This information allows an attacker to extract the peer
partners using a two-staged algorithm: the disclosure attack. Mitigation of this
attack is very difficult because the basis for each user sending only a single message
per batch is an actual security feature to prevent Sybil attacks (see Section 6.4.2).
While the complexity of the disclosure attack was NP-complete, Danezis pro-
posed a probabilistic version of it that possesses polynomial run time [Dan03]. Due
to the nature of being a statistical attack, the result could be wrong with a certain
probability, based on the amount of observations available to the adversary.
This attack was taken up by Mathewson and Dingledine in [MD04] and con-
siderably improved. Besides relaxing the preconditions of the attack and therefore
broadening the scope of applicability, they also showed simulations of this attack
in real systems and also in mix systems with other than fixed-sized batch mixes.
The next step was the development of the hitting set attack [KP04]. Similar
to the previous intersection attacks, this work made use of intrinsic properties of a
mix, i.e. the fact that each batch has at least one contribution per participating user.
This allowed an even further relaxation of preconditions for intersection attacks.
Another major advancement is that an attacker now does not necessarily need to
know the number of a victim’s peer partners in advance. Also, this attack works,
if there are several contributions of a user to a batch. Compared to the disclosure
attack, the run-time behaviour was also improved: with the help of an oracle that
guessed the peer partners using the available information in polynomial time, it is
now possible to check the validity of the guess in O(nlogn); therefore, delivering
results with less than exponential time effort.
Other attacks on mix networks use signal-detection techniques in order to link
incoming and outgoing streams. Danezis showed in [Dan04] how to apply one
instance of this attack on continuous time mixes. A side result of this work included
the proof that they were actually providing an optimum level of anonymity in the
given scenario. There were also other improved results in the same year presented
in [DS04].
In contrast to the works listed above, [LRWW04] considered an attacker which
would not only record passively messages, but also delay certain messages. The
resulting attack could be used in low-latency anonymizing system in order to gain
information about specific connections.
Whereas most attacks had been developed and evaluated on simulated users, re-
sults on real data were presented in [KPK05]. The applicability of two intersection
attacks was shown on data collected from real users. It showed that users actu-
ally acted quite diverse and the success of the attack largely depends on the type
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of user. [KPK05] also provided an empirical classification of users into several
groups, ranging from casual surfers to power users and even automated scripts.
The latest improvements on intersection attacks extended the model of mix
networks. While formerly only uni-directional communication was considered,
the works [DDT07, Pim07] analysed the effects of bi-directional communication.
The results were yet another improvement on the speed and time complexity of
attacks. Specifically [Pim07], which itself is computationally cheap, can also serve
as a pre-processing step for more complex attacks which would not be feasible
otherwise.
Summing up the various options of all possible attacks for global adversaries,
i.e. timing attacks, intersection attacks, and pattern matching, it can be concluded
that it tends to be very difficult, if not impossible, to defend against an attacker who
can observe large parts of a network. In fact, the Tor project deliberately names the
global attacker as one of the adversaries which they do not try to cope with.
6.6 Non-technical attacks
This section covers a short list of attacks on anonymizing networks that do not
require an attacker to learn technical details of the system, or to keep the amount
of technical parts in the attack to an absolute minimum.
The main reason for including this section is twofold: besides being an eye-
opener for real-world vulnerabilities there are sometimes technical means that can
be used in order to mitigate or at least reduce the impact of some of these attacks.
One of the major threats in general IT security is the fact that virtually all
systems can be accessed by and are controlled by human beings. Therefore, ma-
nipulating the humans which control the machines is sometimes the easier way to
get access to the secrets kept in the computer. This can be done in several ways,
depending on the effort, time and resources available to an attacker.
While non-technical attacks are usually of very high potential, they can only
rarely be automated by an attacker like a computer attack can be automated. Thereby
the cost of this attacks, especially the cost of repeated or multiple non-technical at-
tacks, is quite high compared to technical attacks.
6.6.1 Physical Attacks
Getting physical access to the computers has been discussed in Section 6.2. Similar
powerful attacks can be conducted, if the adversary gets physical hold of some
computer’s administrator.
A ruthless attacker is capable of using physical force in order to coerce an
administrator to provide him access to the machine. Possibilities range from slight
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psychological force on one side to delivering arbitrary amounts of physical harm in
the extreme case. A famous example of excessive force happened in March 2005,
when in Malaysia thieves not only stole a car, but also cut off the owner’s finger as
well, since the car was protected by a biometric system22.
On top of physical treatment, practices like blackmailing, taking hostages, any
other way of extortion (e.g., if the target person owes a lot of money, has uncom-
mon diseases, or is addicted to anything) could be used in order to put administra-
tors under pressure.
In our context this attack is usually directed at the operators of the network’s
nodes or central infrastructure. The more power and influence a single person has
to the network, like operating the directory service or a significant amount of nodes,
the more an attacker might be tempted to attack this person. If the attacker knows
one of the communication’s peer partners, then this attack can also be applied to
this person in order to learn the identity of the second.
Mitigation of these attack is easily possible for node operators, i.e. staff which
relays messages on behalf of others. With dedicated hardware and a special setup
it is possible to run anonymization software on a node such that it is autonomous,
keeps no logs and destroys all material and data if the computer is shut down or
disturbed. However, this is only possible, if the software of the network does not
require signed certificates or access to the private part of a public/private key pair.
Peer partners that know (parts of) the true identity of a possible victim can-
not easily be protected by means of IT technology and have to rely on plausible
deniability instead.
6.6.2 Legal Attacks
Another way for an attacker to force node operators or end users to hand over
information is to force them to comply by legal force23.
The easiest way to learn a piece of desired information which is not accessible
due to a certain technical protection is to ban the use of this technique. This also
applies to anonymizing systems. The effect is that all law-abiding users within the
legislation have to either communicate without such a system or face the potential
consequences. This is similar to a denial-of-service attack on the system (see Sec-
tion 6.5.1 on page 106), but technically allows people to continue usage in face of
possible consequences.
An alternative for governments to control the use of anonymizing systems is
key escrow, i.e. a set of laws to force users to decrypt enciphered data streams
22http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4396831.stm
23There might be countries, where the actions described in the previous Section 6.6.1 on the pre-
ceding page can be considered legal means for secret services or the police. See
http://www.amnesty.org/ or http://www.hrw.org/ for further information.
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on request of law enforcement agencies24 . Since anonymizing networks heavily
rely on cryptographic techniques in order to achieve their security properties, the
protocol is getting transparent for an attacker who is able to decrypt the messages.
However, practical limitations of this include that depending on the implemen-
tation of the network, relaying node might not log any data which can be used to
trace connections back. Therefore the attacker, in this case a government, would
have to store the content of suspected anonymous communication streams himself.
A technical measure against decryption of stored traffic data is the use of encryp-
tion algorithms with perfect forward secrecy (see Section 2.2.3 on page 21 for an
explanation). This is a feature which is supported by, e.g., Tor, but not AN.ON.
On the other hand, in order to avoid “problems” with perfect forward secrecy,
some countries like, e.g., France and the United Kingdom [Koo08], introduced
penalties for users which are not capable of decrypting data streams at a later time.
Therefore, it might not be desirable in these countries to relay data which is subject
to perfect forward secrecy.
A third way for an attacker with access to legislation is to implement a coun-
try wide interception of data traffic, log-file surveillance, or similar techniques.
While these methods are usually not useful for instant identification of anonymized
communication streams, they can be a suitable help to gain more insight into the
network if any other data is leaked. A prominent example of this approach is the
European directive on data retention [Eur06] and especially its German implemen-
tation.
6.6.3 Social Engineering
Finally, attacks that manipulate human behaviour without the victim recognizing
this as an attack are the most powerful version of non-technical attacks. This
class includes so-called social engineering. The potential of social engineering
was shown and documented by, e.g., Kevin Mitnick [MS05].
In the course of an social-engineering attack the attacker pretends to be a dif-
ferent person or to have different motives than his actual ones. The goal of this
attack is to trick administrators or users into arbitrary actions which support the
goal of the attacker.
The range of possible actions which can be achieved start with users revealing
passwords and access codes. This is commonly pulled off by the attacker pretend-
ing to be a legitimate system operator or official person. Faked surveys have also
been proving to be an excellent method [ORBO04].
Another option is to ask users to install a certain piece of software which was
modified by the attacker and thus gives him access to the users data. For example,
24Note that there might be legal inferences due to the right of not having to self-incriminate oneself.
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the user can be told that this particular software is a better instant messenger, or a
quality-enhanced version of another program the user has installed.
Even experienced, alert and security-aware users might still unintentionally
reveal single pieces of critical information. This includes IP addresses, personal
information, telephone numbers, or the like. With the help of this, an attacker
can either identify the weakest point in a defense system, or he can impersonate
that person and attack other persons. Commonly, information acquired by social
engineering is also used to ease brute forcing attacks on passwords or encryption
keys.
Tracing and defending against social-engineering attacks is very difficult, due
to several factors: obviously, the attacked persons often do not recognise the attack
in the first place. As has been shown in Table 6.1, the cost for a fake identity is also
marginal. Thus even if an adversary has to enter buildings in order to enhance the
effect of his attack, he is able to impersonate arbitrary fake identities. Hence, once
he left the physical premises, there might be no more trace of the attack left.
The high potential of social-engineering attacks is also underlined by the fol-
lowing fact: even in professional penetration tests it is easy to get information with
this kind of attacks. However, the working morale of the staff will be destroyed,
if the results of the penetration test will be published within the company. Even
though anyone could have been the target, the single person which was successfully
exploited is socially isolated. Due to this, the Federal German Office for Security
in Information System (BSI) recommends not to use social-engineering practices
in penetration testing [Bun06], with the sole exception for national high-security
areas.
6.7 Theoretical Results on Attacks
Despite this work’s focus on real and deployed networks, we discuss a selected set
of theoretical results on attacks in this section. The presented set was selected based
on their significance for either confidentiality as a general concept or anonymizing
systems in special. One difference between these works and others attacks on
anonymizing networks is that these works measure the basic feasibility of attacks,
regardless of the involved system and algorithms. Hence, their results can be used
to estimate firm lower bounds on the security of systems.
Shannon analysed the theoretical feasibility of attacks on cryptographic sys-
tems in [Sha49]. He showed that there is a bound, the so-called unicity distance.
All messages which are shorter than or equal to this length and enciphered with a
secret key, are safe from being attacked. In this seminal work he uses information
theoretic measures to prove the security of encryption algorithms.
A similar idea was taken up in [KP05], where a lower bound has been shown
to exist for mix networks. This bound, which consequently was also referred to
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as “unicity distance”, was compared to existing attacks on the same abstraction
layer. The results showed that it had an adequate behaviour for a lower bound. The
results also proved that for users with a fixed communication profile there is no
perfect protection possible by a mix network: at some point in time the profile can
eventually be extracted from pure passive observation.
These results were backed up in [KAPR06], where it was shown with a differ-
ent method that a lower bound for security exists and that it can be used to make a
couple of security-related statements about mix networks.
Finally, a set of open theoretical problems to be solved can be found in [Ray00].
6.8 Summary
We have seen in this chapter that there is a multiplicity of attacks on anonymizing
networks. In addition to the attacks on the network layer which are discussed in the
traditional literature on anonymizing networks, we have listed attacks on hardware,
the operating system, software and non-technical attacks.
It is interesting to notice that a couple of these attacks could have be mitigated
or the impact could have been reduced by proper design of the anonymizing net-
work.
Future research in this area includes at least:
• Of course, defense mechanisms against the most serious attacks would need
to be found.
Is there anything which can be done to avoid the severe impact of faults in
“lower layers” of a system? This includes hardware, the operating system
and software issues.
To which end is it actually possible to limit the abuse potential of active web
content?
• Identification of even more attacks on deployed systems would also help to
design better systems in the future. It is likely that more places leak infor-
mation.
Especially the application layer has yet not undergone extensive research and
it is unclear to which extent the plethora of individual software is compro-
mising network layer protection.
Also, local and partial attackers have not received extensive attention yet.
Fingerprinting websites is probably only one method to extract information.
• Users seem to be one of the weakest part in the system for two reasons:
first, they are highly susceptible to be influenced; but also due to the typical
repeating patterns of their communication.
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In order to make it more difficult for attackers system designers would need
to know typical schemes of user behaviour and find methods to protect them.
• Security properties are not additive in the general case, but maybe attacks
are. Is there a way to combine arbitrary attacks into more dangerous attacks?
• Identification of upper- and lower bounds of attacks would be of significant
help.
In the next chapter we will take the input from this and the previous chapter,
i.e. our observations on attacks and attackers in order to do a risk analysis and
security evaluation of anonymizing networks.
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Chapter 7
Considerations and Conclusion
In this chapter we use the input and results of the previous chapters for two pur-
poses: first we elaborate the holistic security of anonymity systems. Second, we
use this information to draw conclusions about the importance of future research
areas within this topic.
We finish this work with a summary.
7.1 Attack Tree
Based on the chapters on attacker models (Chapter 5) and attacks (Chapter 6) we
build and evaluate a holistic attack tree in this section. To this end we make a brief
analysis of the attack tree under various conditions. For one, we will identify the
attacks which pose the biggest threat today. But we also try to see beyond that and
identify possible scenarios of serious future attacks.
For us it is not a viable approach to list all attacks and order them by their cost.
This is because of the huge number of possible attacks and resulting combinations.
Hence, any such list would not be meaningful and comprehensible.
Instead, once we identified the most effective attack we remove essential nodes
from the attack graph such that this attack is not possible any more. The evaluation
is iterated on the resulting graph until no more successful attacks are found. This
provides us with a more legible list of attacks. To a certain extent, this also models
the behaviour of system designers and programmers which discover vulnerabilities
of their system and start to fix these. However, it is impossible to model the impact
of yet-unknown weaknesses.
The survey on attacks on anonymizing networks provides us with one part of
the input needed to build an attack tree. This is a generic representation of different
ways to compromise a system. It was first proposed by Schneier in [Sch00] as a
tool for risk analysis and evaluation of security properties.
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An attack tree can be used to find ways of minimal effort to attack systems. The
disadvantage of attack trees is, however, that there is no methodology to ensure its
completeness. This means that if the creator of an attack tree has disregarded an
attack (possibly because it was not known publicly by the time of the creation)
the results of the attack tree’s evaluation can be misleading. Therefore, one should
always keep in mind that there could be a number of new attacks to a system, which
are to be published in the future, but could already be known to an adversary of the
system.
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Figure 7.1: Attacks on Networks
To give a short overview over the attacks which we presented in the previous
sections, we created Figure 7.1. It bases on Figure 6.1 on page 92, but we inserted
the attacks as listed in the previous chapter into the picture of the message’s flow.
Red attacks can be found in the “traditional” literature on anonymizing networks,
while the blue ones are the attacks which we added in this work.
With this input, we build the attack tree as presented in Figure 7.2 on the fac-
ing page. This is a graphical representation which is constructed from the list of
attacks. Note that due to visual cluttering of the complete data, we clustered at-
tack techniques with similar preconditions and outcome into single points of the
graph. It should be noted that all nodes are “or-style” nodes. This means that it is
sufficient for an attacker to fulfill a single out of several prerequisites in order to
proceed a path with several possible input situations.
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Figure 7.2: An attack tree on anonymizing networks
The attack tree’s source is the general opportunity and motivation of the at-
tacker to attack the system, depicted in red on the left-hand side. Starting there, we
list basic categories and subcategories in green. These stand for classes of attacks
as resembled by the structure of Chapter 6. The actual attacks are depicted in yel-
low and white boxes. Attacks which are very unlikely to be noticed by a victim
are painted yellow; those which have a non-negligible probability to be detectable,
are painted in white. The paths finally lead to possible results of attacks, which are
painted in blue.
We identified four different types of results for an attack, which can be divided
into two groups: the first consists of the results “More Influence” and “Denial of
Service”. While increasing influence on the anonymizing network does not help an
attacker per se, these attacks can be used as step stones to either simplify denial-
of-service attacks, or to reduce the degree of anonymity and continue with more
elaborate attacks. If an attacker chooses to deny users access to the network, he
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has reached an end point in the graph. From this point on it is up to the user
to decide whether to continue communicating or not. While in the first case his
profile will be revealed to the attacker, the information remains secret in the latter
case – however, the user is prone to have no means of communication until the
adversary is defeated or can be circumvented.
The other group of results are formed by “Reducing the Degree of Anonymity”
and “Breaking the System”. Both are instances of the same result, but with different
degrees of success. Namely a “Break of the System” means that the adversary has
learned all necessary information and is in a position where he can accomplish all
his goals. The other is a partial result, where the attacker can exclude a number of
users from the anonymity set, or has other information that can be used to link a
couple of information. Hence, repeated, continuous, or several attacks with partial
results can possibly be combined into a single total attack that breaks the system.
The main difference between these two groups of attack results is that the user
is aware of ongoing attacks in the case of denial-of-service attacks. This gives
the user an opportunity to stop communication before a critical system breach is
achieved. However, in the other case, it might not be noticeable to the user that
an attacker has just compromised the system and learns his identity as well as the
identity of his peers. Even if the user noticed such an attack, it is too late for any
reaction.
7.1.1 Data Conversion
The attack tree as given in Figure 7.2 on the previous page, is only for limited use
in algorithms. Therefore, we need to refine the conceptual attack tree into a more
detailed one. We also have to estimate the cost and effort for each single attack in
order to calculate the cost and effectiveness of a staged attack, i.e. a series of single
attacks, where the previous attacks are used as step stones for the latter attacks.
There are two main reasons for focusing on staged attacks: first, only a very
limited set of attacks on anonymizing networks will lead to immediate success.
Fortunately, these attacks have strong preconditions and thereby they cannot be
easily mounted on real systems. Second, there is nearly no academic coverage on
compound attacks on anonymizing systems, i.e. the effect of an attacker that is
capable and willing to launch a set of attacks.
For this evaluation we defined a format in which attacks could be formally
described in terms of preconditions and requirements, as well as their outcome and
results. As an example, the definition of an end-to-end timing attack is given in
Figure 7.3 on the facing page.
The format starts with a unique identifier, in this case “EndToEndTiming”. This
is followed by a set of preconditions. These are represented by a list of attributes,
which can be compared to any other attribute or numerical constant; boolean values
can be represented by, e.g., the numerical values zero and one.
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EndToEndTiming \
requires PresenceLocal=1, PresencePeer=1, ManPower>=1, \
ComputationalPower>=2 \
results ManPower-=1, ComputationalPower-=2, TotalBreak=1
Figure 7.3: Example declaration in the attack-tree definition
In this example, the attacker needs to be present at the first hop of the cir-
cuit (PresenceLocal=1) and the end of the circuit (PresencePeer=1). He needs
to have one node for each of these (ComputationalPower>=2), and an operator
(ManPower>=1) for both. The outcome of this attack is that the time of the operator
has been spend (ManPower-=11), the computers were busy (ComputationalPower-=2),
but the system is broken with respect to this victim (TotalBreak=1).
One part of the resulting attack trees can be seen in Figure 7.4 on the next page.
The attack trees themselves, however, need to be set within the context of a
specific anonymizing network, in order to produce results. To this end, we chose a
representation of attributes for a representation of the network which is compatible
to the notation used above. We also consider the setup of the networks to be static
for the duration of an attack.
In order to analyse attack paths with multiple attacks, we need to iterate through
the attack tree multiple times: for one given input we get a set of possible follow-
up situations, one for each possible attack. Due to the multiplicity of outputs and
the resulting exponential state explosion, we need to cap the searching depth to a
fixed limit. In our case we could evaluate all attack trees which considered staged
attacks of up to nine single attacks.
After an attack with minimal cost has been identified, the node which is most
relevant to this attack is removed from the attack tree and another iteration is started
to find the next best attack. This is repeated until no more attacks are found to be
possible.
7.1.2 Results
An overview of the results is given in Tables 7.1 to 7.4. The tables list the best
attacks a given attacker can mount on a certain anonymizing system.
These tables are then summarized in Table 7.5 on page 125. To this end, we
created a weighted sum of the occurrences. As numerical results can be misleading,
we labelled the results according to the relative result of this calculation.
It is immediately obvious from Table 7.5 that a number of these attacks are
definitely out of the scope of our topic: developing a secure operating system and
1We use compound assignment operators to denote increasing or decreasing values. “-=” is for
decreasing values, whereas “+=” increases values.
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Figure 7.4: A part of the modified attack tree.
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Attacker Attacks
External Party 3x Denial Of Service Attack On Node
Peer Analyse Network Latency, Profiling
Local Administrator Packet Counting, Analyse Network Latency
Local Administrator Blocking Access On IP Level
Local Administrator Physical Treatment
ISP 2x Denial Of Service Attack On Node, Sybil Attack
ISP Active Attack On TLS
ISP Attack Network Stack, Develop OS Zero Day
Secret Service Develop OS Zero Day, Attack Directory Service
Secret Service Ban Anonymizing System
Secret Service IXP Level Attacks
Table 7.1: Best attacks on “AN.ON”
Attacker Attacks
Peer Analyse Network Latency, Profiling
Local Administrator Packet Counting, Analyse Network Latency
Local Administrator Blocking Access On IP Level
Local Administrator Physical Treatment
ISP Active Attack On TLS
ISP Attack Network Stack, Develop OS Zero Day
ISP Insert Traffic To Worse User Experience, Undirected Phys-
ical Treatment, Enlist Users
Secret Service Undirected Physical Treatment, Enlist Users
Secret Service Use Many Court Order Forensics
Secret Service Develop OS Zero Day, Attack Directory Service
Secret Service Ban Anonymizing System
Secret Service IXP Level Attacks
Table 7.2: Best attacks on “I2P”
secure applications are two of those. However, mitigating the consequences of
these is a valid target.
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Attacker Attacks
Peer Analyse Network Latency, Profiling
Local Administrator Packet Counting, Analyse Network Latency
Local Administrator Blocking Access On IP Level
Local Administrator Physical Treatment
ISP Active Attack On TLS
ISP Attack Network Stack, Develop OS Zero Day
ISP Insert Traffic To Worse User Experience, Undirected Phys-
ical Treatment, Enlist Users
Secret Service Undirected Physical Treatment, Enlist Users
Secret Service Use Many Court Order Forensics
Secret Service Develop OS Zero Day, Attack Directory Service
Secret Service Ban Anonymizing System
Secret Service IXP Level Attacks
Table 7.3: Best attacks on “Mixmaster”
Attacker Attacks
Local Administrator Blocking Access On IP Level
Local Administrator Physical Treatment
ISP Active Attack On TLS
ISP Attack Network Stack, Develop OS Zero Day
Secret Service Develop OS Zero Day, Attack Directory Service
Secret Service Ban Anonymizing System
Secret Service IXP Level Attacks
Table 7.4: Best attacks on “Tor”
7.2 Conclusion
In the last section, we identified a number of dangerous attacks on anonymizing
systems. The three most dangerous attacks are vulnerable software, a central di-
rectory service and blocking access to the network. Another dangerous class of
attacks are physical attacks.
Attacks which are relevant to “traditional” research in this area, i.e. network
layer analysis and active attacks on the network layer, were only marked with
“medium” severeness.
In order to enhance the security of anonymizing networks we therefore propose
to conduct research to find countermeasures against the more dangerous threats.
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Potential Attack
very high Buy OS Zero Day
very high Attack Directory Service
very high Blocking Access On IP Level
high Physical Treatment
medium Analyse Network Latency
medium Denial Of Service Attack On Node
low Attack Network Stack
low Social Engineering Of Alice
low Active Attack On TLS
low Packet Counting
low Develop OS Zero Day
low Profiling
low Ban Anonymizing System
low IXP Level Attacks
low Attack Other Software At Alice Computer
low Several Hardware Attacks
rather low Develop Zero Day
rather low Buy Zero Day
rather low Attack Webbrowser
rather low Undirected Physical Treatment
rather low Enlist Users
rather low Use Many Court Order Forensics
rather low Host Bait Page
rather low Insert Traffic To Worse User Experience
rather low Sybil Attack
Table 7.5: Rating of attacks based on tables 7.1 to 7.4
While it is beyond the scope of this work to derive and analyse solutions to all of
these problems, there are some basic directions which seem promising:
Missing software security and vulnerable software can possibly be handled by
similar solutions as untrusted node operators. Distributing the trust amongst
a high variety of different software platforms is a good start to avoid that a
single vulnerability can compromise large parts of the network.
For similar reasons it seems promising to have a fair number of completely
different implementations of a given service.
Also, keeping the complexity low is another point to ensure that software
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will not become too complex, not manageable and hence vulnerable. Using
well-known building blocks and libraries instead of proprietary solutions can
help to reduce the effort of building secure software.
The most advanced system with regards to these points today is Shallon.
Directory Services are amongst the most weak points of an anonymizing system.
The use of a central system does not only comprise a single point of failure
for availability reasons. It also trivially allows to identify users of the system.
In the worst case, if the central directory is compromised, an attacker is able
to commit arbitrary harm to any of the users.
In any case, there has been no publicly known research dedicated to creating
a secure, performing and anonymous directory service. This lack should be
filled rather sooner than later.
Moving to a de-centralized structure, like Tor, where a set of globally dis-
tributed people run the directory seems to be a good idea. Also, the use of
distributed hash tables for the distribution of information should be more
thoroughly investigated.
Blocked Access is, as can be seen in China and Iran, already a hot topic today.
There also exists a small amount of research related to the problem to make
anonymizing networks harder to detect and more difficult to block.
However, perfect protection is likely to be infeasible: as long as an adversary
can get access to the software there will be a way to find and shut down or
block nodes of the system. Still, methods might be identified to make this as
difficult as possible.
Physical Assaults on users go hand in hand with unobservability. If an adversary
is not able to identify the users of a network, and also if the traffic of a user
cannot be classified into belonging to an anonymizing network, it is highly
unlikely that an adversary will resort to physical assaults.
This means that for those users which actually have to defend themselves
against adversaries which do not refrain from physical force, there is a de-
mand for unobservability.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter we used the input of the previous work to discuss and identify a set
of serious vulnerabilities in today’s anonymizing networks.
We found that contemporary systems suffer from highly dangerous attacks de-
spite the fact that these are usually considered to be “out of scope”. However, in our
opinion it is possible to defend against these by broadening the scope of research
on enhanced anonymizing networks.
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Appendix A
Mailinglist Extracts: Hosting
provider misbehaviour
The following emails were send on the open german mailing list exitnodes@
lists.ccc.de. However, as there is no publicly available archieve, we included
emails which are of relevenace to this work in this appendix. Where appropriate,
the emails were shortened in order to save space; in this case the original text has
been replaced with “[..]”.
As the major nodes of anonymizing services are not run by academic institutes,
mailinglists are the major source of information on events around Tor nodes.
A.1 Thread on OVH
Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2008 14:57:02 +0200
From: "Karsten N." <tor-admin@privacyfoundation.de>
To: exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Warnung vor OVH
Hallo Exit-Node-Liste,
vor kurzem haben wir noch den ISP OVH aufgrund der guten Anbindung und
des bisher problemlosen Betrieb von TOR-Servern empfohlen.
Seit ein paar Tagen sind die TOR-Exit-Nodes "gpfTOR4" und
"humanistischeunion1" von OVH blockiert.
Die Server sind nicht gekündigt, sie laufen noch, aber OVH blockiert
vollständig den Zugriff auf die Server. Es kommt kein Bit mehr durch.
Diesen Zustand will OVH bis zum Ende der Vertragslaufzeit aufrecht
146
A.1. THREAD ON OVH 147
erhalten.
Grund für die Blockade von gpfTOR4 ist der Download einer einzigen
urheberrechtlich geschützten Datei via BitTorrent über TOR. Folgender
Auszug einer E-Mail reichte OVH, um die Blockade zu veranlassen:
> > Title: Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare
> > Infringement Source: BitTorrent
> > Infringement Timestamp: 10 Jul 2008 16:40:18 GMT
> > Infringement Last Documented: 10 Jul 2008 16:40:18 GMT
> > Infringer Username: Infringing Filename: Call of duty 4 [PC-DVD]
[English] [www.topetorrent.com]
> > Infringing Filesize: 6789794354
> > Infringer IP Address: 91.121.26.150
> > Infringer DNS Name: gpftor4.privacyfoundation.de
> > Infringing URL: http://tracker.prq.to/announce
Es gibt keine Möglichkeit der Stellungnahme von unserer Seite zu den
Vorwürfen und keinen Hinweis, wer da behauptet, die Datei wäre auf
unserem TOR-Server bereitgestellt worden.
Dieses kundenunfreundliche Verhalten soll ab sofort Standard bei OVH
werden und betrifft nicht nur BitTorrent Downloads, siehe:
http://forum.ovh.de/showthread.php?t=4356
Beide Server liefen mit der Default-Exit-Policity, die typische
BitTorrent-Ports blockiert.
Karsten N.
From: Sven Anderson <tor@kaputtendorf.de>
To: exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Warnung vor OVH
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 17:26:48 +0200
[..]
So eine Mail ist bei mir auch schon mal angekommen, und ich habe es
zunächst auch für eine Falschaussage gehalten, da ein Tor-Client ja
nur aktiv Verbindungen aufbauen kann und so nichts zum Download
anbieten kann. Ein Test hat dann aber ergeben, dass selbst Clients
hinter NAT oder eben Tor sehr wohl Dateien zum Download anbieten
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können. Bittorrent-Clients bekommen über den Tracker mitgeteilt,
welche anderen User noch einen bestimmten Teil einer Datei benötigen
und bauen dann gelegentlich selbst eine Verbindung zu diesem anderen
Client auf, um das Dateisegment hochzuladen. So gesehen kann auch ein
Torrent-Client hinter Tor eine Datei zum Download anbieten.
>Beide Server liefen mit der Default-Exit-Policity, die typische
>BitTorrent-Ports blockiert.
Das funktioniert aber leider nicht. Die P2P Verbindungen, also die
eigentlichen Dateitransfers, laufen auf beliebigen Ports, und können
so nicht blockiert werden.
Da mich dieser Filesharing-Abuse sowieso genervt hat, habe ich im
Wesentlichen nur noch Port 80 und 443 in der Exit Policy geöffnet.
Sven
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2008 14:39:59 +0200
From: "Karsten N." <tor-admin@privacyfoundation.de>
To: exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Warnung vor OVH
Dr. Morpheus schrieb:
> Ein Unding; ich zahle bei Hetzner im Monatszyklus.
>
> Dann musst du wohl außerordentlich kündigen und Herausgabe der
> restlichen Monatsraten fordern (§ 812 BGB), etwaigen Schadensersatz
> würde ich mir auch nicht entgehen lassen.
OVH hat soeben fristlos gekündigt:
Zitat aus der Kündigung: "Ein Anspruch auf Erstattung der
vorrausbezahlten Beträge besteht nicht!"
> Schnapp dir einen Anwalt, denn SO geht das nicht.
Das werden wir tun.
Karsten
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A.2 Hosting provider kills processes
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2008 16:14:48 +0200
From: Jens Kubieziel <maillist@kubieziel.de>
Cc: exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Tor-freundliche ISPs?
* Martin Schobert schrieb am 2008-06-21 um 16:47 Uhr:
> mich wuerde interessieren, bei welchen ISPs Ihr Tor-Knoten betreibt und
> inwiefern Eure Erfahrungen mit den ISPs aussehen. Habt Ihr Stress, weil
> Ihr zu Traffic verbraucht? Hostet jemand bei einem ISP, der nicht
Ich habe bei Xantron Tor auf einem vServer laufen gehabt. Irgendwann
starb der immer ab. Nachdem ich zuerst von einem Bug in Tor ausging (war
aktuelles SVN), kam ich dann drauf, dass der Provider offensichtlich
einen Cronjob (sic!) laufen hatte, der alle Prozesse mit dem Namen "tor"
killte. Andere Leute haben mit dem Provider ähnliche Erfahrungen
gemacht.
Momentan läuft ein Server bei Manitu (hostblogger.de). Da das noch recht
neu ist, kann ich keine pos. wie. neg. Angaben machen.
> behauptet, der Traffic sei flat, sondern konkrete Limits angibt, z.B.
> Host-Europe? Ist so ein Provider ggf. entspannter?
Diverse Provider reden von Flat, meinen das aber nicht. Ich hatte vor
längerer Zeit mal eine Umfrage gemacht. Nahezu alle gaben mehr oder
weniger offen zu, dass man als Kunde dann eher unerwünscht ist.
> Benutzt jemand Methoden, um den Traffic zu reduzieren, um so dem
> Provider oder dem eigenen Geldbeutel entgegenzukommen? Oder ballert ihr
Ich begrenze den Traffic so, dass ich monatlich an das monatliche
Maximum komme (i.d.R. <2TB) und dem Netz mind. 100kB zur Verfügung
stelle (sofern das die Leitung hergibt).
> Welche ISPs wuerdet Ihr empfehlen und von welchen abraten?
Richte dich nach der Liste auf
<URL:https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs> und
pflege die nach Gelegenheit auch.
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2008 00:11:41 +0200
From: "Hendrik P." <mlists@zankt.net>
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To: Jens Kubieziel <maillist@kubieziel.de>
Cc: Martin Schobert <martin@weltregierung.de>, exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Tor-freundliche ISPs?
Ich habe auch seit ca 2 jahren einen Tor-Middelnode bei Xantron laufen
und kann es nur allen Abraten.
Wie Jens schrieb werden Prozesse mit dem Namen "tor" gekillt.
Wenn der Traffic weiterhin anhaelt wird der traffic auf 100kByte/s
gedrosselt, Wenn die Technik/der Service irgendwann mal auf die Mails
antworten wird es dementiert...
Incoming ist nix gedrosselt, outgoing auf 100kByte/s nennt meinereiner
durchaus gedrosselt. Wenn man per mail 5 mal den Techniker losschickt
und nichts findet geht auf einmal outgoing 200kByte/s und das obwohl
"nix" gefunden wurde und die traffic einbussen wohl durch die anderen
nutzer kommen...
Also es wird alles versucht einen los zu werden, da es dem tor-prozess
dennoch geling ein bisschen traffic zu machen lauft der kasten halt
weiter.
Um Xantron als serioesen Hoster zu bezeichnen muessen die noch einiges
tun :)
[...]
A.3 Hosting providers do not allow anonymizing services
Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:40:18 +0200
From: Muelli <Muelli@cryptobitch.de>
To: Jens Kubieziel <maillist@kubieziel.de>
Cc: Martin Schobert <martin@weltregierung.de>, exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Tor-freundliche ISPs?
[...]
Nun die Antwort von Manitu:
On 03.02.2008 13:53 manitu (Support) wrote:
> Hallo Herr Müller,
>
> um es kurz zu machen: Wir sind zwar für den Datenschutz (das wissen
> Sie), allerdings haben wir uns aus anderen Gründen gegen TOR-Server in
> unserem Rechenzentrum entschieden.
>
> Die Nutzung von Servern als TOR-Server ist entgegen unserer AGB.
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>
> Ich vermute, dass sich die restlichen Fragen damit erledigt haben,
> oder?
>
> Viele Grüße
> Manuel Schmitt
From: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
To: exitnodes@lists.ccc.de
Subject: Re: Tor-freundliche ISPs?
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2008 18:39:05 +0200
Hi.
On Thursday, 3. July 2008, Olaf Selke wrote:
> die Motivation waere spannend zu erfahren. Liegt es am Traffic oder
> am Aufwand fuer das Abuse Handling falls als Exit Node betrieben? Ich
> vermute letzteres.
Bei mir sah die Antwort auf eine ähnliche Anfrage so aus:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> * Ich plane, eine TOR-Node[1] zu betreiben. In Ihren AGB konnte
> ich keine Ausschlussklausel o.ä. finden, da ich aber ungern
> allzu häufig umziehe: Ist das für Sie ein Problem?
ehrlich: Ja. Prinzipiell ist es nicht ausgeschlossen, aber wir haben
hier ungern die Kripo rumlaufen ... :-|
Gegenfrage: Ist das für Sie ein Problem?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mein TOR-Server läuft seitdem bei EUserv. Seit einem DDOS auf den
Rechner (auf den EUserv mit IP-Wechsel reagiert hat, der leider einige
Tage gebraucht hat) vorerst allerdings nurnoch als middleman.
Die Story dazu war allerdings ganz lustig: Ein paar Tage vorher gabs
eine Beschwerde an die Abuse-Adresse mit dem Zusatz, man werde falls
nötig selbst dafür sorgen, den bösen Rechner aus dem Netz zu kicken.
Meine Vermutung: Da hatte sich wohl jemand mittels TOR mit einem
Botnetz-Betreiber angelegt...
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